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INTRODUCTION
Frequently throughout the history of warfare, widespread rape
has been associated with war.' It has been alleged in recent years
that rape and sexual assault by military personnel in peacetime
also constitute problems of substantial magnitude.2 This Article
seeks to examine the relationship between sexual assault, combat,
and military organizations. Toward that end, the Article first com-
pares military rape rates with civilian rates in peace as well as in
war. In the light of those crime-rate comparisons, the Article then
offers policy analyses and proposals with a view to reducing the
incidence of rape by military personnel.
1. See infra note 5.
2. See infra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
RAPE AND THE MILITARY
The research conducted for this Article indicates that the
peacetime rates of rape3 by American military personnel4 are
actually lower (controlling for age and gender) than civilian rates.
However, the data also indicate that peacetime military rape rates
are diminished from civilian rates far less than are military rates
of other violent crime. A similar phenomenon is also reflected in
the wartime data collected: Military rape rates in the combat the-
ater studied climbed to several times civilian rates, while military
rates of other violent crime were roughly equivalent to civilian
rates. Thus, in both the wartime and the peacetime contexts stud-
ied, a rape differential exists: The ratio of military rape rates to
civilian rape rates is substantially larger than the ratio of military
rates to civilian rates of other violent crime.
The existence of a military rape differential in war and in
peace suggests that it may be possible to reduce military rape
rates, perhaps bringing them into line with military rates of other
violent crime. This Article considers whether and how such a
reduction in military rape rates might be achieved.
Part I examines peacetime and wartime data, which both
reflect the rape differential. Part II then considers means of reduc-
ing military rape rates. It considers possible underlying causes of
the rape differential and appropriate responses to those underlying
factors. In particular, Section II(B) explores the hypothesis that
the rape differential may result in part from certain aspects of
military culture: Military organizations are composed of bonded
groups of individuals who come to share a set of group norms-a
culture. As is discussed, the norms currently prevalent within mili-
tary organizations include a configuration of norms regarding mas-
culinity, sexuality, and women that have been found to be condu-
cive to rape. To the extent that such military cultural factors con-
3. This Article focuses specifically on rape by military personnel. However, research
in this field suggests that the causal factors affecting rape share common features with
the factors affecting sexual harassment. See, e.g., Carl A. Bartling & Russell Eisenman,
Sexual Harassment Proclivities in Men and Women, 31 BULL. OF THE PSYCHONOMIC
SOC'Y 189, 191 (1993) (finding common characteristics associated with rape proclivity and
sexual harassment proclivity). For that reason, the observations made in this Article are
in part applicable to sexual harassment by military personnel.
4. It is anticipated that the patterns of rape incidence identified in the present study
may be shared by the military organizations of many nations and cultures. However,
because the empirical study reported in this Article is a case study of the American mili-
tary only, further empirical work will be required to test the hypothesis that the rape
differential described herein is generalizable to other nations and cultures.
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tribute to the military rape differential, changing those normative
aspects of military culture may foster a reduction in the incidence
of rape by military personnel.
Part III attempts to identify policy choices that would facili-
tate the contemplated changes in the gender and sexual culture of
the military. Contemplating such a fundamental change in military
culture gives rise to a critical question: Can the gender and sexual
norms of military organizations be changed without reducing mili-
tary effectiveness? Or, put differently, are the norms in ques-
tion-the gender culture of the military-integrally related to
military effectiveness? That question is addressed in Part IV,
which explores the functions of the gender culture of the military
and considers the implications for military effectiveness of making
changes in that culture. In identifying the existence and likely
contributing causes of a rape differential within military organiza-
tions, the Article points to a set of previously unexamined consid-
erations that should be taken into account in shaping military law
and policy.
I. RAPE BY MILITARY PERSONNEL
Rape by military personnel occurs in the two very different
contexts of war and peace. It is commonly assumed that the per-
vasiveness of rape in war results in some way from the nature of
war itself: "War is hell," and one of its concomitants is rape.5 But
5. Certainly, rape in war is pervasive. Perhaps surprisingly, rape victims in war
commonly include not only enemy civilians and troops but also allied and national civil-
ians and even comrades in arms.
The tragedy in the former Yugoslavia provides recent examples of rape in war. See
Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Report of the Spe-
cial Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., Annex II,
Agenda Item 50, at 63-75, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50 (1993); Roy Gutman, Serbs' Rape
of Muslim Women in Bosnia Seen as Tactic of War, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 23, 1992, at
Al; Carol J. Williams, Balkan War Rape Victims: Traumatized and Ignored, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 1992, at Al. The European Community estimated in its January 8, 1993 Report
that 20,000 Muslim women had been raped by Serbian forces. See Jeri Laber, Bosnia:
Questions About Rape, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 25, 1993, at 4; Rape Was Weapon of
Serbs, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1993, at Al. Such estimates can be subject to
considerable inaccuracy, but may nevertheless provide some initial indication of the mag-
nitude of the problem.
Although Muslims and Croats are also guilty of widespread war-related rapes, see
Lance Morrow, Unspeakable, TIME, Feb. 22, 1993, at 48, numerous reports appear to
indicate that Serbian soldiers may have been under orders to rape, pursuant to a deliber-
ate Serbian military policy. See id. The Serbian case would not be unique with regard to
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the involvement of the national government in mass rapes by military personnel. The
Japanese government has recently admitted that forced-prostitution centers, called "com-
fort stations," were established and run by the Japanese military pursuant to official
governmental policy, prior to and during World War II. See James Sterngold, Japan
Admits Army Forced Women into War Brothels, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993, at A2; Teresa
Watanabe, Japan Admits That WWII Sex Slaves Were Coerced, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993,
at Al. Estimates of the total number of women forced into sexual slavery at Japanese
"comfort stations" range from 70,000 to 200,000. See Leslie Helm, Human Rights: Kore-
ans Won't Let Japan Bury "Comfort" Issue, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1992, at A3.
Rape also is common in wars where there is no evidence of an official policy to
rape. During the Rwandan war and genocide of 1994, thousands of women and girls
were raped in a most brutal and inhuman manner. See AFRICAN RIGHTS, RWANDA:
DEATH, DESPAIR AND DEFIANCE 748-97 (rev. ed. 1995). In the Vietnam War as well,
horrific descriptions of widespread rape were reported-by veterans as well as oth-
ers-without any suggestion that an official policy was involved. See, e.g., SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 87-118 (1975); VIETNAM
VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, THE WINTER SOLDIER INVESTIGATION 13-14, 29, 44,
53-54, 94 (1972).
The victims of rape in war are not exclusively "enemy" civilians or troops. Allied
and national civilians and troops also are assaulted. For example, rape of French women
by American soldiers in World War II was sufficiently pervasive to cause General
Eisenhower's headquarters to issue a directive in December 1944 to U.S. Army Com-
manders announcing the General's "grave concern" and instructing that speedy and ap-
propriate punishments be administered. See JOHN COSTELLO, LOVE SEX AND WAR 143
(1985).
Civilian women in Peru recently have been subjected to widespread rape by mili-
tary troops of their own country-apparently without regard to which "side" in the war,
if any, with which the women may have been associated. As described in a publication
of Human Rights Watch:
Throughout Peru's 12-year internal war, women ... have been threatened,
raped and murdered by government security forces; and women have been
threatened, raped and murdered by the Communist Party of Peru-Shining
Path. Often, the same woman is the victim of violence by both sides.
See AMERICAS WATCH & THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, UNTOLD TERROR: VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN PERU'S ARMED CONFLICT 1 (1992). For additional examples of rape
of civilian women by military troops of their own countries, see BROWNMILLER, supra, at
81; Christine Chinkin, Peace and Force in International Law, in RECONCEIVING REALITY:
WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 203, 203-06 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993).
Not only allied and national civilians but also comrades-co-members of the same
military units-are raped in theaters of combat. A preliminary study of female Vietnam
veterans estimated that as many as 29% of the American military women who served in
Vietnam were the victims of attempted or completed sexual assaults. See The Counseling
and Other Needs of Women Veterans Who Were Sexually Assaulted or Harassed While on
Active Duty and VA's Ability to Respond, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Veterans'
Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1992) [hereinafter Counseling and Other Needs of Women
Veterans] (statement of Dr. Jessica Wolfe, Associate Director, National Center for PTSD,
Behavioral Science Division, Dep't of Veterans Affairs). (It should be noted, however,
that this testimony reported only preliminary findings of an unpublished study. See Letter
from the office of Jessica Wolfe to author (July 26, 1994) (on file with author). In addi-
tion, the 29% estimate in the Wolfe study is based not on data drawn from a random
sample but on data drawn from a set of women who volunteered to participate in the
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this "c'est la guerre" view of rape in war may in fact hide more
than it reveals. As is examined below, influences particular to
military populations appear to affect the incidence of rape by
military personnel in peacetime as well as in war.
To distinguish the effects of war on rape rates from the ef-
fects of military service on rape rates, we must examine not only
rates of rape in war but also rates of rape by military personnel in
the peacetime context. For that reason, this section compares the
rape incidence of military and civilian populations using peacetime
as well as wartime data.
A. The Rape Differential
Rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment by military per-
sonnel has been a focus of increasing concern in recent years.
Some claim that sexual assault, including rape, within the United
States military is a problem of substantial proportions;6 and some
argue that sexual assault may be more pervasive among military
personnel than among civilians.7 Several witnesses at Senate hear-
ings in 1992 alleged that the extent of sexual assault within the
U.S. military is significantly underestimated because reporting is
informally discouraged and because reports that are made are fre-
quently swept aside.8
survey. Id. That self-selection of respondents may, of course, introduce some bias into the
data.) During the Persian Gulf War period, 24 female American military personnel were
raped or sexually assaulted by male American soldiers, according to official reports. See
John Lancaster, 24 Women Assaulted in Gulf Duty, WASH. POST, July 21, 1992, at Al
(reporting six rapes, four attempted rapes, and fourteen indecent assaults). One self-report
victimization study of female American Gulf War veterans found that approximately 8%
of respondents had experienced attempted or completed sexual assault during their Gulf
War deployment. Jessica Wolfe et al., Self-Reported Sexual Assault in Female Gulf War
Veterans (Nov. 1992) (paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Ass'n for Ad-
vancement of Behavior Therapy). Wolfe et al. state that the 8% sexual assault victimiza-
tion rate of women deployed in the Gulf War represents "nearly a ten-fold increase over
rates obtained using female community samples." Id. Wolfe et al. do not state whether
those community samples control for age differences in military and civilian populations.
Again, the 8% figure in the study is based on a set of self-selected respondents rather
than on a random sample, which may introduce bias into the data.
In sum, rape in war is pervasive. It may be officially permitted or forbidden. Its
victims include civilians as well as troops, allies, and sometimes even nationals as well as
enemies.
6. See Counseling and Other Needs of Women Veterans, supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., id. at 382 (statement of Christine Courtois).
8. See id. at 12, 13 (statement of Diana Danis); id. at 24 (statement of Jacqueline
Ortiz); id. at 26 (statement of Barbara Franceo); id. at 28, 33-34, 38-39 (statement of
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Many have pointed to the events at the 1991 Tailhook con-
vention as illustrative of a broader problem of sexual assault with-
in the military. At that convention of Navy and Marine aviators,
at least ninety people (eighty-three women and seven men) were
sexually assaulted one or more times by U.S. military men.' The
Department of Defense Inspector General's report on Tailhook
'91 makes clear that these events were not an aberration. As the
report states, "Our investigation disclosed that gauntlet-related
indecent assaults dated back to at least Tailhook 88.2 0 It has
been widely suggested that the incidents of sexual assault at the
1991 Tailhook convention represent the small visible tip of an
underlying iceberg of military sexual assault.
In fact, however, little is known about the actual extent of
sexual assault by military personnel because little data on this
issue has been collected." A large-scale study of active duty mili-
tary personnel conducted by the Defense Manpower Data Center
in 1988 found that 5% of the female respondents and 1% of the
Kelley Richard).
Of course, it is also frequently remarked that rates of sexual assault are underesti-
mated in the civilian context. The author is aware of no systematic comparison of the
relative accuracy of military and civilian estimates of sexual assault rates. For further
discussion of military and civilian rape reporting and recording rates, see infra note 33.
9. See INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, TAiLHOOK 91, PART 2: EVENTS
AT THE 35TH ANNUAL TAILHOOK SYMPOSIUM VI-13 to VI-14 (1993); see also David
Ballingrud, Assaults Tarnish Navy Group, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 17, 1992, at IA;
John Lancaster, Navy "Gauntlet" Probed, Sex Harassment Alleged at Fliers' Convention,
WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1991, at Al.
While other forms of sexual assault were reportedly pervasive, no allegations of
rape at Tailhook '91 have been reported.
For a critique of some aspects of the Department of Defense Inspector General's
Report on Tallhook '91, see William H. Parks, Tailhook What Happened, Why & What's
to Be Learned, PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 1994, at 89, 101.
10. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supra note 9, at VI-3; see also John
C. Bahnsen, Do We Need a Few Good Men?, PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 1994, at 59, 59 ("Ac-
cording to my good Navy sources, Tailhook '91 was not an unusual Tailhook get-togeth-
er, except for a larger turnout of women pilots.").
11. See Counseling and Other Needs of Women Veterans, supra note 5, at 10 (state-
ment of Diana Danis); 1990 NAVY WOMEN'S STUDY GROUP, AN UPDATE REPORT ON
THE PROGRESS OF WOMEN IN THE NAVY 111-28 (1990) ("The incidence, the reporting,
and the actions taken regarding sexual assault/rape are not fully captured in any Navy
data base."); Gary A. Warner, Rape In Military: Vexing Problem, but Difficult to Mea-
sure, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 11, 1992, § A, at 1; Gary A. Warner, Pentagon Has
No Clearinghouse for Data on Rape in Military, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 18, 1992, §
A, at 18; cf. 1990 NAVY WOMEN'S STUDY GROUP, supra, at 111-23 ("The lack of a data
base and a common punitive charge for sexual harassment inhibits command oversight
and trend analysis.").
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male respondents stated that they had been the victims of actual
or attempted rape or sexual assault during the previous year.
12
While that study indicates that the majority of perpetrators of all
forms of sexual harassment reported were other military person-
nel,13 the specific ratio of military to civilian perpetrators of
rape/sexual assault is not stated. Because the purpose of the study
was to measure victimization of military personnel, it did not seek
to estimate rates of rape/sexual assault perpetration by military
personnel. Thus, it did not examine, for example, rape/sexual as-
sault of civilians, American or otherwise, by military personnel. 4
In sum, rather little is known about the extent of rape or
sexual assault by military personnel. This Article attempts to make
some meaningful comparison of the rape incidence of military and
civilian populations. Toward that end, this study compares the
rates of offenses committed by male U.S. military personnel 5 and
civilians in peacetime and during World War II (WWII). 6
12. MELANIE MARTINDALE, DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER, SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT IN THE MILITARY: 1988, at xiii (1988). The "actual or attempted rape or sexual as-
sault" category, though rather broad, was not further subdivided in the study.
Some commentators have noted that the Martindale study has the limitation that it
did not provide for respondent anonymity, which may have resulted in underreporting.
Wolfe et al., supra note 5, at 1.
13. See MARTINDALE, supra note 12, at 32-34.
14. A 1989 Navy study of sexual harassment rendered results similar to those ob-
tained in the 1988 Defense Manpower Data Center study. See AMY L. CULBERTSON ET
AL, ASSESSMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE NAVY: RESULTS OF THE 1989 NAVY-
WIDE SURVEY (1992). The Navy study, like the Defense Manpower Data Center Study,
sought to measure victimization of, rather than perpetration by, military personnel. For
that reason, the Navy study shares the limitations of the Defense Manpower Data Center
study.
15. This Article does not examine officer and enlisted military personnel separately.
A separate examination of those two populations would be valuable in subsequent re-
search.
16. World War II was chosen for study because it is the most recent war, other than
Vietnam, for which data were available in which the United States was engaged for a
prolonged period, and in which troops had extensive contact with civilians. The Korean
War was not chosen for study because of difficulty in obtaining relevant data. See Letter
from Maria T. Hanna, Reference Librarian, Suitland Reference Branch, Nat'l Archives, to
Kenneth W. Bullock, Research Assistant to author (Oct. 14, 1994) (stating that relevant
records from Korean war are not indexed and may or may not exist) (on file with au-
thor). Vietnam was not chosen for study because its levels of low troop morale, particu-
larly during the latter part of the war, would presumably influence crime rates. See Col.
Robert D. Heinl Jr., U.S.M.C., The Collapse of the Armed Forces, ARMED FORCES J.,
June 1971, at 30, 30 ("The morale . . . of the U.S. Armed Forces [in Vietnam] are, with
a few salient exceptions, lower and worse than at any time in this century and possibly
in the history of the United States."). The Persian Gulf War was not chosen for study
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As noted earlier, this Article focuses on the American mili-
tary as a case study.'7 It is anticipated that the observations made
may be in part generalizable to the armed forces of other coun-
tries. Further research will be required, however, to determine the
actual extent of generalizability.
To provide a context in which the rape data may be viewed
more meaningfully, data on violent crimes other than rape will be
considered together with the rape rate comparisons. Thus, the
crimes considered in both the peacetime and wartime studies are
murder/nonnegligent manslaughter ("murder/nn.m"), aggravated as-
sault, and forcible rape. 8 The raw data for both the peacetime
and wartime studies are drawn from the FBI's Uniform Crime
Reports for civilian crime statistics and from the archives of each
military service for military crime statistics. All crime rate compar-
isons are for males only, and control for the age structures of the
civilian and military populations. 9
1. The Peacetime Study. The results of the peacetime
(1987-92)' study are as follows. First, the rates of violent crime
are lower, controlling for age, among the male military than a-
mong the male civilian population. This is true of rape as well as
of the other violent crimes studied. Second, however, the diminu-
because troops' contact with civilians in the Persian Gulf was limited. See H.G. Reza,
When Troops Went to Persian Gulf So Did Military Justice, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1992,
at B1.
Of course, because rape incidence and reporting are affected by societal factors
that change over time, comparisons between 1940s wartime and contemporary peacetime
rape statistics would be impracticable. The point of the present study, however, is not to
compare rates or measure trends across time. Rather, this study seeks to compare mili-
tary and civilian rates-first within one time period (1944-45) and then within another
(1987-92). Thus, the focus is on the military/civilian comparison within a given (1940s or
1980s) time period. For that reason, societal changes over time should not unduly influ-
ence the comparison.
17. See supra note 4.
18. All references hereinafter to "rape" refer to forcible rape. Statutory rape is not
included in the scope of this study.
19. Regarding other possibly relevant control variables, see infra text accompanying
notes 66-74. For a full description of the methodology used in studying the peacetime
data, see infra Appendix A, at pp. 764-70.
20. The "peacetime" period studied is 1987-92. Of course, that period includes Janu-
ary and February of 1991, during which there was active fighting in the Persian Gulf
War. That combat period, however, had no discernible effect on the relevant crime rates.
Regression analyses performed on the data excluding 1991 produced essentially equivalent
results to those produced when including the 1991 data.
1996]
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tion in military rape rates from civilian rape rates is less-several
times less-than the diminution in the rates of the other violent
crimes. In other words, military rape rates are reduced far less
from civilian levels than are military rates of other violent crimes.
During the period 1987-1992, the military services' mur-
der/nn.m, aggravated assault, and rape rates compared, on yearly
average,2' with civilian rates as shown in Table I.22 The figures
shown in the Table are military rates for each crime as a percent-
age of civilian rates for that crime (controlling for age and gen-
der).
TABLE I
1987-1992 AVERAGE YEARLY MILITARY RATES OF
MURDERNN.M, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, AND RAPE AS A
PERCENTAGE OF U.S. MALE CIVILIAN RATES
(controlling for age)'
Army Navy Marine Air
Corps Force
Murder/nn.m 20 727 13 5
Aggravated 18 4 4 2
Assault
Rape 47 19 27 20
21. For year by year data, see infra Appendix B, at pp. 771-74.
22. One additional crime, robbery, was also examined in the peacetime study. (It was
not examined in the WWII study because of a paucity of data.) The diminution in mil-
itary robbery from civilian rates was even greater than the diminutions in murder/nn.m
and aggravated assault. See infra Appendix B, at pp. 771-74. This is perhaps not surpris-
ing since robbery has a property-crime component. We might reasonably expect lower
rates of property crime by a fully employed population such as the military than by the
civilian population. Because the property-crime aspect of robbery makes it less compara-
ble to rape than the violent crimes of murder/nn.m and aggravated assault, this Article
does not focus on it.
23. Percentages are rounded to whole numbers.
24. The statistics kept by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, which supplied the
Navy and Marine Corps data, do not separate murder/nn.m from negligent manslaughter.
For that reason, the murder/nn.m rates of the Navy and Marine corps have been estimat-
ed. For estimation method, see infra note 406 and accompanying text.
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It thus appears that active duty military populations' rates of
murder/nn.m and aggravated assault are substantially lower than
civilian rates of those crimes, but that the diminution in military
rape rates from civilian levels is much less significant 5 To sim-
plify presentation, I have combined the murder/nn.m and aggravat-
ed assault data into an index of "other-violent-crime." 26 Military
populations' diminution of other-violent-crime rates from civilian
levels can now usefully be compared with their diminution of rape
rates from civilian levels.
Table m shows the extent to which military diminution in
rates of other violent crime from civilian levels exceeds military
diminution in rape rates from civilian levels.
25. The following additional information for the 1987-92 period may be of interest to
the reader.
TABLE II
COMPARISION OF CRIME RATES OF MALE MILITARY
PERSONNEL AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
(average crime rate per 100,000)
Army Navy Marine Air Male Civilians
Corps Force Civilians (not
(controlling controlled
for age)* for age
or gender)
Rape 64 28 42 26 135 42
Murderlnn.m 8 4 7 3 37 9
Aggravated 270 57 75 24 1,476 419
Assault
*The "civilian rates controlling for age" are controlled relative to the age distribution of
the Army. Because the age distributions of the military services vary somewhat, the civil-
ian rates "controlling for age" may be viewed only as approximations (though rather
close approximations) for comparisons with the military rates for the services other than
the Army.
For methodological and source information regarding the foregoing data, see infra
Appendix A, at pp. 764-70.
26. The index is constituted by adding the raw numbers of murder/nn.m and aggra-
vated assault per year in each military service and dividing by the number of male per-
sonnel in that service to establish a rate of other violent crime for each service.
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TABLE HI
THE PEACETIME RAPE DIFFERENTIA07
Army Navy Marine AirCorps Force
Other-Violent- .18 .04 .05 .02
Crime Ratios
Rape Ratio29  .47 .19 .20 .20
Rape 2.62 4.95 5.63 10.74
Differential j
Regression analyses performed on these peacetime data deter-
mined that, for each military service, the difference between the
diminution of rape and diminution of other violent crime was
statistically significant." Thus, although the particulars differ
among the different services, 2 all of the services show the same
overall pattern of diminishing all violent crime rates, including
rape, from civilian levels, but diminishing rape rates significantly
less than the rates of other violent crime.3
27. All numbers are yearly averages for 1987-92.
28. The "other-violent-crime ratio" is the ratio of military other-violent-crime rates to
civilian other-violent-crime rates.
29. The "rape ratio" is the ratio of military rape rates to civilian rape rates.
30. The "rape differential" is the multiple by which the rape ratio exceeds the other-
violent-crime ratio.
31. P -< .01. The differences between the diminutions of rape and of aggravated
assault alone were highly significant (P _< .01) for all four services. Differences between
the diminutions of rape and of murder/nn.m alone were highly significant (P < .01) for
Army and significant (P < .05) for Air Force and Navy. For the Marine Corps, the dif-
ference between rape diminution and murder/nn.m diminution was significant (P = .04)
when an outlier year (1987) is excluded, but not significant (P = .14) when the outlier is
included. For a description of the regression analyses performed, see infra Appendix A,
at pp. 769-70.
32. Indeed, the interservice differences in crime rates are fascinating in themselves.
While beyond the scope of this Article, an analysis of the different crime patterns of the
four services would be worthwhile.
33. In comparing any sets of crime statistics, there is always the possibility that dif-
ferences in reporting patterns and record-keeping practices may distort findings. In the
present study, the findings would be misleading if rape were more completely reported in
military than in civilian populations, and/or if murder/nn.m or aggravated assault were
less completely reported in military than in civilian populations. Either or both of those
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reporting differences would cause an artificial appearance of a lesser diminution in mili-
tary rates of rape than of other violent crime. It appears, however, that reporting differ-
ences of those sorts have not influenced the findings of the present study for the follow-
ing reasons.
First, it seems unlikely that rape reporting rates are higher in military populations
than in civilian populations, particularly when the victim is a military woman. As stated
in the 1990 Update Report on the Progress of Women in the Navy, regarding the authors'
study of rape and sexual assault of Navy personnel:
The majority of staff level advisors interviewed perceive that most female vic-
tims would not report a rape. In the Study Group survey, only one out of ten
females who said they had been raped or assaulted in the past year said they
reported it to the police or Master at Arms .... Interview data suggest that
rape is under-reported for the following reasons: fear of reprisals; embarrass-
ment; would not be believed; lack of confidentiality and lack of sensitivity by
those personnel providing assistance to the victim. Women in the Personal Reli-
ability Program said they would not report a rape for fear of being removed
from the program.
1990 NAVY WOMEN'S STUDY GROUP, supra note 11, at m-29 (emphasis omitted).
Another reason to believe that the military rape figures used in this study are
estimated as conservatively as the civilian figures involves the definition of the crime. The
definition of rape applied by the U.S. military until October 1992 excluded marital rape.
See Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, art. 120, 64 Stat. 107, 140
(1950), amended by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L.
No. 102-484, § 911(c), 106 Stat. 2315, 2506 (1992) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 920 (1994)).
By contrast, the UCR definition of rape during 1987-92 had no marital exemption. See
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 1992: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 23 (1992) [hereinafter UCR 1992]; FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES
1991: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 23 (1991) [hereinafter UCR 1991]; FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1990: UNI-
FORM CRIME REPORTS 15 (1990) [hereinafter UCR 1990]; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI-
GATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1989: UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS 14 (1989) [hereinafter UCR 1989]; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1988: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 15
(1988) [hereinafter UCR 1988]; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1987: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 13 (1987)
[hereinafter UCR 1987]. Many states had eliminated marital exemptions from their rape
statutes by or during the 1980s, and thus would have included marital rapes in their data
provided for the UCR. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.5201 (1991); Merton v.
State, 500 So.2d 1301, 1305 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315
S.E.2d 847, 855 (Va. 1984); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 572-73 (N.Y. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985); State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 45 (NJ. 1981). Thus, the mili-
tary crime data for 1987-92 would have excluded marital rapes, while the UCR included
marital rapes. Hence, military rapes may have been less completely reported than civilian
rapes.
I turn now from the question of possible overestimation of military rape rates rela-
tive to civilian rates to the question of possible underestimation of military rates of other
violent crime relative to civilian rates. It seems unlikely that murder/n.m is less com-
pletely reported in military than in civilian populations. Once a homicide has occurred
and there is a corpse to be accounted for, informal handling is precluded-and there is
no evidence of greater leniency in charging or prosecution of homicides in the military
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The fact that peacetime military rape rates are diminished
much less from civilian levels than are military rates of other vio-
lent crime raises the question of whether peacetime military rape
rates may be reduced to levels commensurate with the low peace-
time military rates of other violent crime. Before examining possi-
ble approaches to reducing military rape rates, however, we shall
examine military rates of rape and other violent crime in the war-
time context.
2. The Wartime Study. Study of military and civilian crime
rates during the WWII period provides a measurement of rape
incidence in the combat context. The results of the WWII study
suggest that a differential between military rates of rape and of
other violent crime exists in war as well as in peace. In the war
context, however, rather than military rape rates being less
diminished from civilian levels than military rates of other violent
crime, military rape rates in the combat theater studied rose far
above civilian levels, while rates of other violent crime did not.
Comparisons with U.S. male civilian rape rates were made for
U.S. Army' 4 forces in the continental European Theater of Oper-
ations (ETO). 5 As in the peacetime study, all crime rate compar-
than in the civilian criminal justice system. Interview with Col. Scott Silliman, U.S.A.F.
(Ret.), former Staff Judge Advocate, Air Combat Command, in Durham, N.C. (Aug. 10,
1994).
Finally, it is possible that aggravated assault might be less completely reported in a
military population that may have a greater tolerance for violent behavior than the civil-
ian population. As indicated above, while the diminutions of military rates of both mur-
der/nn.m and aggravated assault from civilian levels are significantly greater than diminu-
tions of military rape rates, the magnitude of difference is greater for aggravated assault
than for murder/nn.m; that is, while both military aggravated assault and military mur-
der/nn.m rates are diminished significantly more from civilian levels than are military rape
rates, military aggravated assault is reduced even more from civilian levels than is military
murder/nn.m. Perhaps some of that greater magnitude of diminution for aggravated as-
sault found in the present study is due to greater underreporting of aggravated assault in
military than in civilian populations. Even if this is so, however (and the proposition is
highly speculative), the findings of significantly lesser diminution in rape apply to both
murder/nn.m and aggravated assault. Therefore, even if greater underreporting of aggra-
vated assault by military populations exists, its effect would seem to be on the magnitude
rather than on the existence or statistical significance of the difference between rape and
aggravated assault diminution.
For discussion of additional methodological safeguards, see infra Appendix A, at pp.
764-70.
34. The "U.S. Army" here includes air forces. The U.S. Air Force, which was not
yet a separate military branch, was part of the War Department during WWII.
35. "Continental ETO" refers to the ETO excluding the United Kingdom. (Of
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isons are for males only and control for the age structures of the
civilian and military populations.'
Because the circumstances of troops in the ETO varied from
one phase of the war to another, the story of crime patterns in
the ETO must be told chronologically over the course of the war.
From the D-Day landing at Normandy (June 6, 1944) until late
July, the Allied forces in the ETO were engaged in intense
fighting-first on the beachhead and then for protracted weeks in
the hedgerows of Normandy. 7 During that period, fighting was
heavy, and troops' contact with civilians was extremely limited. In
the words of Charles Whiting, "That summer, the weary, dirty, un-
shaven and very often frightened infantrymen lived, fought and
died in those dugouts carved into the sides of the hedgerows."38
"The tankers fought, cooked, slept, drank, and in many cases died
in their 30-ton 400 hp-engined Shermans. ' '39 "[The troops] existed
in a strange limbo, a world cut off completely from civilian life,
either back home or here in France."'  In light of the intensive
combat activity and minimal contact with civilians, it is not surpris-
ing that rape rates were very low during this period. Aggravated
assault rates also were low, and murder/nn.m rates were mini-
mal.
The situation changed entirely during the two breakouts in
the ETO, in France during August and September 1944 and in
course, the "ETO" also excludes the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, which includ-
ed parts of Europe such as Italy.) .
36. For a full description of the methodology used in studying the VVII data, see
infra Appendix C, at pp. 775-81.
37. See MARTHA HOYLE, A WORLD IN FLAMES 247-49, 253-54 (1969); CHARLES
WHITING, '44: IN COMBAT FROM NORMANDY TO THE ARDENNE 59-102 (1984).
38. WHITING, supra note 37, at 82.
39. Id. at 91.
40. Id. at 63.
41. See CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BRANCH, OFFICE OF THE THEATER PROVOST
MARSHAL, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, JUNE-DEC. 1944 (1944) (on file with the National
Archives RG 160, Entry 91, Box 725) [hereinafter 1944 SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT] (statisti-
cal graphs on unnumbered pages at end of Report). The number of investigations in
June and July for rape was nineteen; for murder/nn.m was two; and for aggravated as-
sault was twenty-seven (as adjusted). See id. Regarding adjustment of ETO aggravated
assault numbers, see infra Appendix C, notes 432-34 and accompanying text. Unfortu-
nately, it is not possible to calculate a rate per 100,000 troops for these crimes because
the number of troops on the continent in the months of June and July is not available.
Rather, the available data on ETO troop strength for those months combines troops on
the continent with troops in the United Kingdom. See WAR DEP'T GEN. STAFF,
STRENGTH OF THE ARMY (Aug. 1944-May 1945) (monthly reports).
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Germany during March and April 1945. During the breakouts,
forward troop movement was fast because new ground was quickly
occupied,42 and fighting was lighter for most units than during
the Normandy period or the winter period between breakouts.
4 1
Most importantly, there was extensive contact with civilians both
as troops on duty liberated one village after another, leaving rear
echelon personnel among the civilians, and as troops on leave
"went to town."44
During the two breakout periods, the incidence of violent
crime (murder/nn.m, aggravated assault, and rape) among ETO
troops rose dramatically.4' But the ETO rape rates increased far
more than the rates of aggravated assault or murder/nn.m. Indeed,
during the French breakout period, murder and aggravated assault
rates for ETO troops remained below U.S. civilian rates, whereas
ETO rape rates far surpassed U.S. civilian rates.
Specifically, during the breakout across France in August and
September 1944, the average monthly ETO murder/nn.m rate was
about half (47%) of the U.S. civilian rate, and the average month-
ly ETO aggravated assault rate was about one-sixth (18%) of the
U.S. civilian rate. During the same period, the ETO rape rate was
nearly three times (260%) the U.S. civilian rate.'
Describing the context in which rape of French women by
American troops occurred, the official history of the Office of the
Judge Advocate General for the ETO states:
42. See HUBERT ESSAME, THE BATTLE FOR GERMANY 178-218 (1969) (Germany);
HOYLE, supra note 37, at 259-61 (France), 300-06 (Germany); WHrnNG, supra note 37,
at 97-108 (France).
43. See ESSAME, supra note 42, at 178-222 (Germany); HOYLE, supra note 37, at
259-61 (France); WHMTING, supra note 37, at 98-118 (France).
44. See COSTELLO, supra note 5, at 343-46 (Germany); ESSAME, supra note 42, at
178-222 (Germany); HOYLE, supra note 37, at 259 (France); WHrMNG, supra note 37, at
105-118 (France); Interview with Col. William S. Fulton Jr. (Ret.), Clerk of Court, U.S.
Army Judiciary, in Durham, N.C. (Jan. 10, 1994) (describing the levels of contact with
German civilians during the "house to house pursuit" phase of the breakout period in
Germany).
45. See European Theater of Operation Historical Division, Dep't of War, Criminal
Investigation Branch, in HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF THE THEATER PROVOST MARSHAL,
ETOUSA: 1 Ocr. 1944-8 MAY 1945, § III, at App. A (1945) (statistical graphs) (on file
at the National Archives RG 332, Adm. 567c).
46. The raw numbers of ETO offenses for August and September on monthly av-
erage were 16 murder/nn.m (1.4 per 100,000 troops), 54 aggravated assaults (4.62 per
100,000 troops), and 107 rapes (9.27 per 100,000 troops). For methodological and source
information on the foregoing data, see infra Appendix C, at pp. 775-81.
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The French people welcomed their liberators, often giving them
drink to show their appreciation. They spoke a strange tongue.
The invading soldiers came fully armed. The people were grate-
ful, but they had little or no protection. Many soldiers had the
notion that French women generally were both attractive and
free with their love. At any rate, whatever the operative factors,
the number of violent sex crimes enormously increased with the
arrival of our troops in France.
Generally speaking, the rape cases of the French Phase fell
into one broad pattern characterized by violence, though of dif-
ferent degrees. The use of firearms was common in perpetrating
the offense.47
One may find it dubious that the rates of murder/nn.m and
aggravated assault in a combat theater would be lower than civil-
ian rates. It seems likely that all three of the crimes examined in
the present study-murder/nn.m, aggravated assault, and
rape-would be substantially undercounted in official combat-the-
ater statistics because of underreporting, informal handling, and
slippages in central collection of crime records.
Undercounting presumably would be most extreme in cases
involving non-American victims-civilian or prisoner-who might
be less inclined or able to report crimes to American authori-
ties, and whose victimization might often be taken less seriously
by American authorities. Indeed, the ETO Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Report states that, in general courts martial of American
troops for murder in the ETO, 48% of the victims were Ameri-
cans, while only 27% of the victims were German (and 14% were
French).49 Such statistics may well reflect that murders of Ameri-
cans were handled in such a way as to show up disproportionately
in official murder statistics."0
47. Office of the Judge Advocate Gen., Dep't. of War, History of the Judge Advo-
cate General's Office in the European Theater, 18 July 1942-1 November 1945, at 241
(1945) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Office of the Chief of Military History,
Historical Manuscript File, no. 8-3.5 AA v.1).
48. My colleague Mel Shimm shared with me a story that illustrates this point. As
an officer serving in Korea after WWII, he interviewed a woman filing a complaint alleg-
ing that she had been raped by an American soldier. When Mel (a Caucasian male
dressed in military uniform) asked her if she knew the soldier's identity or could describe
his appearance, the woman said that she did not know her assailant's identity, but that
he looked just like Mel.
49. Office of the Judge Advocate Gen., supra note 47, at Chart 15.
50. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume, given the nature of a combat theater,
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Undercounting of aggravated assault may have been even
greater than undercounting of murder because assault is a less
serious crime and, therefore, more likely to go unreported or to
be handled informally. Rape is particularly likely to have been
undercounted because it is less serious than murder,5 it is reput-
edly the most underreported violent crime even in the domestic
context,5 2 and it was perpetrated in the ETO virtually exclusively
against non-Americans."
German rape complainants would have faced a particularly
difficult situation. In a section entitled "Mitigating Circumstances,"
the ETO Judge Advocate General's Report states:
The unusual circumstances surrounding the cases of alleged rape
under Article of War 92 where the complainants have been Ger-
man nationals have presented a special and difficult clemency
situation.... [T]his office, as well as the Staff Judge Advocates
of the Theater, have exerted unremitting efforts to see justice
done for the accused in these cases. An example of the results
from such efforts is seen in [several cases] where, based on post
trial investigation, the victimized accused had their convictions set
aside ?4
that some number of actual murders of Germans soldiers by American troops in the
ETO were classified not as murders but as lawful killings in combat or in self-defense.
51. It is important to note, however, that under the Articles of War the sentences
provided for rape and murder were the same. LEE S. TILLOTSON, THE ARTICLES OF
WAR ANNOTATED 179 (1944) ("Any person subject to military law who commits murder
or rape shall suffer death or imprisonment for life .... "). Therefore, there is no reason
to believe that murders would be more likely than rapes to be covered up to spare a
soldier from harsh punishment.
52. See 1990 NAVY WOMEN'S STUDY GROUP, supra note 11, at 111-29.
53. According to the Report of the ETO Judge Advocate General, none of the 761
complainants in the general courts martial for rape in the ETO were American. Office of
the Judge Advocate Gen., supra note 47, at Chart 16.
One initially colorable theory suggesting overcounting of rapes in the ETO must be
rejected on close examination of the available information. The theory for overcounting
would be that because of factors associated with the war, women in WWII Europe were
very sexually active with U.S. troops and then frequently alleged rape if the women's
socially unacceptable sexual activity was discovered, which resulted in frequent false re-
ports and an aggregate overcount of rapes. The problem with this theory is that the
reports on criminal activity in the ETO consistently characterize the rapes as occurring in
a violent manner, often at gunpoint. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; infra text
accompanying note 58.
54. Office of the Judge Advocate Gen., supra note 47, at 339-40. Although this sec-
tion of the Report indicates that "[a] more complete discussion of this situation will be
set out in the next Chapter," id. at 340, the pages containing that discussion are missing
from the Report and have been for many years, notwithstanding the considerable efforts
of archivists to find the missing pages. Memorandum by Library of Congress 1 (Aug.
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In addition, the ETO Judge Advocate General's Report spe-
cifically observes with regard to rape that "an indeterminable
number of [rape reports] were investigated by agencies other than
[the Criminal Investigation Branch of the Provost Marshal's office],
such as investigating officers appointed by commanders."'55 Re-
ports handled by agencies other than the Criminal Investigations
Branch of the Provost Marshal's office would not appear in official
statistics of investigations.
Thus, in considering all of the ETO crime figures, we must
bear in mind that they probably reflect substantial undercounting.
There is no reason to believe, however, that rape statistics are
more complete than those for murder or aggravated assault. (In-
deed, as indicated, there are reasons to draw the opposite conclu-
sion.) Therefore, even while acknowledging counting problems, we
may still place some reliance on the official counts for purposes of
comparing the relative patterns or incidence of the three offenses
in the ETO.
The relative crime rate pattern during the breakout into Ger-
many was very similar to the pattern during the breakout across
France. The rates of all three types of crimes examined rose to
even higher levels during the German breakout than during the
French breakout. But the relative relationship of the three crime
rates was strikingly similar in the two periods: In each instance,
the increase in rape was far greater than the increase in either
murder/nn.m or aggravated assault. During the period of the break-
out across Germany (March and April 1945), the average monthly
ETO murder/nn.m rate was essentially equivalent (102%) to the
U.S. civilian rate, and the average monthly ETO aggravated as-
sault rate was about one-quarter (27%) of the civilian rate. During
the same period, the ETO rape rate was nearly four times (366%)
the civilian rate. As summarized in the Army's official history
of the ETO Criminal Investigation Branch, "Crimes of violence,
meanwhile, after holding more or less steady during most of the
1975) (on file with the Office of the Chief of Military History, Historical Manuscript File,
no. 8-3.5 AA v.1).
55. Office of the Judge Advocate Gen., supra note 47, at 249.
56. The raw numbers of ETO offenses for March and April on monthly average
were 80 murder/nn.m (3.1 per 100,000 troops), 228 aggravated assaults (8.82 per 100,000
troops), and 452 rapes (17.47 per 100,000 troops). For methodological and source infor-
mation on the foregoing data, see infra Appendix C, at pp. 775-81.
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year, skyrocketed to tremendous proportions during the final drive
through Germany in March and April 1945.... Predominant
among the crimes of violence, especially during March and April,
"57
was rape ....
Describing the context in which rape of German women by
American troops occurred, the official history of the Office of the
Judge Advocate General for the ETO states:
The pattern of German rape cases was quickly discernible. In the
typical case, one or more armed soldiers entered a German
house, either by force or by stratagem (such as a pretense of
searching for German soldiers), and engaged in sexual intercourse
with one or more of the female occupants. Sometimes the act
was accomplished through the application of direct force, at other
times by submission resulting from the occupants' fear for their
lives.
Thus, during both breakout periods in the ETO, elevations in rape
rates far exceeded elevations in rates of other violent crime."
57. European Theater of Operation Historical Division, supra note 45, at 6.
58. Office of the Judge Advocate Gen., supra note 47, at 242.
59. In considering these data, it is interesting to note that patterns of violent crime
in the United States underwent sharp changes during the WWII period. While civilian
murder/nn.m rates decreased from pre-war rates, aggravated assault rates increased sub-
stantially, and forcible rape rates increased dramatically. As of January 1945, the wartime
murder/nn.m rate was 7.5% below the pre-war (1939-41) average, the wartime aggravated
assault rate was 19.9% above the pre-war average, and the wartime forcible rape rate
was well over 27% above the pre-war average. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 79
(1945) [hereinafter UCR 1945]. (I say that the forcible rape rate was "well over" 27%
above the prewar average because the 27% increase figure includes all rape including
statutory; the increase in forcible rape during the war period, however, was actually far
greater than the increase in statutory rape. See UCR 1945, supra, at 3; FEDERAL BU-
REAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR THE UNITED STATES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 83 (1944) [hereinafter UCR 1944]; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 80
(1943) [hereinafter UCR 1943].)
One might speculate about some of the reasons why the civilian rape rate in-
creased so dramatically during wartime: a changed role for women, who undertook great-
er participation in the public sphere during the war, reckless behavior by men expecting
to go to war, and perhaps other effects of war mobilization on American culture. In any
event, it is worth noting that, when comparing military rates of violent crime with civilian
rates during WWII, we base these comparisons on relatively stable civilian murder/nn.m
rates compared with previous levels, somewhat elevated aggravated assault rates, and
highly elevated civilian rape rates. This fact underscores the finding that, of the three
crimes examined, military rape rates are increased most from civilian levels.
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During the period between breakouts (October 1944 through
February 1945), U.S. troops in the ETO were fighting under con-
ditions of strong resistance, slow gains, extreme cold and high
snow, I and most forward troops had little contact with civil-
ians.' Not surprisingly, ETO rape rates during that period were
very low compared with the breakout periods (on monthly average
about half (54%) of the U.S. civilian rate). For this period, the
ETO average monthly murder/nn.m rate was about two-thirds
(64%) of the U.S. civilian rate, and the aggravated assault rate
was about one-sixth (16%) of the U.S. civilian rate.62 Figure I
shows in graphic form the pattern of crime rates in the ETO.
60. See ESSAME, supra note 42, at 65-177; MAX HASTINGS, VICrORY IN EUROPE
91-114 (1985); HOYLE, supra note 37, at 263-64, 270-72, 295-99; WHrrING, supra note
37, at 177-89.
61. See ESSAME, supra note 42, at 65-177.
62. The raw numbers of ETO offenses for October through February on monthly
average were 34 murder/nn.m (1.8 per 100,000 troops), 77 aggravated assaults (4.0 per
100,000 troops), and 33 rapes (1.8 per 100,000 troops). For methodological and source
information on the foregoing data, see infra Appendix C, at pp. 775-81. For month by
month data, see infra Appendix D, at p. 782.
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FIGURE 1
ETO RATES OF MuRDERNN.M, AGGRAVATED
ASSAULT, AND RAPE AS A PROPORTION OF
U'S. MALE CIVILIAN RATES *
AUGUST 1944 - MAY 1945
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Not only were ETO rape rates much more highly elevated
than rates of other violent crime during the breakout periods in
the ETO, but the rape rates of U.S. military personnel in occupied
Germany continued to be disproportionately elevated long after
the end of the war. As stated in the Theater Provost Marshal's
Report of Operations for July through September 1946 (over a
year after V-E Day): "One of the lessons learned in regards [sic]
to specific crimes was that the appalling continuation of rape here
in Germany can be said to have been largely influenced by war
psychology and propaganda on both sides. Time alone will be able
to erase this curse." 6 3
These data from the World War II period suggest that rape is
not just "one atrocity among others," which results, like other vio-
63. 10 OFFICE OF THE THEATER PROVOST MARSHAL, REPORT OF OPERATIONS 1
JULY-30 SEPTEMBER 1946, at 3 (1946) ("supporting documents" section).
Apr May
-- RAPE
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ° . . . . . . . . .
t. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o . °.. . .
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lent crime, from the character of combat. Rather, the pattern of
rape in war (at least in the ETO of WWII) differs from that of
murder/nn.m and aggravated assault, with the rape increase being
starkly disproportionate to the increase of other violent crime in
the peak crime periods and also after the cessation of hostilities.
The differences between patterns of rape rates and other violent
crime rates in the ETO are of sufficient magnitude to sug-
gest-even accounting for inevitable distortions from reporting,
processing, and record-keeping practices-that rape in war is a
crime influenced by dynamics at least in part distinct from those
influencing other violent crimes in war. If "war factors" such as
diminished deterrents, foreign lands, chaos, violence, and terror 64
accounted for violent crimes in war homogeneously, then we
would expect the rates of the various crimes such as rape, mur-
der/nn.m, and aggravated assault to follow similar patterns. But
they do not. Rather, rape is distinct from other crimes of violence
in war, as is reflected in its far greater increase during peak-vio-
lent-crime periods.
A differential between military rape rates and rates of other
violent crime thus exists both in peace and in war. In peacetime,
military rape rates are reduced significantly less from civilian levels
than are rates of other violent crime. In wartime, military rape
rates are increased far more above civilian levels than are rates of
other violent crime.
64. Wars are often fought in foreign lands where troops may experience a feeling of
"time out" from the usual rules. In addition, troops may identify less with persons from
other countries and cultures and may therefore tend more readily to dehumanize poten-
tial victims. See PETER KARSTEN, LAW, SOLDIERS AND COMBAT 55-61 (1978); Peter G.
Bourne, From Boot Camp to My Lai, in CRIMES OF WAR 462, 466-67 (Richard Falk et
al. eds., 1971); see also KARSTEN, supra, at 35 (discussing the role of cultural distance in
the My Lai massacre). In addition, battle is terrifying, often chaotic and, of course, vio-
lent. The fear, rage, and desires for revenge produced in combat all can lead to atrocities
in war. See KARSTEN, supra, at 62; JAMES S. KUNEN, STANDARD OPERATING PROCE-
DURE 281 (1971) (testimony of Dr. Robert Lifton before the Citizens' Commission of
Inquiry in U.S. War Crimes in Indochina); see also Richard Fox, Narcissistic Rage and
the Problem of Combat Aggression, 31 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 807, 807-08 (1974)
(commenting on the transition toward more personalized hostility and desire for revenge
after longer exposure to combat, especially after death of a "buddy" in combat).
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II. THE RAPE DIFERENTIAL: CAUSFS AND CULTURE
A. Causes
The existence of the military rape differential suggests that it
may be possible to reduce military rape rates in peace and in war,
perhaps to levels commensurate with military rates of other violent
crimes. This section considers why military rape rates should in-
crease so disproportionately to other violent crime rates in war,
and why, in peacetime, military service should correlate with a
much lesser diminution in rape than in other violent crime. That
causal analysis will then provide the basis for an examination of
possible approaches to military rape reduction.
As discussed above, differences in the rape reporting patterns
of military and civilian populations do not appear to account for
the findings that military rape rates are diminished less from civil-
ian levels (in peacetime) and increased more from civilian levels
(in wartime) than are other violent crime rates.65 Therefore, a
substantive explanation is required. In this section, a number of
possible causal factors contributing to the military rape differential
will be explored.
In considering what factors may contribute to the rape differ-
ential, the first point to be acknowledged is that, while the peace-
time and wartime studies conducted for this Article control for age
and gender, additional demographic factors that are not controlled
for here may account for part of the variance observed. Several
additional variables that are often hypothesized to affect crime
rates might usefully be controlled for in further studies. Those
additional variables might include race, education, income, social
disorganization, and geographic region.' The relevant question in
connection with those additional variables would be whether any
of them differentially affects rates of rape as compared with rates
of other violent crime so as to account for the military rape differ-
ential.67
65. See supra note 33; supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
66. See, eg., Judith R. Blau & Peter M. Blau, The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan
Structure and Violent Crime, 47 AM. SOC. Rnv. 114 (1982); Gary LaFree et al., Race and
Crime in Postwar America. Determinants of African-American and White Rates, 1957-1988,
30 CRIMINOLOGY 157 (1992); Joseph F. Sheley, Structural Influences on the Problem of
Race, Crime; and Criminal Justice Discrimination, 67 TUL L. REv. 2273 (1993).
67. It is important to note that, since the rape differential was observed not only in
the 1987-92 all-volunteer force but also in the largely conscripted WWII force, a demo-
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Preliminary examination of the race variable suggests that it
would not help to account for the military rape differential for the
following reasons. African-Americans constitute a higher propor-
tion of the American military population than of the civilian popu-
lation.' For the period 1987-92, the rate of arrest for rape for
African-Americans was 6.36 times that for whites.6 9 During the
same period, blacks' murder/nn.m arrest rate was 9.37 times that
of whites.7' Therefore, the fact that the military has a higher per-
centage of African-Americans than the civilian population would
be expected to increase the military's murder rates somewhat more
than its rape rates. Yet the finding to be accounted for is the
opposite: Military murder/nn.m rates are diminished more than
military rape rates. The aggravated assault arrest rate for blacks in
1987-92 was 5.04 times that of whites compared to a rape arrest
rate 6.36 times that of whites.7' A race variable thus might ac-
count for some, but very little, of the observed military rape dif-
ferential with regard to aggravated assault.' This preliminary ex-
amination suggests that introduction of a race variable would con-
tribute very little to an explanation of the observed military rape
differential.73
No data comparable to the race data described above are
available for the education, income, social disorganization, and
geographic region variables.74 Further research will therefore be
required in order to offer even preliminary suggestions regarding
graphic factor that would account for part of the rape differential would have to obtain
even for a conscripted army.
68. See MARTIN BINKIN, WHO WILL FIGHT THE NEXT WAR? 61-101 (1993).
69. See UCR 1992, supra note 33, at 235 (arrests by race); UCR 1991, supra note
33, at 231 (same); UCR 1990, supra note 33, at 192 (same); UCR 1989, supra note 33,
at 190 (same); UCR 1988, supra note 33, at 186 (same); UCR 1987, supra note 33, at
182 (same).
70. See sources cited supra note 69.
71. See id.
72. The robbery rate for blacks was 12.9 times that of whites compared once again
to a rape arrest rate 6.36 times that of whites. See id. Therefore, for robbery as well as
for murder, race would not account for any part of the observed variance in diminution
of rape and robbery incidence.
73. This brief consideration of the expected effects of a race control variable rests on
the assumption that race would have the same effect on arrest rates (i.e., both on crimi-
nality and on police arrests decisions) in the military and civilian contexts. That assump-
tion might or might not be warranted.
74. For some discussion of the effects of those additional variables on crime in the
general population, see Blau & Blau, supra note 66, at 121-27.
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the possible effects of those additional variables on the military
rape differential.
One additional demographic factor, the percentage of popula-
tion married, would be of particular relevance to a "sexual depri-
vation" theory of the military rape differential. The sexual depriva-
tion theory would propose that military rape rates are elevated
relative to military rates of other violent crime because, whereas
military personnel have as much or more opportunity than civilians
to express any aggressive impulses they might have (for instance,
in combat practice), military personnel's sexual opportunities are
more limited than those of civilians. Certainly, personnel on ships
at sea or in other remote locations may have severely limited
sexual opportunities. Moreover, men stationed on military bases on
the American mainland-including those who live off base-may
have more limited heterosexual opportunities than most male
civilians, if only because the sex ratios of the base and surrounding
areas are disproportionately male.' One might hypothesize that,
for these reasons, military populations' rates of sexual aggression
would be high relative to their rates of other forms of violent
crime.76 The suggestion here is not the simplistic one that "men
must have sex" and will rape if "deprived" of sex. Rather, what is
envisioned is a more complex dynamic in which sexual rejection
may be more frequent for males in a sex-skewed environment such
as would obtain, for instance, around some military bases, leading
over time to frustration and anger, and to various undesirable out-
comes, perhaps including rape.'
75. This statement would apply to the many military bases located in rural locations,
but would not apply, of course, to bases such as Long Beach Naval Shipyard in Los
Angeles, Treasure Island Naval Base in San Francisco, or other military bases located in
or near urban areas.
76. I am indebted to my colleague Bob Mosteller for noting the need to consider
this possible explanation for the variance observed.
77. Related to the "sexual deprivation" explanation for the rape differential is the
possible effect on military rape rates of the exclusion of gays from the military. See infra
note 357 (regarding U.S. policy concerning gays in military service). If the percentage of
gay males is lower in the military than in the civilian population, then perhaps the per-
centage of potential rapists of women is higher in the military than in the civilian popu-
lation. (This proposition rests on the untested hypothesis that gay men rape women at a
lower rate than do heterosexual men.) The possibly lower percentage of gays in the
military than in the civilian population could thus explain some part of the military rape
differential. We cannot know, of course, what proportion (if any) of the rape differential
is accounted for by this factor because we do not know whether or to what extent the
proportion of gay males in the military is actually lower than the proportion of gay
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This sexual-deprivation explanation for the rape differential
may account for some of the variance observed, but it seems un-
likely to contribute substantially to an explanation of the phenom-
enon for several reasons. First, the limited research that has been
done on the subject does not indicate that skewed sex ratios affect
rape rates.78 That research, however, has not been extensive and
certainly is not dispositive of the question. The research thus does
not support but also cannot be taken to preclude a sexual-depriva-
tion explanation of some part of the military rape differential.
A second factor that detracts from the potential explanatory
force of a sexual-deprivation explanation of the military rape dif-
ferential is the ready availability of prostitution in the vicinity of
military installations.79 The easy access to prostitutes that is typi-
cal of the areas surrounding military installations means that an
individual lacking other sexual opportunities would have a sexual
outlet short of rape that would be preferable to rape both in ease
of access and in safety from harsh legal consequences. Still, some
proportion of men experiencing a scarcity of sexual opportunity
presumably do not go to prostitutes-and some subset of that
group may commit rape, for instance on a date.
A third reason that sexual deprivation seems wanting as a full
explanation of the military rape differential is that, during the
peacetime period studied, both the percentage of military person-
nel that are married (and so, presumably, have increased sexual
opportunities) and military rape rates (but not military rates of
other violent crimes) rose simultaneously.0 If sexual scarcity were
males in the civilian population, and we do not know whether or to what extent gay
men are less likely than heterosexual men to rape women. (Rape of a male is excluded
from the present study because it was not defined as "rape" under military law prior to
1992. See 10 U.S.C. § 920 (1994) (amending 10 U.S.C. § 920 (1988)), and so does not
appear in the available military crime statistics.)
78. See, e.g., MENACHEM AMIR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 63-68 (1971) (discuss-
ing but not finding support for a skewed-sex-ratio theory of rape causation); cf. Larry
Baron & Murray A. Straus, Four Theories of Rape: A Macrosociological Analysis, 34
SOC. PROBS. 467, 481-82 (1987) (finding no positive correlation between the percent of
states' populations constituted by single adult males and states' rape rates).
79. See generally HELEN REYNOLDS, THE ECONOMICS OF PROSTrUTION 103 (1986)
(prostitution and U.S. military in Nevada); SAUNDRA P. STURDEVANT & BRENDA
STOLTZFUS, LET THE GOOD TIMES ROLL: PROSTITUTION AND THE U.S. MILITARY IN
ASIA (1992); CHARLES WINICK & PAUL M. KINSIE, THE LIVELY COMMERCE: PROSTITU-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 245-67 (1971) (history of prostitution and U.S. military).
80. During the period 1987-92, the percentage of male active duty military personnel
who were married rose from 56% to 60%. See Defense Manpower Data Center, Active
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responsible for the military rape differential, then we would expect
an increase in sexual opportunities to correlate with rape reduc-
tion, all other things being equal. Instead, an increase in the per-
centage of personnel married accompanied a rape rate increase.
Of course, all other things likely are not equal. It may be that
an increase in percentage of personnel married does, because of
increased sexual opportunity, tend to reduce military rape rates
but that the minimizing effect of the greater percentage of person-
nel married was overwhelmed in the period studied by other fac-
tors raising rape rates.8 Nevertheless, the simultaneous rise in the
percentage of personnel married and military rape rates, together
with the consistent availability of prostitution and the lack of sup-
port in the research on skewed sex ratios for a sexual deprivation
theory of the rape differential, does suggest that some explanation
other than or in addition to sexual deprivation is required to pro-
vide a full explanation for the military rape differential.
Another possible explanation for the military rape differential
is that all-male groups (especially young all-male groups), military
or otherwise, have a tendency toward rape proneness. The prob-
lem with this avenue of explanation is the apparent existence of
counterexamples. There is no evidence that all or most boys'
schools, men's clubs, or all-male seminaries and yeshivas have
elevated rape rates.' While some genres of all-male group may
exhibit an elevated tendency to rape (for example, some fraterni-
ties, gangs, and other groups, as discussed below), it does not ap-
pear that all do. Therefore, an adequate explanation of the pattern
Duty by Marital Status 1987-92 (Oct. 26, 1994) (computer printout provided by the U.S.
Defense Manpower Data Center, on file with author). During the same period, military
rapes rates showed an upward trend. Specifically, for each of the years 1987-92, Army
rape rates per 100,000 active duty personnel were 55, 64, 61, 62, 69, 74. Navy rape rates
were 16, 23, 23, 35, 34, 38. Marine rape rates were 31, 41, 32, 48, 41, 56. And Air Force
rape rates were 20, 25, 24, 26, 29, 31. See data described infra Appendix A, at pp.
764-70, on file with author. During this period, military rates of murder/nn.m and aggra-
vated assault did not show an upward trend. See id.
81. For example, at least for the period after Tailhook '91 in which the services
publicized "zero tolerance" policies regarding sexual assault, the increase in reported rape
rates may reflect a higher rate of reporting by victims and of record-keeping by military
authorities.
82. Telephone Interview with Mary Koss, Professor of Psychology, Univ. of Arizona
(July 1994); Telephone Interview with Susan Roth, Professor of Psychology, Duke Univ.
(Nov. 17, 1994); Telephone Interview with Leslie Lebowitz, National Center for the Study
of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Nov. 17, 1994).
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of military rape rates cannot be based solely on the fact that mili-
tary organizations have been virtually all-male groups.
An alternative explanation for the pattern of military rape
rates would focus on self-selection. The hypothesis here would be
that those who self-select for military service are disproportionately
rape prone. This hypothesis too would be flawed. First, it would
not explain the patterns of military rape and other violent crime
during WWII, when the army was largely conscripted. Second, it
would require some elaboration of why individuals who choose to
enter military service are disproportionately prone to commit rape
as opposed to other violent crimes. Thus, if self-selection contrib-
utes at all to the explanation of patterns of military rape rates (a
possibility to be explored further below),' it must be as part of a
larger explanation.
Yet another explanation of the military rape differential would
rest on the hypothesis that biological factors exert an upward pres-
sure on rape rates but not (or not as much) on rates of other
violent crime. The argument regarding military rape rates would
be that, if there is a particular biological impetus to rape, then we
might expect rape rates to be more amenable to increase (such as
in war) and less amenable to reduction (such as in peacetime
military service) than the rates of other violent crime.
Some sociobiologists do maintain that there is a sex-linked
genetic disposition to rape among human males.'" But sociobiolo-
83. See infra notes 257-66 and accompanying text.
84. See LEE ELLIS, THEORIES OF RAPE: INQUIRIES INTO THE CAUSES OF SEXUAL
AGGRESSION 14-16 (1989) (reviewing the literature on sociobiological theories of rape);
see also Charles Crawford & Birute M.F. Galdikas, Rape in Nonhuman Animals: An
Evolutionary Perspective, 27 CANADIAN PSYCHOLOGY 215, 225-26 (1986); William M.
Shields & Lea M. Shields, Forcible Rape: An Evolutionary Perspective, 4 ETHOLOGY &
SOCIOBIOLOGY 115, 117-20 (1983); Randy Thornhill & Nancy W. Thornhill, Human
Rape: The Strengths of the Evolutionary Perspective, in SOCIOBIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY.
IDEAS, ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS 269, 286 (C. Crawford et al. eds., 1987); Randy
Thornhill & Nancy W. Thornhill, Human Rape: An Evolutionary Analysis, 4 ETHOLOGY
& SOCIOBIOLOGY 137, 140 (1983).
Not surprisingly, data for the sociobiological theories of rape are inconclusive, and
the theories (as well as sociobiology more generally) have come under serious scholarly
criticism. For critiques of sociobiological theories of rape, see JOHN KLAMA, AGGRES-
SION: THE MYTH OF THE BEAST WrrHmiN 147-48 (1988); SUZANNE R. SUNDAY & ETHEL
TOBACH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIOBIOLOGY OF RAPE
(1985). Regarding the scientific status of sociobiology in general, see MICHAEL RUSE,
SOCIOBIOLOGY: SENSE OR NONSENSE? (2d ed. 1985); FLORIAN VON SCHILCHER & NEIL
TENNANT, PHILOSOPHY, EVOLUTION AND HUMAN NATURE 106-68 (1984); Robert L.
Simon, The Sociobiology Muddle, 92 ETHICS 327 (1982).
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gical theories of crime generally posit biological influences under-
lying a broad range of aggressive behaviors, including not only
rape but also, for instance, homicide and assault. 5 Therefore, a
view that biological forces reduce the malleability of rape rates
more than the malleability of other violent crime rates would go
beyond the claims currently made even by sociobiology and would
be highly speculative at this time.
A related and intriguing avenue of possible explanation for
the military rape differential is that there exists a psychosexual
linkage-perhaps biologically based, perhaps not-between vio-
lence and sexuality, such that training in and focus on deployment
of violence, as occur in the military, would tend to foster sexual
aggression.86 Again, the state of the science in this area makes
this avenue of explanation necessarily speculativeY Nonetheless,
biological or other psychosexual factors linking sexuality and vio-
lence might indeed account for some part of the phenomenon in
question.
While biological or related psychosexual factors may account
for some part of the military rape differential, it is undisputed that
biology is, at most, only one contributing factor determining the
rape incidence of individuals, groups, and societies.SS Environmen-
tal factors bearing on individual psychology, group dynamics, and
societal structure and culture all are widely recognized to be influ-
ential in determining the rape incidence of individuals, groups, and
societies-notwithstanding the effects of possible biological influ-
ences.89 While a biological approach may thus partly explain the
military rape differential and may warrant further exploration, this
85. See generally KLAMA, supra note 84, at 147-48 (discussing sociobiological theories
of aggression).
86. For a discussion of such possible aggression/sexuality links, see DOLF ZILLMANN,
CONNECrIONS BETWEEN SEX AND AGGRESSION (1984).
87. Id. at 15-17.
88. As sociobiologist E.O. Wilson stated, while "genes hold culture on a leash[, t]he
leash is very long." EDWARD 0. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE 167 (1978).
89. See, e.g., AMIR, supra note 78, at 43-125; A. NICHOLAS GROTH, MEN WHO
RAPE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE OFFENDER 12-83 (1979); JEAN S. MACKELLAR, RAPE:
THE BAIT AND THE TRAP 68-78, 129-33 (1975).
Particularly persuasive evidence of the strong influence of social factors on rape
incidence are the findings that there are large differences in rape rates between different
geographical areas, such as between different regions of the United States, and that these
differences are consistent over time. See, e.g., Baron & Straus, supra note 78, at 467,
480-83; Joseph E. Scott & Loretta A. Schwalm, Rape Rates and the Circulation of Adult
Magazines, 24 J. OF SEX RES. 241, 245-48 (1988).
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approach, like the other explanations discussed above, is unlikely
to account for all of the variance observed.
A crucial aspect of an analysis of possible causes contributing
to the rape differential is an examination of the law relating to
rape by military personnel. If the legal deterrents to rape were
different in the military and civilian contexts, then it would not be
surprising if there were a resultant differential in the rape rates of
those two populations. The following analysis explores whether
differences between the domestic criminal justice system and the
domestic military justice system or international criminal justice
system may contribute to the military rape differential.
American military law governing the handling of rape by mil-
itary personnel appears to be comparable to civilian law in its
substantive aspects, but possibly less stringent than civilian law in
its procedural requirements and actual implementation. Shortcom-
ings in the relevant military procedures and enforcement provisions
may be contributing factors in an explanation of the military rape
differential. Measures to identify procedural flaws and to bolster
enforcement practices are considered below.
The statute under which rapes are prosecuted within the mili-
tary justice system is similar in its definition of rape to the rape
statutes of most American civilian jurisdictions. The military stat-
ute provides that "[a]ny person ... who commits an act of sexual
intercourse, by force and without consent, is guilty of rape.""
The sentence provided for rape under the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (UCMJ) is "death or such other punishment as a
90. 10 U.S.C. § 920 (1994). This statute applies to any rape committed by military
personnel regardless of whether the victim is another military personnel or a civilian.
When a military personnel commits an offense within a civilian jurisdiction (i.e., not on a
military base or installation), that individual generally will still be prosecuted by military
authorities applying military law, but may by law alternatively be (and, in practice, oc-
casionally will be) prosecuted by civilian authorities applying civilian law. Interview with
Wilbur L. Hardy, U.S. Army Crime Records Center, in Baltimore, Md. (May 19, 1994);
Interview with personnel at the Navy Criminal Investigative Service, in Washington, D.C.
(May 4, 1994).
The military rape statute that was in effect prior to October 1992 actually defined
rape more narrowly than does the current statute. See supra note 33 (describing former
statute, which excluded rape of a spouse and rape of males). The change in law, howev-
er, does not affect the analysis here. Rather, it means only that the rape differential
measures in this Article are conservative measures, because the effect on the rape differ-
ential of having now broadened the military definition of rape would actually be to in-
crease the rape differential since a broader range of conduct would now be counted as
rape in military statistics. See id.
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court-martial may direct."91 By regulation, that UCMJ provision
is interpreted to mean life imprisonment or such other punishment
as a court martial may direct for all rapes, except those in which
the victim is under the age of twelve or in which the accused
maimed or attempted to kill the victim; the death penalty may be
imposed in those cases. 2 The substantive military law defining
rape thus is comparable to civilian law on the subject, and the
potential sentences are as severe or more severe than those appli-
cable to civilians.
The procedural framework governing the handling of rape by
military personnel may be somewhat more problematic. Reports of
rape by military personnel are to be forwarded by the military
personnel or agency receiving the report to the immediate com-
mander of the suspect (or to a law enforcement or investigative
agency if no suspect is identified).93 That immediate commander
is then required to make a preliminary inquiry into the alleged of-
fense.94 At this stage, the commander generally should refer the
case to the service's criminal investigative department (CID) for
investigation pursuant to a regulation stating that "in serious...
cases the commander should consider whether to seek the assis-
tance of law enforcement personnel in conducting any inquiry or
further investigation."'95 Assuming that a case is referred to CID,
an investigative report is then sent back to the commander who,
usually in consultation with Judge Advocate General Corps per-
91. 10 U.S.C. § 920 (1994).
92. MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, Rule 1004(c)(9) (1984) (as
amended).
I reserve comment here on the appropriateness of the death penalty in general or
on its constitutionality when applied to the category of rape cases for which it may be
imposed under military law.
Unfortunately, meaningful statistics on the military sentences actually imposed for
rape are unavailable because of the nature of military sentencing procedures. Military
courts do not impose separate sentences for each count of which a defendant is convict-
ed. Rather, one sentence is imposed for all the counts of which the defendant is convict-
ed at a particular trial. For example, in 1991-92, for trials resulting in convictions of
which rape was the most serious count, the median sentence in the Navy was five years
and in the Marine Corps was thirteen years; however, those numbers are largely
uninterpretable because the sentences might have included punishment for multiple
crimes, all prosecuted in the same trial. See Letter from Capt. W.F. Grant, Jr., Chief
Trial Judge, U.S. Navy, to author (June 15, 1995) (on file with author).
93. See MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL, UNrrED STATEs, Rule 301 (1984) (as
amended).
94. See id., Rule 303.
95. See iL. (Discussion of Regulation).
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sonnel, decides whether to bring a charge of rape against the sus-
pect.96 An Article Thirty-Two investigation, the military analog to
a grand jury proceeding, is then convened to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to warrant referring the charge to a
court martial.'
Provisions intended to ensure adequate enforcement also are
in place. Article Ninety-Eight of the UCMJ provides that "[any
person ... who (1) is responsible for unnecessary delay in the
disposition of any case of a person accused of an offense ... shall
be punished as a court-martial may direct.""8 The UCMJ also
provides for the processing and redress of complaints by "[a]ny
member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his
commanding officer."'  Such wrongs presumably would include
failure to process a rape complaint properly.
Notwithstanding these provisions intended to ensure enforce-
ment, there is anecdotal evidence of failure to enforce military
rape laws, including failures to investigate, to keep records, and to
preserve evidence."° Witnesses at Senate hearings in 1992 testi-
fied that such failures are common.'' Other than anecdotal evi-
dence, there are currently no data available to evaluate the nature
or extent of failures to enforce military rape law (much less to
compare military enforcement with civilian enforcement).
96. See generally id., Rule 306 (Initial Disposition); id., Rule 307 (Preferral of Charg-
es).
97. See id., Rule 405.
Any plea bargaining with regard to sentencing normally occurs in the period be-
tween the conclusion of the Article Thirty-Two investigation and the commencement of
trial. See Interview with Col. Scott Silliman, U.S.A.F. (Ret.), former Staff Judge Advo-
cate, Air Combat Command, in Durham, N.C. (Oct. 14, 1994). Plea bargaining as to the
crime charged is extremely rare in the military justice system, see iL, in contrast with the
civilian sector where pleas to a lesser charge are common.
98. 10 U.S.C. § 898 (1994).
99. 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1994).
100. See, eg., Counseling and Other Needs of Women Veterans, supra note 5, at 12-14
(statement of Diana Danis); id at 24 (statement of Jacqueline Ortiz); id. at 34 (statement
of Barbara Franco); Molly Moore, Navy Failed to Prosecute in 6 Rapes; Probe Finds
Laxity on Sex Offenses at Florida Base, WASH. PosT, Oct. 22, 1990, at Al; Jeff Nesmith,
Military Courts Often Fail to Deal with Rape Charges: Leniency Is Common as Com-
manders Use Their Discretion to Punish Offenders, ORANGE COuNTY REG., Oct. 4, 1995,
at A14.
101. See, e.g., Counseling and Other Needs of Women Veterans, supra note 5, at 12-14
(statement of Diana Danis); id. at 24 (statement of Jacqueline Ortiz); id. at 34 (statement
of Barbara Franco).
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Certainly, commanders have discretion in the processing of
rape complaints, especially in the early stages of the process, such
as the preliminary inquiry. That discretion could be misused to
divert cases from prosecution or otherwise to extend inappropriate
leniency."° If there is, in fact, a laxity in the enforcement of mil-
itary laws against rape, then that weakness would be expected to
reduce the efficacy of that law in deterring rape."° Such a lack
of deterrence would be expected to increase military rape rates
and therefore could constitute an important element contributing
to the rape differential.
Implementation of a thoroughgoing system of record-keeping,
tracking all military rape allegations from their initial report to
final disposition and compiling those data in a central data bank,
would be valuable both in encouraging enforcement and in allow-
ing for identification of procedural flaws or enforcement problems
in the handling of rape within the military justice system. Careful
record-keeping and oversight both would tend to improve enforce-
ment directly (simply by increasing the visibility of the handling of
cases) and would assist in identification of any problems in en-
forcement procedures."° Legislation instituting such centralized
record-keeping and oversight of military sexual misconduct cases
has been proposed in the past,0 5 but none has been adopted to
date.Y
102. See Nesmith, supra note 100:
Behind the guarded gates of military installations, there is no public scrutiny
when commanders decide whether persons accused of crimes will be court-mar-
tialed or "counselled." That tends to favor leniency, said Frank Zimring, a law
professor at the University of California at Berkeley.
In addition, Zimring said, if a charge is seen as serious enough to war-
rant prosecution, military commanders and court-martial juries often are under
pressure to get rid of the accused, rather than incur the expense of incarcera-
tion.
103. On the roles of certainty and celerity in deterrence, see J.L. Miller & Andy B.
Anderson, Updating Deterrence Doctrine, 77 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 418, 421-22
(1986).
104. Regarding the utility of such a record-keeping and oversight program, see State-
ment of Professor Madeline Morris on the DeConcini Amendment to the National De-
fense Authorization Act of 1994 to Establish Within the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense the Position of Director of Special Investigations and for Other Purposes, 140
CONG. REC. S8164 (dally ed. July 1, 1994).
105. See, eg., Proposed DeConcini Amendment to the National Defense Authorization
Act of 1994 to Establish Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense the Position of
Director of Special Investigations and for Other Purposes, 140 CONG. REC. S8159 (daily
ed. July 1, 1994) (Amend. No. 2146) (companion legislation to S. 816, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993)).
106. See, eg., 140 CONG. REc. S8167-72 (daily ed. July 1, 1994) (rejecting proposed
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Domestic military law, then, appears to be comparable to
civilian law in its substantive aspects but may be less stringent in
its actual implementation. If military enforcement mechanisms are
in fact comparatively weak, then a resulting reduction in deter-
rence might explain some part of the military rape differential.
Improved oversight in this area is warranted in order to identify
and correct any patterns of enforcement failure.
The other body of law governing rape by military personnel is
international law. It appears that enforcement of the international
laws against rape by military personnel may be even more lacking
than enforcement of other aspects of international law relating to
military personnel." Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that any fea-
ture of international justice contributes appreciably to the rape
differential.
International law clearly criminalizes rape by military person-
nel."8 There is, however, evidence that international law's prohi-
DeConcini Amendment).
The Department of Defense is currently in the process of implementing a Defense
Incident Based Reporting System (DIBRS) which will provide for centralized uniform
crime record-keeping throughout the military services. Telephone Interview with Lt. Col.
David Shutler, U.S.A.F., Deputy Director, Legal Policy, Requirements and Resources
(June 24, 1994). DIBRS, once in place, will greatly facilitate any attempt at centralized
data compilation and oversight of rape/sexual assault case handling.
107. See infra note 109.
108. Rape is incontrovertibly a war crime. Both the Fourth Geneva Convention and
the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions explicitly prohibit rape. See Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3536, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 306 (Fourth Geneva Convention); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, arts.
76(1), 85, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, art. 4(2)(e), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 612.
Rape also may constitute a grave breach under the Geneva Conventions. Although
rape is not specified in the Conventions as a grave breach, there is clear movement in
the international community toward interpreting the Conventions' grave breach provisions
to cover rape. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has declared that
the grave breach of "wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health"
(Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention) covers rape. Theodor Meron, Rape as a
Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 424, 426 (1993)
[hereinafter Meron, Rape] (citing ICRC, Aide-Memoire (Dec. 3, 1992)). The U.S. De-
partment of State also has stated recently that rape in some instances may constitute a
grave breach. See id. at 427 n.22 (citing Letter from Robert A. Bradtke, Acting Assistant
Sec. for Legislative Affairs, to Senator Arlen Specter (Jan. 27, 1993)).
For excellent overviews of the law of rape as a war crime, see Christine Chinkin,
Peace and Force in International Law, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTER-
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bitions of rape have been even less subject to enforcement than
have other provisions of international criminal law." Nonethe-
NATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 203; Meron, Rape, supra.
Rape, like other war crimes, may constitute a crime against humanity when com-
mitted in a mass and systematic manner, and on the basis of political, racial, or religious
group membership. See Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia,
72 FOREIGN AFF. 122, 130 (1993) [hereinafter Meron, Case]. The Statutes of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda list rape among the
conduct that may constitute crimes against humanity. Statute of the International Tribunal,
in UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COuNCIL, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSU-
ANT TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 808 (1993), Annex, art. 5(g),
at 13, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at
29, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993) (former Yugoslavia); UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUN-
CIL, STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, art. 3(g), U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994) (Rwanda). There was broad consensus among the parties participating
in the drafting of the first International Tribunal Statute to include rape (when commit-
ted under relevant conditions) within crimes against humanity. The U.N. Secretary-Gener-
al, France, Italy, seven states represented by the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC), and the United States each submitted proposals for definitions of crimes to come
within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal that defined rape, committed under
certain conditions, as a crime against humanity. See Statute of the International Tribunal,
supra, art. 5; UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL, LETTER DATED 10 FEBRUARY 1993
FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS AD-
DRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, Annex V, art. VI(1)(b)(iv), at 62, U.N. Doc.
S/25266 (1993); UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL, LETrER DATED 16 FEBRUARY
1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ITALY TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, Annex I, art. 4(c), at 3, U.N. Doc. S/25300
(1993); UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL, LETTER DATED 31 MARCH 1993 FROM
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF EGYPT, THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, MALAYSIA, PAKI-
STAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND SENEGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, Annex, art. II(c)(1), at 2, U.N. Doc. S/25512 (1993) (OIC); cf.
UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL, LETTER DATED 5 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PER-
MANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NA-
TIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, Annex II, art 10(b)(i), at b, U.N.
Doc. S/25575 (1993) (making an argument that implicitly defines rape, committed under
certain conditions, as a crime against humanity).
Under certain circumstances, rape can also be a part of the crime of genocide. The
U.N. Convention on the Prevention or Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines
genocide to include "[k]illing members of the group," "[c]ausing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group," and "[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part." Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, art. II,
78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280. The Convention requires proof of intent to destroy or partially
destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Id. Rape, when carried out for the
purposes of destroying such a group, may be prosecuted under the Genocide Convention.
See Meron, Case, supra, at 130-32. For analysis of the applicability of the Genocide
Convention to ethnic cleansing, see John Webb, Genocide Treaty-Ethnic Cleans-
ing-Substantive and Procedural Hurdles in the Application of the Genocide Convention to
Alleged Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 377 (1993).
109. Those few prosecutions for violations of international criminal law that have
occurred have given scant attention to the prosecution of rape. Rape was not mentioned
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less, to date, international criminal law relating to military person-
nel has been so rarely enforced-whether regarding rape, murder,
assault, or otherwise"°--that it seems unlikely that differential
enforcement of international provisions accounts for any significant
part of the rape differential.
The proposition that underenforcement of international crimi-
nal law probably contributes little to an explanation of the rape
differential should not be taken to suggest that international crimi-
nal law could not contribute in the future to a reduction of rape
by military personnel. There are indications that the enforcement
of international criminal law relating to military personnel may
improve considerably in the coming years. Within the past three
years, we have witnessed the establishment of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,"'
and the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court
is becoming an ever more real possibility." The establishment of
in the Nuremberg Charter and was not prosecuted as a war crime at the Nuremberg
trials. See Meron, Rape, supra note 108, at 425-26. Rape received limited treatment at
the Tokyo tribunal. See id at 426 & n.14; Charter of the International Tribunal for the
Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, amended Apr. 26, 1946, TIAS No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20; 2 THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST, THE TOKYO JUDGMENT
967-68, 971-73, 988-89 (B.V.A. Rbling & C.F. Rilter eds., 1977); 1 id. at 385; JOHN A.
APPLEMAN, MILIrARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 259 (1971); ARNOLD C.
BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE TOKYO WAR
CRIMES TRIALS 20-21, 84, 379-82 (1987); William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for
War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1, 69-73 (1973). National tribunals have only occasionally
included evidence of rape as a part of prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against
humanity. See, e.g., CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, Art. II(1)(c) (Dec. 20, 1945) (Al-
lied Control Council), reprinted in NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, DOCUMENTS ON PRISONERS
OF WAR 305 (Int'l Law Studies vol. 60, Howard S. Levie ed., 1979) (providing occupying
powers in Europe with authority to conduct war crimes trials subsequent to WWII); XV
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 121 (1949); PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL 179-80 (1979).
110. Prosecution of war crimes or other crimes committed by military personnel has
been inconsistent and rather minimal. Since the Nuremberg and Tokyo international tri-
bunals after WWII, there have been no international war crimes tribunals. See Meron,
Case, supra note 108, at 122. Some national courts have tried war crimes, but such pro-
ceedings have been sporadic, and their outcomes far from satisfactory. See id. at 123.
Regarding the myriad impediments to the efficacy of war crimes tribunals in national
courts, see II TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH
FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (country studies).
111. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 108 (former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, supra note
108 (Rwanda).
112. Most recently, in November 1995 the U.N. General Assembly 6th Committee
adopted a draft resolution calling for a Preparatory Committee to draft texts of a con-
vention for an International Criminal Court (ICC). Draft Resolution of the Gen. Assembly
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such tribunals for the adjudication of international crimes would
be expected to contribute substantially to enforcement of interna-
tional criminal law, including the enforcement of international law
prohibiting rape."' Thus, international criminal law has the po-
tential to become a real factor in the deterrence of crime, includ-
ing rape, by military personnel. But the influences of international
criminal justice probably contribute little to an explanation of the
existing military rape differential.
In sum, flaws in the enforcement of domestic law governing
rape by military personnel may account for some part of the rape
differential and may require the remedial steps discussed above. In
contrast, while international criminal law may contribute to future
efforts to reduce rape by military personnel, its existing shortcom-
ings probably do not contribute significantly to an explanation of
the rape differential observed."4
Sixth Comm., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.14 (1995). Regarding the historic development and pros-
pects for implementation of the ICC concept, see Timothy C. Evered, An International
Criminal Court Recent Proposals and American Concerns, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 121
(1994); Roy S. Lee, Remarks Made at Pace University School of Law on October 23,
1993, 6 PACE INT'L L. REv. 93, 95-97 (1994); Robert Rosenstock, Remarks Made at Pace
University School of Law on October 23, 1993, 6 PACE INT'L L. REv. 83 (1994); Michael
P. Scharf, Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV.
103 (1994).
113. Despite the weak history of prosecution of rape as a war crime, there is every
indication that the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda will
prosecute rape vigorously. See, e.g., Indictment 2, Meakic and Others, issued by the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Feb. 13, 1995) (listing rape and
sexual assaults among the acts constituting crimes against humanity), reprinted in 34
LL.M. 1011, 1014, 1020 (1995); Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, supra note 108 (listing rape as a crime against humani-
ty); Judge Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal, Remarks
Made at Duke Law School (Nov. 5, 1994). Indeed, the International Tribunal may con-
tribute greatly to the development of the international humanitarian law of rape (e.g., by
setting a precedent for diligently prosecuting rape as a war crime, establishing it clearly
as a grave breach under the Geneva Conventions, identifying it as a crime against hu-
manity when committed on a mass and systematic scale, identifying it as a tool of geno-
cide when so used, and by establishing that forced prostitution is a form of rape). Cf.
SPECIAL TASK FORCE OF THE A.B.A. SECTION OF INT'L LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT
ON THE INT'L TRIBUNAL TO ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES COMMITFED IN THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 15 (1993) (suggesting that the statute of the International Tribunal should
"expand subparagraph 5(g) (rape) to include specific reference to enforced prostitution,
enforced pregnancy, and other widespread sexual offenses").
114. Individual civil liability for rape, as well as criminal liability, may obtain under
provisions of both domestic and international law. (For a discussion of state responsibility
for rape by military personnel, see infra note 393.) There is, however, no reason to be-
lieve that any aspect of potential civil liability would contribute to the military rape dif-
ferential. In the domestic context, military personnel would be subject to civil suit for
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Finally, it is worth focusing on an additional avenue of expla-
nation, concerning environmental factors, that appears promising in
its potential to illuminate one important set of factors contributing
to the military rape differential. A virtue of this avenue of expla-
nation is that it carries significant implications for policymaking
that may help to address the rape differential and thus to reduce
further the incidence of rape by military personnel."5
rape in the same courts and under the same laws as civilians would be-or, more pre-
cisely, as civilian federal employees would be. In any event, the provisions applicable to
suits for torts by federal employees are, for present purposes, entirely comparable to the
provisions applicable to suits for torts by any civilian. See Letter from Col. Scott Silliman,
U.S.A.F. (Ret.), former Staff Judge Advocate, Air Combat Command, to author (Jan. 23,
1996) (on file with author).
In the international context, the provisions under which military personnel would be
subject to civil suit for rape would apply equally to other forms of violent abuse or
torture because there are no provisions in international law giving rise to individual lia-
bility for rape in particuiar. Rather, international law permits states to provide civil rem-
edies, in tort or restitution, for international crimes giving rise to universal jurisdiction.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 cmt. b (1986). Crimes giving rise to universal jurisdiction include grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions, crimes against humanity and, probably, genocide. See Meron,
Case, supra note 108, at 129; Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International
Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 788 (1988) (crimes against humanity). Compare RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 404 (pro-
viding universal jurisdiction to punish genocide) with E.S. Fawcett, The Eichman Case, 38
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 181, 206 (1962) (arguing that territoriality is the exclusive jurisdic-
tional basis for prosecution of genocide). Thus, rape or any other crime committed in
such a way as to constitute a grave breach, a crime against humanity, or (probably)
genocide, see supra note 108, can form the basis for civil liability. See, e.g., Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the Alien Tort Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1988), provided U.S. federal jurisdiction for a tort suit against Radovan Karadzic, presi-
dent of the Bosnian Serb administration in Pale, in his individual capacity, for wrongs,
including rape, committed in the armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Comparative data
are lacking regarding the imposition of international law-based civil liability for rape and
for other forms of violent abuse. But the prospect that military personnel perceive some
disparity in the imposition of international civil liability for rape and for other forms of
abuse, and that this perception affects their rape incidence, is extremely remote indeed.
115. One might ask why military rape incidence needs to be addressed or reduced,
given that peacetime military rape rates are lower than civilian rape rates (after control-
ling for age and gender). The response is threefold. First, the blight of extremely high
rape rates that is common to many wars (extremely high both in comparison with civilian
rates and in comparison with military rates of other violent crime in war) is well worth
addressing. Second, while peacetime military rape rates are lower than civilian rates, they
are diminished from civilian rates substantially less than are military rates of other vio-
lent crime. See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text. If that lesser diminution in
rape is in fact due to factors that can be addressed with a resultant further reduction in
military rape rates, bringing reduction in military rape rates more into line with reduction
in military rates of other violent crime, then this too is a goal worth pursuing. Thirdly,
reducing military rape rates as much as possible may be a national obligation under
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The avenue of explanation for the military rape differential
that I intend now to pursue rests largely on an interpretation of
military culture, as follows: There are conditions of military life
and lifestyle that inhibit and diminish rates of violent crime includ-
ing rape, but there are other conditions in military life that tend
to re-elevate rape rates. The factors minimizing military violent
crime would include a structured and controlled lifestyle, often
with greater surveillance of one's activities than in civilian life;
fewer opportunities for many kinds of crime (especially for person-
nel living on base); a population that excludes past felons;1 6 a
reduced incidence of drug abuse; 17 and a close knit social orga-
nization that generally imparts and enforces anti-crime norms.
These factors would contribute to a diminution in violent crime by
military personnel in peacetime and, to a lesser extent, even in the
combat context.
What may explain the lesser minimizing effect of these factors
on military rape rates is that, even while those crime-inhibiting
pressures are being exerted on all violent crime including rape,
countervailing factors in military culture tend to push the rape
rate-but not the rates of other violent crime-back up. In brief,
the cultural influences that may tend to re-elevate military rape
rates are as follows. When a closely bonded group (a "primary
group") shares group norms conducive to rape, the risk of rape by
group members is increased. Norms conducive to rape include
certain normative attitudes toward masculinity, toward sexuality,
and toward women, and also include norms favoring de-
individuation (described below) among group members. When
primary group members with rape-conducive attitudes enter a
deindividuated state, the risk of individual or group rape becomes
significant, especially if external deterrents are minimal. The fol-
lowing section demonstrates that military units are primary groups,
and examines evidence that military primary groups often share
rape-conducive norms that may elevate the rape incidence of mili-
tary organizations in war and in peace."' Thus, the hypothesis to
international law. See infra note 393 and accompanying text.
116. See 10 U.S.C. § 504 (1994).
117. See Eric Schmitt, Military Struggling to Stem an Increase in Family Violence, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 1994, at Al, A12.
118. Of course, military primary groups also could share norms conducive to crimes
other than rape. The prevalence of certain crimes in particular units in certain wars sug-
gests that such phenomena have indeed occurred. See, e.g., Office of the Judge Advocate
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be explored is that these military cultural factors tend to increase
military rape rates but not military rates of other violent
crime-and that these cultural factors may contribute significantly
to the military rape differential.
B. The Rape Differential and Military Culture
1. Primary Groups. The "primary group" is a familiar feature
of analyses in sociology. As defined by the author of the term,
primary groups are
characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation.
They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are
fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the indi-
vidual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a
certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's
very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and
purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this
wholeness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the sort of
sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural
expression.119
Primary groups are particularly influential in shaping their
members' attitudes and behaviors.'20
Primary groups are distinguished from other forms of group
association in that primary groups are emotionally central to the
individual.' While the prototype of the primary group is the
family,12 other forms of primary group include close friendship
groups,' fraternities and sororities,24  religious orders,'" reli-
Gen., supra note 47, at 263-68 (discussing widespread organized theft and resale of gov-
emnent supplies by members of a certain railway battalion in the ETO). However, there
are reasons why norms conducive to rape in particular are especially likely to form in
military organizations. See infra Part IV. For that reason, the following analysis, while
having some applicability to crimes by military personnel in general, is particularly cogent
and applicable to the phenomenon of rape by members of military organizations.
119. CHARLES H. COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: A STUDY OF THE LARGER MIND
23 (1909).
120. See DEXTER C. DUNPHY, THE PRIMARY GROUP: A HANDBOOK FOR ANALYSIS
AND FIELD RESEARCH 40-79 (1972).
121. See id. at 5.
122. Ellsworth Faris, The Primary Group: Essence and Accident, 38 AM. J. Soc. 41,
48 (1932) ("The family has always been considered the essential type of a primary
group.").
123. See id. at 49; Peter 0. Peretti, Perceived Primary Group Criteria in the Relational
Network of Closest Friendships, 15 ADOLESCENCE 555, 555 (1980).
124. See DUNPHY, supra note 120, at 5, 15.
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gious or psychotherapeutic "cults,' ' 126 street gangs,127 some
sports teams, and the like."
Primary groups involve personal affective relationships (often
of a form replicating familial relationships); often require some
form of renunciation or separation by members from other com-
mitments and relationships; often have formal membership require-
ments and/or initiation rites; and frequently have some ideology or
cause to which the group is committed.'29 Each of these charac-
teristics of primary groups contributes to group cohesion.
Primary groups are powerful forces in the lives of their mem-
bers because primary group relationships tap into the formative
emotional and psychological structures that constitute the bases of
the individual's personality or self. For this reason, primary groups
profoundly affect individuals' inner emotional lives and, conse-
quently, their attitudes and actions. 30 From a psychoanalytic per-
spective, primary groups "recreate primary ties originally formed in
the family. They reactivate family identifications and make use of
transference relationships to modify personality."''11 In sum, pri-
mary groups are potently influential.
Military units prominently feature the characteristics of prima-
ry groups. We would therefore expect the norms and attitudes
engendered in the context of military units to have significant
effects on the behavior of their members. After discussing the
primary-group attributes of military units, we shall consider more
specifically primary groups' influence on sexual attitudes and be-
havior, including rape.
2. Primary Groups in Military Organizations. The military
unit is an institution with strong primary-group characteristics, 32
125. See id. at 5.
126. See id at 5, 31-34 (including as primary groups "[r]esocialization groups such as
therapy groups, rehabilitation groups, and self-analytic groups").
127. Id at 5, 13-15.
128. See generally id. at 5.
129. This list contains factors characteristic of primary groups, not definitive or abso-
lute requirements.
130. For an in-depth analysis of this process, see DUNPHY, supra note 120, at 40-59.
131. Id. at 34.
132. See MARTIN BINIuN & SHIRLEY J. BACH, WOMEN AND THE MILITARY 91
(1977); KARSTEN, supra note 64, at 69; CHARLES C. MOSKOS, JR., THE AMERICAN EN-
LISTED MAN 156 (1970); David H. Marlowe, The Manning of the Force and the Structure
of Battle: Part 2-Men and Women, in CONSCRIPTS AND VOLUNTEERS 189, 193-94 (Rob-
ert K Fullinwider ed., 1983).
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especially in the combat context. 3 3 These characteristics begin to
develop as early as basic training." A central goal of military
unit preparation is the fostering of unit cohesion through the
formation of primary group bonds. 35 As General Colin Powell
put it, "Bonding begins on the first day of boot camp."' 36 The
nature of the affective bonds of the military unit in combat is well
reflected in the remarks of a wounded World War II veteran in
1944: "The men in my squad were my special friends.... If one
man gets a letter from home.., the whole company reads it.
Whatever belongs to me belongs to the whole outfit."' 7 As in
other primary groups, cohesion in military units is fostered by the
cementing of affective ties within the group, by separation of
members from outside emotional ties, by the presence of
membership requirements and initiation rites, and by the presence
of an ideology or cause to which the group is committed.
The affective bonds developed in primary groups of all sorts
tend to replicate the primary ties originally formed in the fam-
ily.138 Not surprisingly, the psychological structures of the family
are conspicuously replicated within the military unit from the time
of its formation.139  The drill instructor who leads the unit
To be more precise, military units are intended to be, and usually are, primary
groups. When they are not, "unit cohesion" is lacking, which is considered a serious
problem by military leaders and experts. See infra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
133. See JESSE G. GRAY, THE WARRIORS 44 (1959) ("As any commander knows, an
hour or two of combat can do more to weld a unit together than can months of inten-
sive training.").
134. For a discussion of the different roles of primary groups in combat and noncom-
bat military units, see Roger W. Little, Buddy Relations and Combat Performance, in
THE NEw MILITARY 195, 195-223 (Morris Janowitz ed., 1964).
135. See Frederick Manning, Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps, in HANDBOOK
OF MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY 453, 457 (Reuven Gal & A. David Mangelsdorff eds., 1991);
see also SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
Acr FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994, S. REP. No. 112, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 264 (1993) ("One
of the most critical elements in combat capability is unit cohesion, that is, the bonds of
trust among individual service members.").
136. SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, supra note 135, at 275 (statement of Gen.
Colin Powell).
137. 11 SAMUEL A. STOUFFER ET AL., THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: COMBAT AND ITS
AFTERMATH 99 (1949).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 122-31.
139. As Dexter Dunphy has observed, "[T]he primary group in the army acts as a
family surrogate ... ." DUNPHY, supra note 120, at 26.
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through basic training comes to occupy the role of a father.1" As
one Marine sergeant explained,
[The recruits are] seeking discipline, they're seeking someone to
take charge, 'cause at home they never got it.... [A]nd it's
kind of like the father-and-son game, all the way through. They
form a fatherly image of the DI [drill instructor] whether they
want to or not.141
In combat, the commanding officer as a paternal figure serves
important functions. As one World War II veteran said, "About
officers-everybody wants somebody to look up to when he's
scared. It makes a lot of difference."'4 The competently pro-
tective and paternal leader has consistently been found to be an
important basis of morale for primary groups in combat."
Sigmund Freud discussed the replication of familial psychologi-
cal structures in armies as well as in other "artificial groups" such
as the church. As he stated,
In a Church... as well as in an army... the same illusion
holds good of there being a head-in the Catholic Church Christ,
in an army its Commander-in-Chief-who loves all the individuals
in the group with an equal love.... It is not without a deep
reason that the similarity between the Christian community and a
family is invoked, and that believers call themselves brothers in
Christ, that is, brothers through the love which Christ has for
them.... The like holds good of an army. The Commander-in-
Chief is a father who loves all soldiers equally, and for that rea-
son they are comrades among themselves .... Every captain is,
140. A typical strategy is for the older, senior drill instructor to play a fatherly role,
while the junior drill instructor is more of a "tough guy." Interview with Cpl. Salvatore
Cardella, Marine Combat Correspondent, at Parris Island Marine Corps Recruit Depot,
S.C. (Oct. 22, 1993).
141. GWYNNE DYER, WAR 113 (1985) (quoting U.S.M.C. Sgt. Carrington).
142. II STOUFFER ET AL, supra note 137, at 124.
143. See Edward A. Shils, Primary Groups in the American Army, in CONTINUmEs IN
SOCIAL RESEARCH 16, 32-35 (Robert K. Merton & Paul F. Lazarsfeld eds., 1974) [here-
inafter Shils, Primary]. Indeed, Shils elsewhere states that
authoritarian leadership can indeed be a crucial component in primary groups
composed of persons with personality needs which can best be satisfied by
authoritative protection or in primary groups operating in situations which bring
these needs for paternal protection to the fore .... With certain types of per-
sonalities or in certain types of situations (tasks and threats) primary-group soli-
darity might well be disintegrated by democratic leadership.
Edward A. Shils, The Study of the Primary Group, in THE POLICY SCIENCEs 44, 65 n.60
(Daniel Lerner & Harold L. Lasswell eds., 1951) [hereinafter Shils, The Study].
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as it were, the Commander-in-Chief and the father of his compa-
ny, and so is every non-commissioned officer of his section.1"
Thus, military units, like other primary groups, feature affective
bonds that are often reminiscent of family relationships. 45
In addition to replicating family relationships, military groups,
like other primary groups, also encourage separation by members
from other commitments and relationships. From the time of basic
training, military personnel are encouraged to effectuate, at least
temporarily, some separation from outside emotional ties. This
trend in military training toward separation from family or other
outside bonds is based on an understanding that the solidarity or
cohesion of the military unit can be undermined by the pull of
competing loyalties."4 For that reason, military personnel are en-
couraged to transfer their loyalties from any previous attachments
to the military unit, at least as a temporary matter.'47 The com-
ments of one Marine Corps captain regarding recruits' commu-
nication with people "outside" during basic training are illustrative:
They're allowed to call home, so long as it doesn't get out of
hand.... If it's a case of an emergency call coming in, then
they're allowed to accept that call; if not, one of my staff will
144. SIGMUND FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO 25-26
(1959). This commonality between military and religious groups was again reflected in
recent congressional testimony stating that "[s]uccessful officers . . . relay a strong sense
of... security to their soldiers which . . .gains a degree of influence and control over
members of their units often associated with charismatic leaders." SENATE COMM. ON
ARMED SERVICES, supra note 135, at 307 (quoting Dr. William Daryl Henderson, retired
Research Fellow at the National War College); see also DYER, supra note 141, at 103
("[Military socialization] is, essentially, a conversion process in an almost religious
sense-and as in all conversion phenomena, the emotions are far more important than
the specific ideas.").
The theme of commonalities in the quasi-familial psychological structures of primary
groups as seemingly diverse as military units, religious orders, cults, fraternities, street
gangs, and sport teams is significant. The significance lies in the fact that those quasi-
familial psychological structures greatly magnify the power of such groups' influence on
their members. As we shall see, that magnified group influence may tend to increase,
under certain circumstances, the rape incidence of group members.
145. Of course, "mother" and "sister" have been largely absent from the military
"family." The significance of this absence is discussed infra notes 303-04 and accompa-
nying text.
146. See DUNPHY, supra note 120, at 26 ("[A] man's real family loyalties were one of
the most substantial threats to the solidarity of the army unit."); Edward A. Shiis &
Morris Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II, 12 PUB.
OPINION Q. 280, 289-91 (1948).
147. See DUNPHY, supra note 120, at 26.
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take the message .... In some cases I'll get calls from parents
who haven't quite gotten adjusted to the idea that their son had
cut the strings .... The military provides them with an opportu-
nity to leave home but they're still in a rather secure environ-
mentY.
The emotional displacement of outside ties with unit bonds is
pronounced during training, is generally more moderated in day-
to-day peacetime military life, and is at its height in the combat
context. Soldiers in combat frequently say that they are closer with
their unit members than with their wives or families.1 49 As one
Vietnam veteran put it,
[T]here's a love relationship that is nurtured in combat because
the man next to you-you're depending on him for the most im-
portant thing you have, your life.... I'd say this bond is stron-
ger than almost anything, with the exception of parent and child.
It's a hell of a lot stronger than man and wife-your life is in his
hands .... '50
This replacement of family with the military unit as the emo-
tional center of soldiers' lives, at least temporarily, is consistently
reflected in solders' remarks and in the literature on the social
psychology of combat.' As Arkin and Dobrofsky conclude,
The interruption of intimate family relations which basic training
accomplishes, the separation from family which basic training
enforces, and the distance from one's family which the first en-
listment tour encourages are all processes intended to ensure that
148. DYER, supra note 141, at 109 (quoting U.S.M.C. Capt. Brassington).
149. For a psychoanalytic analysis of the combat buddy relationship as narcissistic
failure to discriminate between self and other, see Fox, supra note 64, at 809-11.
150. DYER, supra note 141, at 104 (quoting former U.S. Army Capt. John Early); see
also id. at 127 (quoting William Manchester. "You are closer to those men than to any-
one except your immediate family when you were young.").
151. See, e.g., William Arkin & Lynne R. Dobrofsky, Military Socialization and Mascu-
linity, in MAKING WAR, MAKING PEACE: THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS 68, 76-77
(Francesca Cancian & James Gibson eds., 1990).
Consistent with the trend toward avoiding relationships with outsiders that might
undermine the cohesion of the military primary group, a certain level of care is taken so
that personal friendships within the military unit do not threaten its primary group soli-
darity. Thus, especially in the combat context, there is an avoidance of overt pairing off
into duos that might seem exclusionary or rejecting of others or of the group. See Little,
supra note 134, at 198.
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the man is fully socialized (disciplined) by the military before re-
introducing civilian and intimate influences of family. 2
In addition to the building of affective ties within the group,
and the separation from affective ties outside the group, military
units also share the formal membership requirements and initiation
rites that are characteristic of primary groups.'53 As well as the
threshold membership requirements for becoming a recruit (such
as mental and physical testing, age, gender, and educational quali-
fications), various forms of initiation occur throughout basic train-
ing. Physical hardship and stern discipline must be undergone
before one "becomes" a soldier, sailor, marine, or airman. The
extraordinary challenge or ordeal from which one emerges as an
initiate serves to create and to support a sense of group identity
and solidarity." The use of such formal and informal member-
ship requirements and initiation rites is a characteristic mode of
defining insiders and outsiders in primary groups.
Finally, as is common in primary groups, there is in the mili-
tary an ideology or cause to which the group is committed: the
defense and protection of a nation, or of a political system or way
of life. A military organization's ideological basis, like that of
other primary groups, may or may not actually be a primary moti-
vation for membership or for group members' activities.' 5 Nev-
152. Arkin & Dobrofsky, supra note 151, at 76-77.
153. For descriptions of membership requirements and initiation rites in college frater-
nities, see PEGGY R. SANDAY, FRATERNITY GANG RAPE: SEx, BROTHERHOOD, AND
PRIVILEGE ON CAMPUS 135-55 (1990); Patricia Martin & Robert Hummer, Fraternities
and Rape on Campus, 3 GENDER & SOC'Y 457, 462 (1989).
154. See DUNPHY, supra note 120, at 278; cf. Martin & Hummer, supra note 153, at
462 ("Characteristics of the [demanding and demeaning] pledge experience are rational-
ized by fraternity members as necessary to help pledges unite into a group, rely on each
other, and join together against outsiders.").
155. While a group ideology or cause (e.g., a religious or political commitment) may
serve as the members' ostensible purpose for membership, there is substantial evidence
that ideology plays a secondary role to emotional sustenance and attachment in the moti-
vations of many ideological primary group members. See DUNPHY, supra note 120, at 27;
Edward A. Shils, Primordia4 Personal, Sacred, and Civil Ties, in THE STUDY OF SOCI-
ETY: AN INTEGRATED ANTHOLOGY 178, 178-92 (Peter I. Rose ed., 1967); Madeline Mor-
ris, IAM: A Group Portrait 75-96 (1986) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
For examination of the relationship between primary group bonding and ideological
motivation in military organizations, see RICHARD A. GABRIEL, THE NEW RED LEGIONS
(1980); Elliot P. Chodoff, Ideology and Primary Groups, 9 ARMED FORCES & SOc'Y 569,
577-91 (1983); Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam, 31 J.
OF SOC. ISSUES 25, 26-27 (1975); Shils, Primary, supra note 143, at 23-24; Shils &
Janowitz, supra note 146, at 281-315.
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ertheless, members' ulterior or additional motives notwithstanding,
the military organization's ideological basis provides for group
members a basis or ostensible basis for participation and identifica-
tion.
Military units, then, are primary groups.'56 They share with
other primary groups the central characteristic of personal, affec-
tive bonding, along with the frequent concomitants of separation
from external bonds, initiation requirements, and ideological com-
ponents. The primary group bonds of the military unit begin form-
ing in basic training and are most intense in the combat context.
3. Sexual Norms in Primary Groups. Heightened rape inci-
dence is associated with certain primary groups. Some street or
motorcycle gangs," fraternities,"5  and sports teams, 9  for in-
stance, appear to be have elevated rape rates. Although less is
known about rape in religious and therapeutic cults, the limited
156. More precisely, military units are intended to be (and usually are) primary
groups. See supra note 132.
157. Regarding the phenomenon of rape by gang members, see MACKELLAR, supra
note 89, at 112; W.H. Blanchard, The Group Process in Gang Rape, 49 J. OF SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 259, 259-66 (1959); Gilbert Geis, Group Sexual Assaults, MED. ASPECTS OF HUM.
SEXUALITY, May 1971, at 101, 101-13; David Gelman et al., The Mind of the Rapist,
NEWSwEEK, July 23, 1990, at 46, 50.
158. Regarding the prevalence of rape by fraternity members, see SANDAY, supra note
153; Julie K. Ehrhart & Bernice R. Sandier, Party Rape, 9 RESPONSE 2, 2-3 (1985);
Mary P. Koss & John A. Gaines, The Prediction of Sexual Aggression by Alcohol Use,
Athletic Participation, and Fraternity Affiliation, 8 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 94,
105 (1993); Martin & Hummer, supra note 153, at 457-59.
159. Regarding the prevalence of rape by sports team members, see Gerald Eskenazi,
The Male Athlete and Sexual Assault, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1990, § 8, at 1 (stating that
"[i]nterviews with rape-crisis counselors as well as results of studies of assaults on college
campuses indicate that athletes are involved in a disproportionate number of rapes and
other sexual assaults"); Jerry Kirshenbaum, An American Disgrace: A Violent and Un-
precedented Lawlessness Has Arisen Among College Athletes in All Parts of the Country,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 27, 1989, at 16, 17; Koss & Gaines, supra note 158, at
104--05 (finding participation in organized athletics a significant predictor of sexual aggres-
sion in undergraduate population studied); Rick Telander & Robert Sullivan, You Reap
What You Sow: Oklahoma Has Paid the Price for the Anything Goes Attitude That Coach
Barry Switzer Has Allowed to Take Root, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 27, 1989, at 20, 21,
23-24; see also Todd W. Crosset et al., Male Student-Athletes Reported for Sexual As-
sault: A Survey of Campus Police Departments and Judicial Affairs Offices, Address
before the North American Society for Sports Sociology (Nov. 11, 1994), at 9 (on file
with author) (reporting that, at 20 schools with highly rated Division I football and bas-
ketball teams surveyed between 1991 and 1993, "athletes appear to be disproportionately
involved in incidents of sexual assault on college campuses").
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data available suggest that rape rates are elevated in some cults as
well. 1'0
The cause of the heightened rape incidence in such primary
groups appears to lie, at least partly, in the groups' norms. 61
Certain gender and sexual norms and attitudes have been found to
be conducive to rape. This section briefly considers the role of
sexual and gender norms in primary groups, and then examines
the set of gender and sexual attitudes that has been found to be
correlated with heightened rape propensity. The section concludes
with an examination of the presence and role of rape-conducive
norms in military culture.
The sets of norms developed in primary groups invariably
include gender and sexual norms. Perhaps the prototype of sexual
norms in primary groups is the incest taboo in families. 62 Some
primary groups develop specialized sexual norms (such as celibacy
or "free love") for reasons including avoidance of loyalties devel-
oped in sexual relationships that might compete with loyalties to
the group; avoidance of disruptions to group cohesion caused by
sexual jealousies or rejections within the group; control over
members' intimate selves through control of sexuality; and desire
by group members or leaders for norms consistent with their sexu-
al preferences.' 63 Sigmund Freud made explicit the analogous
160. Regarding sexual abuse of adults in cults, see Paul Martin et al., Post-Cult Symp-
toms: As Measured by MCM1 Before and After Residential Treatment, 9 CULTIC STUD. J.
219, 221, 238-39 (1992). Little systematic research has been done on the incidence in
cults of rape specifically, as opposed to sexual abuse defined to include rape along with
other forms of sexual abuse of adults. However, some anecdotal data on the subject is
collected in Marcia Rudin, Women, Elderly, and Children in Religious Cults, 1 CULTIC
STUD. J. 8, 10 (1984).
161. "Group norms" have been described as "ideas in the minds of members about
what should and should not be done by a specific member under specified circumstanc-
es." THEODORE M. MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SMALL GROUPS 74 (1967); see also
GEORGE C. HOMANS, THE HUMAN GROUP 121-27 (1950).
162. See generally Kurt W. Back, Small Groups, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIOLOGI-
CAL PERSPEcrvES 320, 327-28 (Morris Rosenberg & Ralph H. Turner eds., 1990) (dis-
cussing Freudian perspectives on family relations as prototypes for small group interac-
tions).
163. See generally id. at 334 (citations omitted):
[A] group will be more cohesive if it has fewer mutual choices .... [Plairing is
an activity that is opposed to the general efficient group process, just as fight-
ing-interpersonal aggression-is. Social critics have seen this point intuitively.
Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four opposes individual love to group solidarity with
Big Brother.
Cf. Martin & Hummer, supra note 153, at 470-71 (The fraternity norm of "getting sex
without giving emotionally . . .poses no threat to the bonding and loyalty of the frater-
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functions of such specialized sexual norms in religious organiza-
tions and military organizations:
In the great artificial groups, the Church and the army, there is
no room for woman as a sexual object. The love relation be-
tween men and women remains outside these organizations.
Even in a person who has in other respects become ab-
sorbed in a group, the directly sexual impulsions preserve a little
of his individual activity. If they become too strong they disinte-
grate every group formation. The Catholic Church had the best
of motives for recommending its followers to remain unmarried
and for imposing celibacy upon its priests."6
The content of primary groups' sexual norms varies between
groups and between types of groups. For example, religious cults
typically gravitate toward norms of broad sexual access by group
leaders but limited or leader-controlled sexual access for oth-
ers, 165 whereas fraternities tend to favor broad sexual ac-
cess-sometimes including coercive access-for all members.'6
The sexual norms of some primary groups are conducive to
rape. While the group norms conducive to rape in primary groups
may on occasion be specialized sexual norms directly approving of
rape,167 rape-conducive group norms more often will consist of a
set of normative attitudes toward sexuality and toward gender
more broadly that enhances the attractions and reduces the aver-
sions or inhibitions to rape.
nity brotherhood.").
164. FREUD, supra note 144, at 73.
165. Broad sexual access for group leaders often means virtually unconstrained sexual
access by the group leader to all group members (or sometimes to all group members of
the opposite sex). See Martin et al., supra note 160, at 221, 240. Limited or leader-con-
trolled sexual access by group members takes a variety of forms ranging from celibacy
requirements to requirements that members have sexual relations with (and/or marry)
other members of the leader's choosing, or that members (usually female) engage in
prostitution for the benefit of the group, or other arrangements in which the leader dic-
tates the sexual behavior of group members, invariably prohibiting some sexual activities
and often requiring others. See Rudin, supra note 160, at 9-10 (describing the leader-
controlled sexual practices of a variety of religious cults); Roy Wallis, Sex, Violence, and
Religion, 7 NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS 3, 3-4 (1983) (same).
166. See SANDAY, supra note 153, at 1-19; Martin & Hummer, supra note 153, at 459
("[Some] fraternities create a sociocultural context in which the use of coercion in sexual
relations with women is normative . . .).
167. See e.g., SANDAY, supra note 153, at 11-19.
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4. Rape-Conducive Sexual and Gender Attitudes. Social
science research conducted over several decades has identified a
specific set of attitudes that appears to be conducive to rape.161
This set includes certain attitudes toward masculinity, toward
sexuality, and toward women.
Particular attitudes toward masculinity have been found to be
related to heightened levels of rape propensity.69 Standards of
masculinity that emphasize dominance, assertiveness, aggressive-
ness, independence, self-sufficiency, and willingness to take risks,
and that reject characteristics such as compassion, understanding,
and sensitivity have been found to be correlated with rape propen-
sity. Several different measures for this construct of masculinity
have been used in the studies that have identified this correlation.
These measures include "negative masculinity," meaning a posture
of self-assertion and self-protection unalloyed with communion or
concern with others;7 ° "hypermasculinity," meaning stereotypic
masculinity and interpersonal opportunism; and nonfeminine
"sex-typing," meaning personality or sex role constructs with mini-
mal stereotypically feminine characteristics such as sensitivity or
gentleness. 2 In essence, normative standards of masculinity that
emphasize aggressiveness, dominance, and independence, and that
minimize sensitivity, gentleness, and other stereotypically feminine
168. While social science research on attitudes and rape-propensity cannot definitively
establish a causal relationship based on the extensive correlations established, a causal
relationship is strongly suggested by the available data and is generally believed to exist
by researchers in the field. See, e.g., Donald L. Mosher & Ronald D. Anderson, Macho
Personality, Sexual Aggression, and Reactions to Guided Imagery of Realistic Rape, 20 .
OF RES. IN PERSONALTY 77, 91 (1986).
169. Measures of rape propensity encompass measures both of prior commissions of
rape (based on convictions or self-reports) and of self-reported likelihood of raping in the
future under various conditions that may or may not occur (e.g., wartime). The available
research suggests that all of these measures are valid indicators of some consistent factor
of rape proneness or propensity. See, eg., Neil M. Malamuth, Rape Proclivity Among
Males, 37 J. OF Soc. ISSUEs 138, 138 (1981) (affirming the validity of likelihood-of-raping
measures).
170. Neil M. Malamuth et al., Characteristics of Aggressors Against Women: Testing a
Model Using a National Sample of College Students, 59 J. OF CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 670,
673-74 (1991).
171. David Lisak & Susan Roth, Motives and Psychodynamics of Self-Reported,
Unincarcerated Rapists, 60 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 268, 277-78 (1990).
172. Robert L. Quackenbush, A Comparison of Androgynous, Masculine Sex-Typed,
and Undifferentiated Males on Dimensions of Attitudes Toward Rape, 23 J. OF RES. IN
PERSONALITY 318, 328, 333 (1989).
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characteristics have been found to be associated with heightened
propensity to commit rape.
In addition to attitudes toward masculinity, certain attitudes
toward sexuality also have been found to be associated with
heightened rape propensity. "Adversarial sexual beliefs," the view
that sexual relationships are inherently exploitative-that is, that
each party seeks to benefit without regard for the other and will
use manipulation and deceit for that purpose 73 --are associated
with heightened rape propensity.74 "Sexual promiscuity," a high
emphasis on sexuality and, in particular, a high number of sexual
partners, also has been found to be correlated with high levels of
sexual aggression.' 75
Numerous studies have found that "rape myth acceptance"
also is associated with rape propensity. Rape myths are "prejudi-
cial, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and
rapists."' 76 Examples of rape myths would include, for instance,
the belief that women enjoy being raped.' Belief in rape myths
has been shown consistently to be strongly associated with sexual
aggression and with self-reported likelihood to rape. 78
In addition to attitudes toward masculinity and sexuality, atti-
tudes acceptant of violence against women also bear a relationship
to rape propensity. Such an attitudinal construct, as described by
Martha Burt, is "the notion that force and coercion are legitimate
ways to gain compliance and specifically that they are legitimate in
intimate and sexual relationships.' '179 Not surprisingly, attitudes of
173. Martha Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. OF PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL 217, 218 (1980).
174. See Quackenbush, supra note 172, at 338; cf. Burt, supra note 173, at 224-25
(finding that adversarial sexual beliefs are correlated with rape myth acceptance, which
itself has subsequently been shown to correlate with sexual aggression and attraction to
sexual aggression).
175. Malamuth et al., supra note 170, at 677-78.
176. Burt, supra note 173, at 217.
177. Id.
178. See John Briere & Neil M. Malamuth, Self-Reported Likelihood of Sexually Ag-
gressive Behavior: Attitudinal Versus Sexual Explanations, 17 J. OF RES. IN PERSONALITY
315, 321-22 (1983); Neil M. Malamuth, The Attraction to Sexual Aggression Scale: Part
One, 26 J. OF SEx REs. 26, 38-40 (1989) [hereinafter Malamuth, Part One]; Neil M.
Malamuth, The Attraction to Sexual Aggression Scale: Part Two, 26 J. OF SEX REs. 324,
335-37 (1989) [hereinafter Malamuth, Part Two]; Quackenbush, supra note 172, at 334;
see also Hubert S. Feild, Attitudes Toward Rape: A Comparative Analysis of Police, Rap-
ists, Crisis Counselors and Citizens, 36 J. OF PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHoL 156, 169
(1978) (finding rapists more likely than rape counsellors to endorse rape myths).
179. Burt, supra note 173, at 218.
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this type have consistently been found to be highly correlated with
sexual aggression and with rape propensity.8 '
Finally, not only attitudes specifically toward violence against
women but also attitudes toward women more generally influence
rape propensity. "Hostility toward women" is a measure designed
to reflect attitudes of distrust, anger, alienation, and resentment to-
ward women." Such attitudes include, for example, beliefs that
most women are deceitful, that women flirt to tease or hurt men,
and that women take advantage of men who do not stand up to
them." Several studies have found correlations between hostility
toward women and sexual aggression against women. 3
Similarly, sex-role stereotyping generally-regarding occupa-
tional, familial, and social roles-also has been found to be associ-
ated with rape-propensity, at least in the contemporary American
context. Such sex-role stereotyping includes views that women
should not do men's work nor men do women's work, that a man
is the head of the household, and that women should take a pas-
sive role in courtship."8 Numerous studies using a variety of
measures of sex-role stereotyping have found a correlation be-
tween stereotypical attitudes concerning gender roles and rape inci-
dence or proclivity.' 85
180. See Neil M. Malamuth, Factors Associated with Rape as Predictors of Laboratory
Aggression Against Women, 45 J. OF PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYcHOL 432, 434 (1983);
Malamuth, Part One, supra note 178, at 26, 38-40 (using acceptance of interpersonal vio-
lence in a three-factor composite index of rape-supportive attitudes that was found to be
correlated with attraction to sexual aggression and with self-reported likelihood to rape);
Malamuth, Part Two, supra note 178, at 335-37 (same); Quackenbush, supra note 172, at
334; see also Burt, supra note 173, at 225-29 (finding acceptance of violence correlated
with rape myth acceptance that in turn has been found to be correlated with sexual
aggression); Malamuth et al., supra note 170, at 676-77 (using acceptance of interpersonal
violence scale in a composite index of attitudes supporting aggression that was found to
be correlated with hostile masculinity that in turn was correlated with sexual aggression).
181. See James V.P. Check, The Hostility Toward Women Scale 170-72 (1984) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Manitoba).
182. Id.
183. See e.g., Malamuth, Part Two, supra note 178, at 340, 348 (finding correlation of
hostility toward women with attraction to sexual aggression); Lisak & Roth, supra note
171, at 274 (finding correlation between hostility toward women and commission of rape).
184. See Burt, supra note 173, at 222; Janet T. Spence et al., A Short Version of the
Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS), 2 BULL OF THE PSYCHONOMIC Soc'y 219 (1973);
Caryl Utigard et al., Gender Stereotyping and Rape Attitudes, 32 CORRECTIVE AND SOC.
PSYCHIATRY & J. OF BEHAV. TECH. METHODS AND THERAPY 99, 100-01 (1986).
185. See James V.P. Check & Neil M. Malamuth, Sex Role Stereotyping and Reactions
to Depictions of Stranger Versus Acquaintance Rape, 45 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOc. PSY-
CHOL 344, 351-52 (1983); Neila Hegeman & Stuart Meikle, Motives and Attitudes of
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Thus, there is a set of attitudes-including attitudes of
hypermasculinity, adversarial sexual beliefs, sexual promiscuity,
rape myth acceptance, acceptance of violence against women,
hostility toward women, and sex-role stereotyping-that is correlat-
ed with rape and rape proclivity. In fact, these attitudes share
more than just their association with rape propensity. The attitudes
associated with rape proneness form a "constellation" of attitudes
in two senses. First, they are frequently found together; the pres-
ence in an individual of certain of these attitudes is correlated
with the presence of certain other of the attitudes. 86 The exis-
tence of extensive intercorrelations between the rape-conducive
attitudes supports the view that they form a meaningful whole, a
Rapists, 12 CANADIAN J. BEHAV. SCI. 359, 366 (1980) (reviewing other literature); Ron-
ald L. Scott & Laurie A. Tetreault, Attitudes of Rapists and Other Violent Offenders
Toward Women, 127 J. OF SOC. PSYcHOL. 375, 379 (1986); see also Burt, supra note 173,
at 225-30 (finding correlation between sex role stereotyping and rape myth acceptance
that has subsequently been found to correlate with rape propensity); Neil M. Malamuth
et al., Using the Confluence Model of Sexual Aggression to Predict Men's Conflict With
Women: A Ten Year Follow-Up Study, 69 J. OF PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 353, 354
(1995) (finding that men's distress in failing to conform to traditional masculine roles
contributes to the characteristics of hostile masculinity); Utigard et al., supra note 184, at
102 (finding a correlation between rape-permissive attitudes and gender stereotyping). But
see Carolyn Kozma & Marvin Zuckerman, An Investigation of Some Hypotheses Concern-
ing Rape and Murder, 4 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 23, 26-27 (1983)
(finding no greater antifeminist attitudes among rapists than among murderers or property
felons); Zindel V. Segal & Lana Stermac, A Measure of Rapists' Attitudes Towards Wom-
en, 7 INT'L J. OF LAW & PSYCHIATRY 437, 438-39 (1984) (finding no difference between
rapists, nonsex offenders and controls).
186. Malamuth et al. found that "attitudes supporting violence" (a three-part compos-
ite index composed of adversarial sexual beliefs, rape myth acceptance, and acceptance of
violence against women) was strongly correlated with "hostile masculinity" (a three-part
composite index composed of negative masculinity, hostility toward women, and ad-
versarial sexual beliefs). Malamuth et al., supra note 170, at 676. Similarly, Check and
Malamuth replicated Burt's findings that sex role stereotyping is correlated with rape
myth acceptance, acceptance of violence against women, and adversarial sexual beliefs.
Check & Malamuth, supra note 185, at 352. Other correlations among rape-conducive
attitudes were found by Lisak and Roth, who observed correlations between sex role
stereotyping and hostility toward women, and between sex role stereotyping and lack of
femininity (the latter being a measure similar to the nonfeminine sex-typing mentioned
supra text accompanying note 172). Lisak & Roth, supra note 171, at 273. Hubert Feild
has observed correlations between sex-role stereotyping and belief in rape myths. Feild,
supra note 178, at 174. Similarly, Quackenbush found strong correlations between
nonfeminine sex-typing and adversarial sexual beliefs, acceptance of violence against wom-
en, and rape myth acceptance. Quackenbush, supra note 172, at 332. As Martha Burt
concluded in 1980, "[Tjhe data support . .. the hypothesis that rape myth acceptance
forms part of a larger and complexly related attitude structure that includes sex role
stereotyping, feelings about sexuality, and acceptance of interpersonal violence." Burt,
supra note 173, at 228.
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constellation or configuration of attitudes rather than a mere as-
sortment of attitudes that are each conducive to rape. Second,
these attitudes have interactive effects that produce a greater total
impact on rape propensity than the simple additive effects of the
attitudes. For instance, in one study, while hostile masculinity and
sexual promiscuity each were found to be correlated with in-
creased rape propensity, when they were both present, an interac-
tion effect accounted for an additional 4% of explained variation
in the prediction of sexual aggression." 7
Mosher and Sirkin have offered an integrated attitudinal con-
struct that posits a "macho personality constellation" consisting of
"calloused sex attitudes," a belief in "violence as manly," and a
conception of "danger as exciting."'" Statistical analyses have
supported the validity of this construct,89 suggesting that it cap-
tures an underlying coherence in the set of different attitudes that
it combines.
A 1986 study by Mosher and Anderson found a significant
positive correlation between the macho personality constellation
and aggressive sexual behavior.Y Two additional studies have
found that men with strong "macho personality" characteristics
experienced more enjoyment and less negative affect while imagin-
ing themselves committing rape than did less "macho" men.19 '
As Mosher and Anderson concluded,
The socialization of the macho man, if it does not directly pro-
duce a rapist, appears to produce calloused sex attitudes toward
women and rape and proclivities toward forceful and exploitative
tactics to gain sexual access to reluctant women. The socialization
of the hypermasculine male may script him to overvalue a defi-
nition of masculinity as tough and unfeeling, violent and exploit-
ative of women, and as seeking the excitement of risking danger.
This personality constellation, in conjunction with a history of
aggressive behavior that elicits increasing levels of positive affect
187. Malamuth et al., supra note 170, at 677.
188. Donald L. Mosher & Mark Sirkin, Measuring a Macho Personality Constellation,
18 J. OF RES. IN PERSONALITY 150, 160 (1984).
189. Id. at 161.
190. Mosher & Anderson, supra note 168, at 83.
191. Id. at 86; James P. Sullivan & Donald L. Mosher, Acceptance of Guided Imagery
of Marital Rape as a Function of Macho Personality, 5 VIOLENCE AND VicriMs 275, 282
(1990).
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and decreasing levels of negative affect, may provide the disinhi-
bition that transforms the rape fantasy into a brutal reality."
In sum, a set of attitudes conducive to rape has been identi-
fied in several decades of research. This set of attitudes is inter-
correlated and forms a coherent attitudinal configuration whose
effect on rape propensity is greater than the sum of its parts.
5. Rape-Conducive Sexual Norms in Military Culture. Indi-
viduals' attitudes toward gender and sexuality, like other attitudes,
are strongly influenced by their primary groups. In the process of
socialization into a primary group, group norms, including
normative attitudes toward gender and sexuality, are conveyed to
group members. 3 If the normative gender and sexual attitudes
of the primary group are of the sort that has been found to be
conducive to rape, then we would expect the rape propen-
sity-and, all other things being equal, the rape incidence-of the
group to be heightened.
Like other primary groups, primary groups in the military
develop and enforce group norms. 4 And like the sets of norms
developed in other primary groups, the sets of norms in military
primary groups include norms about gender and sexuality. 95
192. Masher & Anderson, supra note 168, at 91 (citation omitted).
193. As Peter Peretti observes, "Socialization-the process by which the individual
learns the norms, value, attitudes and customs of his or her subcultural groups-takes
place within the setting of one's primary groups." Peretti, supra note 123, at 555.
194. See SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, supra note 135, at 264 ("[Tjhe mili-
tary society is characterized by its own laws, rules, customs, and traditions."). Indeed, the
military unit in the combat context may have greater power to enforce its group norms
than many other primary groups. As one Vietnam veteran pointed out, "The unit is all
that one has. He either fits into the unit, or relegates himself to a fearful isolation....
Particularly in such a hostile environment, it is imperative for the individual to embrace
the values of the group." KUNEN, supra note 64, at 239-40; see also II STOUFFER ET
AL., supra note 137, at 130-31 (discussing the enforcement of group norms within combat
units).
195. The utilization of sexual norms to foster group identity in military primary
groups is reflected in an anecdote related by David Marlowe:
[C]ertain special forces units quasi-publically [sic] defined themselves
through their sexual behavior. Several massage parlors in South Vietnam were
considered their regular territory; they never engaged in vaginal intercourse; the
women in the massage parlors were engaged exclusively to perform fellatio
upon them. This was the diacritical that contrasted them with other American
groups in Vietnam, as it was widely believed that Vietnamese prostitutes had an
abhorrence of oral sex and normally refused to perform it.
Marlowe, supra note 132, at 192.
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The sexual and gender norms presently imparted to members
entering the U.S. armed forces are inadvertently comprised largely
of the sort associated with heightened rape propensity.'16 The
rape-conducive attitudinal constellation, including elements of
hypermasculinity, adversarial sexual beliefs, promiscuity, rape myth
acceptance, hostility toward women, and possibly also acceptance
of violence against women, is reflected in various ways in military
culture.' 7
Having said that, it is also important to note that the U.S.
military is in some respects in a state of transition regarding gen-
der. Women are now participating in greater numbers and in a
broader range of roles than in the past. And, within very recent
years (particularly in the wake of Tailhook '91), special efforts
have been made by military leaders to eliminate sexual harassment
and assault by personnel.' 98 All of these changes have had some
influence on the gender and sexual norms extant within military
culture.
Nevertheless, certain factors that remain within military orga-
nizations tend to reinforce and to perpetuate the traditional gender
196. This is not to say that norms inculcated in the military explicitly approve of
rape. On the contrary, personnel receive training that there is a policy of "zero toler-
ance" for sexual harassment or assault. See, eg., Gordon R. Sullivan & Togo D. West,
Jr., Statement of Army Policy on Sexual Harassment (July 21, 1994) (on file with author)
("The policy of the United States Army is that sexual harassment is unacceptable con-
duct and will not be tolerated.") Rather, the gender and sexual norms imparted to new
recruits are of the type that enhance attractions and reduce aversions and inhibitions to
rape; that is, they make normative the set of attitudes discussed above that are conducive
to rape.
It is, however, also the case that norms approving of sexual assault short of rape
apparently are perceived to exist by some personnel, at least episodically. As stated in
the Department of Defense Inspector General's report on the events, including sexual
assault, at Tailhook '91, "Officers who engaged in misconduct gave a variety of reasons
for their behavior at Tailhook 91. Perhaps the most common rationale was that such
behavior was 'expected' of junior officers and that Tailhook was comprised of 'traditions'
built on various lore." INSPECrOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supra note 9, at X-1.
197. There is currently no data available on general sex-role stereotyping by military
personnel. One study conducted by the Army Research Institute (ARI) does contain four
questions addressing general sex role attitudes of U.S. Army personnel. See ARMY FAMI-
LY RESEARCH PROGRAM, 1989 ARMY SOLDIER AND FAMILY SURVEY 13 (1989) (ques-
tions 72k-n). However, the study containing those ARI data is classified as a "limited
document" and has not, to date, been made available to the author.
198. See, e.g., Memorandum from Roberta K. Peters, Director, Office of Civilian Per-
sonnel Mgmt., U.S. Navy, to Navy HROs, RDs, and NAFI Elements (July 15, 1992)
(requiring that all Navy and Marine Corps units schedule a full day of training for all
uniform and civilian personnel on sexual harassment prevention).
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and sexual norms of the military, as discussed in Part IV below.
The result is that, while the gender norms within military culture
have undergone some alteration in recent years, much of the tradi-
tional gender and sexual culture of the military remains.
The following examination of the gender and sexual norms of
military culture attempts to present a picture of that culture that
takes into account the extent of relevant change in recent years.
The analysis is intended to describe central themes within an exist-
ing culture of military society.'99 Because no systematic study of
military culture on these dimensions has yet been conducted, the
discussion is necessarily suggestive rather than conclusive.
a. Attitudes toward masculinity in military culture. The military
traditionally has had, and to a very large extent still has, a central
group-identity structure built around a particular construction of
masculinity.' ° As expressed by David Marlowe, Chief of Military
Psychiatry at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research:
In the world of the combat soldier ... masculinity is an essential
measure of capability. In an interaction between male bonding
and widespread cultural norms, the maleness of an act is the
measure of its worth and thus a measure of one's ability. While
many may disapprove of these norms, they have been and are, as
a matter of ethnographic fact, the operative ones in much of
military society and particularly in the combat group."°'
General William Westmoreland made explicit the traditional link
between military service and masculinity in his testimony to Con-
gress: "[N]o man with gumption wants a woman to fight his bat-
tles."202 Or, as General Robert Barrow, former Marine Corps
Commandant, commented on the prospect of women in combat:
"When you get right down to it, you have to protect the manliness
199. It is broadly recognized that the military has a distinct culture within but also
distinguishable from the broader national culture. As General Colin Powell has noted,
"Active military service is not an everyday job in an ordinary workplace. It requires a
unique blend of... ethics, bonding, and culture. ... SENATE COMM. ON ARMED
SERVICES, supra note 135, at 279 (statement of Gen. Powell).
200. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Gender in the Military: Androcentrism and Insti-
tutional Refonn, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 217 (arguing that the
U.S. military is an "androcentric institution").
201. Marlowe, supra note 132, at 194.
202. JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REvOLUTION 341
(1982) (quoting Gen. William Westmoreland).
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of war." 3 In the words of David Marlowe, "The soldier's world
is characterized by a stereotypical masculinity. His language is pro-
fane, his professed sexuality crude and direct; his maleness is his
armor, the measure of his competence, capability, and confidence
in himself."'
While such a vision of masculinity as a basis for group identi-
ty or individual worth is no longer an official part of military
training or socialization (and while statements like those made by
Generals Westmoreland and Barrow more than a decade ago
presumably would not be made by military leaders now), this
aspect of military culture nevertheless retains considerable vitality.
As personnel at Parris Island Marine Recruit Training Depot stat-
ed in interviews in 1993 and 1994, the value of "manliness" is
heavily impressed upon (male) recruits.'0 According to one drill
instructor, this "manliness" means
a warrior spirit that is based upon a sense of brotherhood, frater-
nalism-which, obviously, excludes women.... When a military
organization is called to war, the mission is to kill and to domi-
nate the opposing force. And domination is generally associated
with a masculine thing. There's very little remorse. That's where
the manliness thing comes into play.
One enlisted Army man made related observations:
The macho thing is still the image for the combat arms....
Being rough and tough is still the mainstay of the way of troops
trying to get to the top of the line. It's one of the things that
will get you ahead. Nowadays, you can also advance by other
means-but then you better have something excellent up your
sleeve.w
203. Michael Wright, The Marine Corps Faces the Future, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 20,
1982, at 16, 74 (quoting Gen. William Barrow).
204. Marlowe, supra note 132, at 192.
205. See Interview with Marine Corps Drill Instructor, Name Withheld, in Parris Is-
land, S.C. (Oct. 22, 1993); Interview with Marine Corps Pub. Aff. Officer, Name With-
held, in Parris Island, S.C. (Oct. 22, 1993); Telephone Interview with Marine Corps Drill
Instructor (Ret.), Name Withheld (Oct. 2, 1994).
206. Telephone Interview with retired Marine Corps Drill Instructor, supra note 205.
207. Telephone Interview with male Army Combat Engineer, Name Withheld (Sept.
25, 1994). The units in which gender and sexual norms appear to have changed least are,
perhaps unsuprisingly, the units that have remained all male. Army and Air, Force per-
sonnel-male and female, officer and enlisted-whom I interviewed in 1994 observed
virtually without exception that "the manliness thing is still strong in the combat arms."
See Interviews with female Army enlisted personnel, in Ft. Bragg, N.C. (Sept. 23, 1994)
1996]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
The normative elements of hypermasculinity-a focus on
toughness, self-sufficiency, and dominance 2 -are strikingly re-
flected in these descriptions. As Arkin and Dobrosky conclude in
their analysis of masculinity in military socialization, military so-
cialization produces "a strong, silent, self-reliant man"'  who will
to a heightened extent "[reject] ... intimacy and warmth, '21°
and emphasize "the ideal of virility. '21'
b. Attitudes toward sexuality in military culture. In addition to the
attitudes toward masculinity discussed above, the attitudes toward
sexuality embodied in military culture also largely partake of those
found to be conducive to rape, including both adversarial sexual
beliefs and high valuation of promiscuity. Within traditional
military culture, women are cast largely as the sexual adversary or
target, while men are cast largely as promiscuous sexual hunters.
These themes currently remain rather prevalent in military culture.
To better understand the military construction of the female
as sexual adversary and the male as promiscuous, we should meet
"Suzie." "Suzie Rottencrotch" is a name sometimes used by mili-
tary men to refer to women (other than close relatives of the men
present)."' 2 One drill instructor had the following to say about
her in the course of a training lecture on the use of hand and arm
signals:
If we get home with little Suzie... we're in a nice com-
panionship with little Suzie and here you are getting hot and
heavy and then you're getting ready to go down there and make
that dive, privates, and Suzie says... Suzie says it's the wrong
time of the month. Privates, if you don't want to get back home
(transcripts on file with author). As one female Army Sergeant related,
The combat MOS [military occupational specialty] men are always think-
ing that because I'm a female and in a non-combat MOS, I'm some kind of a
sissy. Sissy meaning I don't want to get dirty, won't want to be around bugs,
and things like that. They view themselves as the opposite of a sissy-as some
kind of a super-hero. I guess it's kind of a macho ego thing.
Interview with female Army Sergeant, Name Withheld, in Ft. Bragg, N.C. (Sept. 23,
1994).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 170-72.
209. Arkin & Dobrofsky, supra note 151, at 72.
210. Id at 77.
211. Id. at 74.
212. DYER, supra note 141, at 123; ROBERT J. LIFrON, HOME FROM THE WAR 243
(1973).
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and indulge in this little adventure, you can show your girlfriend
the hand and arm signal for "close it up."
And you want her to close up those nasty little thighs of
hers, do you not, privates?"
The same training lecture included the following aside: "Privates, if
you don't have a little Suzie now, maybe you're going to find one
when you get home. You bet. You'll find the first cheap slut you
can get back home. What do you mean, 'No'? You're a Marine,
you're going to do it." 14 Together with the intended humor of
the presentation, other messages inhere. These include the intima-
tion that, for a Marine, the female is the sexual adversary or tar-
get and is without other value; that what a Marine is looking for
in women is "the first cheap slut he can get." The attitude is thus
conveyed that a Marine's only relationship to women is the pursuit
and acquisition of sex-a relationship that both casts the Marine
as promiscuous and women as prey.
The current status of "Suzie Rottencrotch" is perhaps em-
blematic of the partial changes that have occurred in military
culture. In October 1993, I asked a female drill instructor at Parris
Island Marine Corps Recruit Depot whether the name "Suzie
Rottencrotch" was still in use. She had never heard of the name
but asked her male counterpart who was standing nearby. He
replied that the name was still used but "not officially.1215
A more contextualized account of aspects of military sexual
norms was conveyed to me in an interview with a former Navy
judge advocate who served in the 1970.26 Other former Navy
and Marine personnel confirm his description of the environment
in Olangapo, the Philippines, near the American Naval Station at
Subic Bay.217 As the judge advocate described,
[W]e participated in creating the world's biggest brothel Oust
outside Subic).... Olangapo is called "the city of 10,000
213. DYER, supra note 141, at 123 (quoting lecture on hand and arm signals, Parris
Island, 1982).
214. IL
215. Interview with female Marine Corps Drill Instructor, Name Withheld, at Parris
Island Marine Corps Recruit Depot, S.C. (Oct. 22, 1993).
216. Telephone Interview with Judge Advocate (Ret.), U.S. Navy, Name Withheld
(Jan. 13, 1993).
217. Interview with former Captain, U.S. Navy, Name Withheld, in Durham, N.C.
(Nov. 14, 1994); Interview with former Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, Name
Withheld, in Durham, N.C. (Nov. 3, 1994).
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whores." If you're an impressionable young kid, and you're taken
in tow-outside to Olangapo which is just row after row of bars,
massage parlors, and no-pretext brothels-what does that do to a
young kid's view on the value of women?
These gals would do the most degrading things-and do
them in public. And it was always in a group. A gal would come
along to a table in a bar and literally "serve" all the guys at the
table. It was always in groups. In fact, girls would do tricks with
their bodies and orifices on stage-that was very common. One
game was to have the girl go under the table and fellate each
guy-and whoever's face cracked soonest would buy the next
round of drinks. This was true in all the enlisted bars-in the
officer clubs there wouldn't be the group sex, but there would be
group performances.
Subic Bay was an automatic stop for all the ships in the
Pacific. So all the guys experienced this. This was not just a few
of the guys or some small proportion; this was all the guys....
That place was a circus. If I had to guess at the percentage
of sailors-officer and enlisted-who never partook of those
activities in Olangapo and Subic, I'd guess five percent.
The one thing that strikes me is: I don't think it's possible
to overestimate the influence of places like Olangapo. And these
included graduates of the top law schools in the country-and we
were all affected by it .... I mean I can't overstate it; it was
beyond anything I'd ever seen or ever have seen since .... The
whole carnival atmosphere cannot be overstated218
Although the account of Olangapo quoted above refers to a
period during the 1970s, Olangapo apparently maintained a similar
atmosphere until Subic Bay Naval Station closed in 1991. As the
New York Times reported in 1993,
Many of the mothers [of the estimated 8,600 Amerasians in
Olangapo] subsisted for a time on sporadic payments from the
[American] fathers, pressuring Navy officials when payments
lagged. But the financial support began drying up in 1991, when
the Philippine Senate barred the renewal of United States leases
on the sprawling naval base at Subic Bay and other installations
in the Philippines....
When the bulk of American ships and planes finally left last
year, the decades-long party was over at the Pussy Cat Bar, the
Joy Club and hundreds of other hostess clubs, discotheques,
218. Telephone Interview with Judge Advocate (Ret.), supra note 216.
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brothels, massage parlors and short-stay hotels with neon signs
just outside the gates of the Subic base.219
While Olangapo is far away, we may be reminded in reading
about it of events in Las Vegas at the 1991 and earlier Tailhook
conventions where, according to the Department of Defense In-
spector General, "[incidents related by witnesses included a high
ranking Navy civilian official dancing with strippers in hospitality
suites, the throwing of flaming mannequins from rooftops, [and]
earlier gauntlets and strip shows ....
Nor are these events limited to faraway places or to conven-
tion weekends." 1 As one Army Combat Engineer stationed at
Fort Bragg related to me in 1994:
You'd be amazed. Most people have no idea what goes on. The
talk is "down." The whores and sluts are circulated between the
guys. (They go for pay, for no pay, for drinks, whatever.) Those
women actually go into the barracks. The guys talk and brag
about it and share it with each other. You pull out of it once
you've found a good woman (like my wife). It's a lot of con-
tempt toward the women plus bragging about what studs they
[the guys] are.
Each of the foregoing descriptions reflects a theme within
military culture of casting women as sexual targets and military
men as promiscuous sexual consumers. This theme, even while
mitigated through the services' equal opportunity and anti-harass-
ment efforts and policies, still appears to be strongly rooted within
current military culture.
An additional datum reflecting this theme within military
sexual culture is the fact that military personnel appear to con-
sume more soft-core pornography' per capita than does the ci-
219. Bruce Lambert, Abandoned Filippinas Sue U.S. over Child Support, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1993, at A3.
220. INSPEcTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supra note 9, at X-1 n.60.
221. Indeed, there has been some controversy within the military over the last decade
as to what place striptease shows and the like have within clubs run by the Services. For
instance,
[t]he uniformed leadership endeavored to terminate all striptease acts and go-go
dancers at Navy clubs in the early 1980s. However, the order of Chief of Naval
Operations James D. Watkins was countermanded the day following its issuance
by Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman. This clearly sent a mixed signal to
the uniformed leadership.
Parks, supra note 9, at 103 n.6.
222. Telephone Interview with male Army Combat Engineer, supra note 207.
223. No data are available on military and civilian readership of hard-core pornogra-
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yilian population of comparable gender, age, and education. Pre-
liminary market research indicates that, on yearly average for
1992-93, the total percentage of all active duty military personnel
reading Playboy was 14%, as compared with 4% of civilians.'
More specifically, 33% of male active duty personnel aged eight-
een to twenty-nine read Playboy as compared with 13% of male
civilians of that age range.' For males aged thirty to forty-four,
the civilian and military readership was comparable (approximately
9%), while for males forty-five and older, the military readership
(approximately 11%) again exceeded civilian readership (approxi-
mately 4%) considerably. 6
When educational level is held constant, the military reader-
ship level is again higher than the civilian level. On yearly average
for 1992-93, among those whose highest educational degree was
high school graduation, 24% of male military personnel read Play-
boy as compared with 9% of male civilians.227 For college
graduates, readership levels were 12% for male military personnel
and 7% for male civilians.'
To point out that pornography is more prevalent in the mili-
tary than in the civilian environment is not to suggest that reading
Playboy causes military personnel to commit rapes. (On the con-
phy. All subsequent references to "pornography" refer only to soft-core materials.
224. These data reflect the results of market research conducted by Simmons Market
Research Bureau, Inc. (on file with author). The market research is "preliminary" for
several reasons, including that Playboy is the only publication considered, that the sample
size for the military population studied is too small for statistical reliability, and that the
military population studied includes only personnel living off base.
225. 1I
226. Id.
227. Id. Usable data were not available for males with less than a high school diplo-
ma.
228. Id. While military personnel may consume a good deal of pornography without
censure, appearing in the same publications is harshly punished on the ground that it
reflects "discredit" on the corps. Several female and a few male service members have
been disciplined for appearing in pornographic magazines. See JUDITH H. STIEHM, ARMS
AND THE ENLISTED WOMAN 125 (1989). After the Marines discharged Sgt. Bambi Finney
for appearing in Playboy, a Marine spokesman stated that "whatever activity is under-
taken by the Marine is to bring credit upon the corps and not discredit.... [E]very
action a Marine takes-both good and bad-reflects not only on herself, but on every
Marine wearing a Marine uniform." Id.
An initial response is that Sgt. Finney was not quite "wearing a Marine uniform"
at the time the photographs were taken. More to the point, the anecdote prompts one to
ask what view of sexuality is expressed by the fact that military personnel
disproportionately consume pornography but view themselves as "discredited" when one
in their own corps appears in pornography.
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trary, the available experimental psychology data on the links
between pornography and sexual aggression tend to indicate that
while violent pornography tends to increase sexual aggression,
nonviolent pornography does not.229) Rather, the suggestion here
is that the prevalence of pornography in the military environment
may reflect sexual attitudes and norms within military culture that
cast women as sexual targets and men as sexual consumers.
The hypothesis that the prevalence of pornography in the
military reflects such a sexual culture within the military is sup-
ported by the findings of research on the links between pornogra-
phy and rape at the societal level. Societal rates of pornography
circulation and rape are highly correlated;' that is, states and
regions with high pornography circulation rates also tend to have
high rape rates' Thus, even while no causal link has been
found between nonviolent pornography and aggression at the indi-
vidual level, the two rates are highly correlated at the societal
level.
The presence of the societal-level correlation seemingly with-
out a relationship of direct causation at the individual level sug-
gests that the correlation between pornography circulation and
rape rates may be spurious. In other words, both phenomena may
be influenced by some common third factor. Researchers in this
field have suggested that the third factor influencing both rape
rates and pornography circulation may be the cultural pervasive-
ness of a "macho" attitudinal pattern. 2 They hypothesize that
each of the two phenomena, heightened pornography consumption
and heightened rape rates, both reflect and at least in part result
from the heightened cultural prevalence of the constellation of
229. See EDWARD DONNERSTEIN ET AL, THE QUESTION OF PORNOGRAPHY 98
(1987). Playboy contains very little violence. Joseph E. Scott & Steven J. Cuvelier, Sexual
Violence in Playboy Magazine: A Longitudinal Content Analysis, 24 J. OF SEX RES. 534,
536 (1987).
230. See Baron & Straus, supra note 78, at 480-81; Scott & Schwalm, supra note 89,
at 246-48. But see Cynthia S. Gentry, Pornography and Rape: An Empirical Analysis, 12
DEVIANT BEHAV.: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY J. 277 (1991) (reporting results of an analysis
similar to that of Baron and Straus but using Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas
rather than states as geographical units of analysis, and finding no significant correlation
between pornography circulation and rape rates).
231. See Baron & Straus, supra note 78, at 480-81; Scott & Schwalm, supra note 89,
at 246-48.
232. See, e.g., 2 JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 150-54 (1985); Baron & Straus, supra note 78, at 467-68.
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attitudes constituting "machismo." Thus, there is reason to believe
that the apparent heightened pornography consumption in the
military environment may reflect the prevalence of normative
sexual and gender attitudes within military culture that place wom-
en in the role of sexual targets or adversaries and men in the role
of sexual consumers.23
Without providing a systematic or scientific comparison of
military and civilian sexual attitudes, the foregoing discussion does
suggest the continuing presence within military culture of ad-
versarial sexual beliefs and normative promiscuity.' Suzie Rot-
tencrotch, Olangapo, Tailhook, Playboy, and remarks from Fort
Bragg all reflect-without providing a systematic measure
of-those attitudinal elements of military sexual culture. While
recent military policy changes presumably are effecting some
change in military gender and sexual norms, such a transition is,
based on the available evidence, far from complete.
c. Attitudes toward women in military culture. Along with the
attitudes toward sexuality discussed above, there are attitudes
toward women reflected in military culture that are associated with
rape propensity. These include hostility toward women and
possibly also acceptance of violence against women. 35
The masculinity that is definitive of the military in-group is,
not surprisingly, defined in contrast to the "other"236--in par-
ticular, in contrast to women.' An unmistakable hostility is
233. Of course, the relative isolation from women experienced by some male military
personnel also might account for some part of the prevalence of pornography in the
military environment. For that reason, the pornography circulation data presented here,
while suggestive, cannot necessarily be interpreted exclusively as reflecting particular gen-
der and sexual norms within military culture. It may even be the case that these two
explanations for the prevalence of pornography are actually interrelated: The isolation
from women experienced by some male military personnel may tend to reinforce the
types of gender and sexual norms in question.
234. Because no information on rape myth acceptance by military personnel is cur-
rently available, no comparison of military and civilian populations on that dimension is
possible.
235. As noted supra note 197, no data are currently available on sex-role attitudes of
or sex-role stereotyping by military personnel.
236. See generally GEORG SIMMEL, CONFLIct 91 (Kurt W. Glencoe trans., 1955) (dis-
cussing the role of an identified "other" in fostering group unity).
237. See STIE-M, supra note 228, at 224 ("[Women] seem to be absolutely essential to
the military. Their essentialness, though, lies in their absence.").
Women and gays (as well as young boys and old men) may be included within the
out-group composed of those defined as not real men. See infra note 357 (regarding the
[VCol. 45:651
RAPE AND THE MILITARY
directed toward this other. A typical method of ostracization,
particularly in basic training, is to refer to a male group member
as a female. For instance, recruits are called "ladies" or "girls" as
well as more vulgar names for women when they perform poorly
in training."' As Randy Shilts recounts,
The lessons on manhood ... focus less on creating what the
Army wanted than on defining what the Army did not want.
This is why calling recruits faggots, sissies, pussies, and girls had
been a time-honored stratagem for drill instructors throughout
the armed forces. The context was clear: There was not much
worse you could call a man."
While the practice of this particular type of gendered name-calling
is not now officially sanctioned, it still does occur with continuing
frequency in practice.2 °
Perhaps the most straightforward expression of hostility to-
ward women is found in the T-shirt worn by several male officers
at the 1991 Tailhook convention. The back of the shirt read
"Women Are Property," while the front read "He-Man Woman
Hater's Club."'
The military definition of the "nonmasculine" as the "other"
is, of course, rendered problematic by the existence of military
women.2 42 One response to this dilemma has been to endeavor
issue of gays in the military and its relationship to the gender and sexual norms of mili-
tary culture).
238. See CYNTHIA ENLOE, DoEs KHAKI BECOME YOU? 14 (1983); CHRISTINE L.
WaLAmS, GENDER DIFFERENCES AT WORK 69 (1989).
There is a striking similarity in this regard in the methods of inculcation of gender
norms in military organizations and sports organizations. David Kopay described how his
high school football coach, "like many other coaches . . . used sexual slurs--'fag,' 'queer,'
'sissy,' 'pussy,'-to motivate (or intimidate) his young athletes." MYRIAM MIEDZIAN,
BOYS WILL BE BOYS 198 (1991). One Indiana University basketball coach resorted to
putting sanitary napkins into a player's locker. Id. Dave Meggessey, after recounting
similar tactics by his coach, notes that "this sort of attack on a player's manhood is a
coach's doomsday weapon." Id.
239. RANDY SHILTS, CONDuCT UNBECOMING 133 (1993).
240. Telephone Interview with female former Army Captain, Name Withheld (Sept.
22, 1994); Telephone Interview with male Army Combat Engineer, supra note 207; Inter-
view with female enlisted Army Legal Specialist, Name Withheld, in Ft. Bragg, N.C.
(Sept. 23, 1994); Interview with female Marine Corps Drill Instructor, supra note 215.
241. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supra note 9, at X-3.
242. The complexities of situating female participants in a "masculine" military are re-
flected in the comments of one young female Marine who remarked: "The way to moti-
vate the male Marines is to play on their masculinity. And then the female Marines are
motivated by a general line of 'We're gonna show those guys that we're just as good as
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to maintain essentially masculine group identity and, necessarily
then, female otherness. Consistent with this approach, official ef-
forts are made to maintain the "femininity" of military women.
The current Marine Corps Handbook, for instance, specifies that
women's hair shall be "arranged in an attractive (feminine)
style."' 43 Many similar examples of official efforts to "maintain
femininity" may be found.2' Maintenance of the otherness of
women is also sometimes achieved through less pleasant means,
like the use of names such as "WUBA," an acronym meaning
"Women Used by All," to refer to (allegedly promiscuous) female
midshipmen245 or the reference to female Marines as "mario-
nettes."24  The effect in each case is to retain, even in the face
of female military participation, the position of females as the
"other" and the definition of the "real military" as masculine and
manly. Women, if present, are in that way recast as outside the
group and, largely, as sexual targets-either under the more ap-
proving valence of having "an attractive, feminine style" or as the
disapproved "Woman Used By All." In each case, the female is
treated as the other and as sexual, as "government issue pussy" as
they are."' Interview with female Marine, Name Withheld, at Parris Island Marine Corps
Recruit Depot, S.C. (Oct. 22, 1993).
243. MARINE CORPS INsTrrurE, MARINE BATTLE SKILLS TRAINING HANDBOOK
1-4-50, at 4-35 (1993).
244. For example, U.S. Air Force Officer Cynthia Wright described a mandatory
briefing entitled "Professional Issues" held for the women of the Air Force Academy's
class of 1993:
Among the issues discussed were the techniques of effective makeup application,
the importance of not swearing or crying in public, . . . and a . . . warning
about the damage to one's reputation ... of "sleeping around." In the same
breath, they were warned that boys will be boys and that they were unlikely to
see those same moral standards upheld by their male peers. Finally, they were
given, as a class, diet tips for maintaining "all those curves they (the male
cadets) like."
Cynthia Wright, G.L JilL" Sexism in the Air Force, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 21, 1991, at 17.
In a similar vein, I was struck during a visit to Parris Island Marine Corps Recruit
Depot by the fact that the majority of male Marines with whom I spoke about the
Fourth Battalion (the one female Marine basic training battalion) mentioned that "they
even have a beauty parlor over there." To a group of shaven-headed Marine recruits
belly-crawling through the Basic Warrior Training terrain, the members of the Fourth
Battalion with their beauty salon must appear very much the "other" indeed.
245. See Wright, supra note 244, at 17.
246. See WILLIAMS, supra note 238, at 69 (1989).
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she is sometimes called,247 even while she is formally a Marine,
soldier, airman, or sailor and so, formally, "one of us."2'
This is not to say that no progress has been made toward
improving gender attitudes and reducing hostility toward women.
Rather, the point is that progress in that direction is incomplete
and still often meets with resistance. The comments of one enlist-
ed Army woman in 1994 are illustrative. As she related,
The changes in positions open to women and the number of
women in the military-this has changed people's attitudes and
ways of relating to women. Because they know we're going into
combat with them. And that's what is important. It means they
have to treat us a little more equal. But they still don't. For in-
stance, in BNCOC [Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Course] the
guys were passing around this story about how we only had to
carry a twelve pound instead of a thirty-five pound rucksack into
the field in training-which wasn't true. They were saying: You
girls don't do anything hard just because you're female. They're
saying that they're big, tough men, and they're saying that we
come in and get an easier deal.249
Even while military gender culture is changing, elements of hostili-
ty toward women still appear to remain a part of that culture. The
picture, then, is a complex one of attitudinal change and resistance
to change being played out currently within military organizations.
In addition to general attitudes of hostility toward women,
attitudes accepting of violence against women also may be height-
ened in military society. Direct measures comparing military and
civilian attitudes regarding violence against women are lacking.
However, recent studies conducted by the Army do suggest elevat-
ed rates of domestic abuse of the female partners of Army person-
nel as compared with rates of abuse of the female partners of ci-
vilian men. 0 This heightened rate in the Army population of
247. See Counseling and Other Needs of Women Veterans, supra note 5, at 26 (state-
ment of Barbara Franco).
248. Regarding the tendency of previously all-male groups to respond to the new
presence of small numbers of "token" women by "exaggerat[ing] both their commonality
and the token's difference," see Rosabeth Kanter, Some Effects of Proportions on Group
Life.: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token Women, 82 AM. J. OF SOc. 975 (1977).
249. Interview with female enlisted Army Legal Specialist, supra note 240.
250. See Eric Schmitt, Military Struggling to Stem an Increase in Family Violence, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 1994, § A, at 1; Mark Thompson, The Living Room War: As the U.S.
Military Shrinks, Family Violence Is on the Rise: Can the Pentagon Do More to Prevent
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violent abuse of women may (though it does not necessarily) re-
flect underlying attitudes in the Army population that are more
accepting of violence against women than are the attitudes in the
civilian population."'
In sum, there is substantial evidence-though as yet, no sys-
tematically collected data comparing military and civilian popula-
tions-of themes of hypermasculinity, adversarial sexual beliefs,
promiscuity, hostility toward women, and possibly acceptance of
violence against women, within current military culture.' 2 The
norms and normative attitudes toward gender and sexuality that
are prevalent in military culture thus appear to partake largely of
the set of attitudes that have been found to be associated with
heightened rape propensity. These norms and attitudes are impart-
ed to new members as they are socialized into their primary
groups within the military. Even while the military services insti-
tute policies of "zero tolerance" of sexual harassment and as-
sault,' 3 and provide formal training pursuant to those policies,
informal socialization continues to perpetuate group norms that are
inconsistent with those formal policies and goals. The result is that,
even while the U.S. military is in some ways in transition regard-
ing gender, military units' normative attitudes toward gender and
sexuality continue in part to be those associated with heightened
levels of rape propensity.
It?, TIME, May 23, 1994, at 48; see also William A. Griffin & Allison R. Morgan, Con-
flict in Maritally Distressed Military Couples, 16 AM. J. OF FAM. THERAPY 14 (1988)
(stating preliminary findings that military wives are more likely than civilian wives to be
physically abused).
251. Alternative explanations for heightened military domestic abuse rates would in-
dude, for example, that frequent separations place strains on military families.
252. Clearly, systematic research comparing military and civilian populations' attitudes
on gender and sexuality would be most valuable. While the Department of Defense
(DOD) has conducted extensive personnel attitude research on other topics, see, e.g., U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER (DTIC), TECH-
NICAL REPORT SUMMARIES, DTIC BIBLIOGRAPHY (May 17, 1993) (on file with author),
virtually no DOD research has been done on the attitudes toward gender and sexuality
discussed here. See id. Presumably, the reason that such research has not been done is
that it apparently does not serve any defense-related purpose. However, to the extent
that the attitudes in question are contributing to the military rape differential, research
on gender and sexual attitudes would be relevant to issues that are of concern to the
DOD. See generally supra note 115.
253. See supra note 196.
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6. Rape Conducive Sexual Norms and the Psychology of In-
dividual Military Personnel. The gender and sexual norms of
military organizations are conveyed to new members as they are
socialized into the military group. But it must also be remembered
that individual military personnel come to the military with their
own psychological structures and motivations, including varying
degrees of proclivity or aversion to rape. As argued below, the
rape-conducive group norms extant in the military may tend dis-
proportionately to attract members with heightened rape proclivi-
ties. This is not by any means to suggest that the U.S. armed
forces are composed of a group of rapists in waiting. Quite the
contrary, the predominant motives for joining the U.S. armed
forces are educational and economic opportunity, followed by
ideological and patriotic commitments0 5 The point, however, is
that a military culture featuring rape-conducive norms and
attitudes may attract a greater number of members with height-
ened rape proclivities than would a military culture without those
features-and those individual members may then have a
particularly undesirable effect on their units.
The individual recruit who is psychologically inclined to rape
poses a heightened rape risk within a military unit for several rea-
sons. He may contribute to the elaboration of rape-conducive
norms within his unit, and may serve as an instigator or leader in
group rape 6 In addition, he may take the opportunity to com-
254. See SUE E. BERRYMAN, WHO SERVES?: THE PERSISTENT MYTH OF THE
UNDERCLASS ARMY 10 (1988); Charles Dale & Curtis Gilroy, Determinants of Enlist-
ments: A Macroeconomic Time-Series View, 10 ARMED FORCES & SOC'Y 192, 202-03
(1982); Robert J. Johnson & Howard B. Kaplan, Psychosocial Predictors of Enlistment in
the All-Voluntary Armed Forces, 22 YouTH & SOC'Y 291, 311-12 (1991).
255. See Rupert F. Chisholm et al., Pre-Enlistment Expectations/Perceptions of Army
Life, Satisfaction, and Re-Enlistment of Volunteers, 8 J. OF POL. AND MIL. SOC. 31, 34
tbl. 1 (1980).
256. It has been observed repeatedly that group rape is typically initiated and led by
a group leader while the other group members follow, enthusiastically or reluctantly. See,
eg., DUNPHY, supra note 120, at 256; Geis, supra note 157, at 101; GROTH, supra note
89, at 112-13.
It appears that some proportion of participants in group rape are not themselves
motivated (or at least not sufficiently or primarily motivated) to commit rape other than
for the purpose of being accepted by the group. GROTH, supra, at 83; MACKELLAR,
supra note 89, at 107-08. Rape as a group activity apparently can foster feelings of rap-
port, fellowship, and cooperation among assailants. See GRoTH, supra, at 115; Geis, supra,
at 111, 113; Edwin Megargee, Psychological Determinants and Correlates of Criminal
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mit rape in a combat situation where deterrents are low.
The following consideration of the patterns of motivation for
rape suggests reasons that an organization with rape-conducive
gender and sexual norms may disproportionately attract individuals
with heightened rape proclivities. Researchers on the psychology of
rape generally concur that there are different motives for rape that
may be categorized into types." Studies of individuals' motives
for rape have produced several typologies of rape motives, includ-
Violence, in CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 81, 110 (Marvin Wolfgang & Neil Weiner eds., 1982).
In addition, members seek to prove their virility or masculinity to each other both by
performing sexually in the presence of the group and by their daring in participating in
the rape. See GROTH, supra, at 113; MACKELLAR, supra, at 106-09. Several researchers
go so far as to say that fulfillment of desire specifically to rape plays little part in the
motives for group rape. See, e.g., MACKELLAR, supra, at 106; see also SANDAY, supra
note 153, at 12 ("The homoeroticism of [gang rape] seems obvious.").
It seems plausible that leaders of group rape and perhaps some other group mem-
bers as well may be predisposed to rape, while for other group members such inclination
may play little part in motivating their participation in group rape. This relative absence
of predisposition to rape in the motives of followers in group rapes may be reflected in
the recidivism patterns of group rapists: While leaders commit as many individual as
group rapes, followers typically commit rapes only in the group context. GROTH, supra,
at 114. This may suggest that, while the act of rape itself is of primary importance to
the leader, the rape may be of secondary or less than secondary importance in the mo-
tives of the followers. Similarly, whereas individual and group rapists have been found to
be about equally likely to have had prior criminal convictions, group rapists were less
likely to have had a prior conviction for a sex crime, which suggests that the usual mo-
tives for sex crimes are perhaps not central to their criminal activities. Richard Wright &
DJ. West, Rape-A Comparison of Group Offenses and Lone Assaults, 21 MED. SC. L.
25, 26 (1981).
We may therefore surmise that individuals with psychological proclivities to rape
are more likely to become the "leaders" who initiate and encourage group rape than are
others without those proclivities. We may also surmise that, among followers in group
rape, the ratio of rape-specific motives to general affiliative motives for participation may
vary, and that enthusiasm and willingness to participate in group rape will be in part in-
fluenced by each follower's inclinations or aversions to rape.
Thus, the presence of individuals with psychological proclivities to rape should be
expected to increase significantly the rape propensity of groups in which they are mem-
bers both by providing the leaders who encourage and initiate group rape and also by
providing more willing followers.
257. Researchers on motives for rape concur that "desire for sex" is not a sufficient
or even a necessary motivation for rape. See, e.g., Lynn Reynolds, Rape: A Social Per-
spective, in GENDER ISSUES, SEX OFFENSES, AND CRIMINAL JUSICE 149, 151 (Sol
Chaneles ed., 1984); GROTH, supra note 89, at 28. As Nicholas Groth states,
Sexual desire, in and of itself, is not the primary or paramount issue operating
in [the rapist]. If it were, there are a number of opportunities available in our
society for consensual sex. In fact, sexual assaults always coexist with consenting
sexual relations in the life of the offender. In no case have we ever found
that . . . [the rapist] had no other alternatives or outlets for his sexual desires.
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ing Nicholas Groth's widely accepted three-type taxonomy.28
Groth identified three patterns of motivation for rape: power,
anger, and sadism. In power-motivated rapes, the offender is moti-
vated by underlying feelings of inadequacy and weakness and by
doubts about his masculinity. He rapes in an effort to compensate
for those feelings through controlling and sexually possessing the
victim. Power rapists typically
feel insecure about their masculinity or conflicted about their
identity....
... Rape, then[,] becomes a way of putting such fears to
rest, of asserting one's heterosexuality, and of preserving one's
sense of manhood....
The intent of the power rapist, then, is to assert his
competency and validate his masculinity."
The anger-motivated rapist, by contrast, seeks to use rape to
gain revenge for a perceived wrong.' He feels hurt, humiliated,
or unjustly treated. The victim may be the perceived wrongdoer or
may be only a symbolic representative of him or her (usually
her).6 Because the rape expresses feelings of rage, it typically is
characterized by deliberate brutality and degradation. 62
Finally, in sadism rapes, "[t]here is a sexual transformation of
anger and power so that aggression itself becomes eroticized....
The assault usually involves bondage and torture and frequently
has a bizarre or ritualistic quality to it." 63
The most prevalent of the three identified motive patterns for
rape appears to be power rape (55% in Groth's study), followed
258. For a history and review of taxonomies of rape motives, see Robert Prentky et
al., Development of a Rational Taxonomy for the Classification of Rapists: The Massachu-
setts Treatment Center System, 13 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 39 (1985).
259. GROTH, supra note 89, at 28-31. Several authors of typologies of rape motives
describe a type corresponding to Groth's power rapist and use the term "macho" or
"machismo" or, occasionally, "hypermasculinity" to describe this type of rapist's personal
style. See, e.g., D.J. West, Violent and Non-Violent Sex Offenders, 16 AusTL. J. OF FO-
RENSIC Sci. 104, 105 (1984) ("The macho man's ideal is to be aggressive in sex...
[and] to show the woman who's boss."); Prentky et al., supra note 258, at 48 ("[This
type of offender] shows an exaggerated masculine style, an assertion of masculinity that is
often labelled 'machismo.' ").
260. GROTH, supra note 89, at 13-14.
261. Id at 16-17.
262. Id at 13-14.
263. Id at 44.
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by anger rape (40%), and then by a small minority of sadism
rapes (5%).' Thus, the vast majority of rapes fall within the
power and anger motive patterns. Here, the perpetrator population
is composed of men with concerns of inadequacy in areas of mas-
culinity, manhood, and power (power rapists) and rage, usually
against a woman or women (anger rapists). It would not be sur-
prising if men intensely concerned with those issues were dispro-
portionately attracted to an all-male, supposedly all-heterosexual,
"macho," highly cohesive organization committed to the threat or
deployment of armed physical force. 65 By constructing a military
organization that answers to that description, we may attract po-
tential power and anger rapists in undesirable numbers.26
Again, the point here is not that many or most military per-
sonnel are psychologically predisposed to rape but, rather, that a
military culture with the group norms discussed above may attract
some critical mass of potential rapists who then have an undesir-
able effect in fostering the acceptance, transmission, and elabora-
tion of rape-conducive norms; in committing rape; and in initiating
and leading group rape, especially in the combat context. In these
ways, individual psychological dynamics may interact with group
264. See iL at 58; see also Prentky et al., supra note 258, at 65-66 (reporting data on
distribution of rape types consistent with that in the Groth study).
265. The "convergence theory" of group behavior suggests that individuals with com-
patible emotional needs tend to join the same groups in order to meet those needs and
further tend to move the groups' activities in directions consistent with the fulfillment of
those psychological dispositions. See DONELSON R. FORSYTH, GROUP DYNAMICS 438-69
(2d ed. 1990).
266. This would be true of any military organization but is especially true in an all-
volunteer force in which the applicant pool is entirely self-selected. Admiral Worth
Bagley, Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Ret.) has made a related point. As he stated,
Men join the Navy for many different reasons; however, a certain portion join
and remain in the Navy because they enjoy being in a job which has been
historically associated with fellowship among men in a difficult and dangerous
endeavor. Changing the fabric of the Navy by integrat[ing] women into all
combat roles might well reduce the attractions of the Navy to this segment of
mankind.
Hearings on H.R. 9832 to Eliminate Discrimination Based on Sex with Respect to the
Appointment and Admission of Persons to the Service Academies Before Subcomm. No. 2
of the House Armed Services Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1975) (statement of Vice
Admiral Worth Bagley, then Chief of Naval Operations (Personnel)). Admiral Bagley's
testimony was in support of the continued exclusion of women. His observations, howev-
er, could cut either way. It is true that different organizational cultures attract different
"segments of mankind." The question, then, is which segments the armed forces should
seek to attract.
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gender and sexual norms to magnify the effects of rape-conducive
norms on the rape propensity of military organizations.
7. Deindividuation Norms in Primary Groups. Rape-conducive
gender and sexual norms are not, however, the only normative
component of military culture that would tend to elevate the
incidence of rape in military organizations. In addition, the
presence in military organizations of norms favoring deindivi-
duation also would tend to heighten military rape incidence.
a. Normative deindividuation in general. "Deindividuation" is a
function of the submergence of individual identity within the larger
group. This eclipsing of individual identity by group identifi-
cation has been found under certain conditions to reduce indivi-
duals' internal constraints on behavior.'
The deindividuated state can render positive results. Strong
feelings of unity and love, ecstatic experiences, and religious and
other conversion experiences are associated with deindividu-
ation.269 However, the submersion of individuality in groups is
also associated with aggression and lack of compassion." In
deindividuation, "[t]he loosening of our hold on the ego can bring
about an emotional communion of a transcendental nature, but it
can also lead us to commit atrocities of horrific proportions."' 1
As Ed Diener states,
[T]he deindividuated person in a certain situation might be more
likely to donate a large amount of money to charity, might be
more likely to risk his or her life to help another, and might be
more likely to kiss friends .... However, a deindividuated per-
267. See Ed Diener, Deindividuation: The Absence of Self-Awareness and Self-Regu-
lation in Group Members, in PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP INFLUENCE 209, 210 (Paul B.
Paulus ed., 1980); Leon Festinger et al., Some Consequences of De-Individuation in a
Group, 47 J. OF ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 382 (1952).
268. See FORSYTH, supra note 265, at 442.
269. See Steven Prentice-Dunn & Ronald W. Rogers, Deindividuation and the Self-
Regulation of Behavior, in PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP INFLUENCE 87, 102 (Paul B. Paulus
ed., 2d ed. 1989); Philip G. Zimbardo, The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and
Order Versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MO-
TIVATION 237, 257 (William J. Arnold & David Levine eds., 1969).
270. See Philip G. Zimbardo, Transforming Experimental Research into Advocacy for
Social Change, in APPLYING SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 33, 53 (Morton Deutsch & Harvey A.
Hornstein eds., 1975).
271. Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, supra note 269, at 87.
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son might also be more likely to throw rocks at others, partici-
pate in a lynching, or set a building ablaze.m'
Deindividuation, then, is associated with extremes of behavior that
may be positive or negative.
Deindividuation is believed to be related to disinhibition of
behavior through a lessening of the deindividuated, group-focused
individual's internal self-awareness or self-reflection t which dis-
rupts his normal self-regulation. 4 External situational cues and
internal emotional impulses come to govern the behavior of the
person in the deindividuated state. 5
This does not mean, of course, that deindividuated behavior is
random. On the contrary, individuals deindividuated at a religious
revival meeting predictably will "testify," and deindividuated gang
members engaged in gang rape do not get confused and "testify"
instead of attacking the victim. The emotional impulses and situa-
tional cues that come to guide individuals' and groups' behavior in
the deindividuated state are themselves a predictable and meaning-
ful reflection of individuals' desires and the groups' cultures. The
situational cues present in the deindividuated situation develop
into the context-specific standards of behavior or "emergent
norms" of the situation. 6 In conditions of deindividuation, emo-
tional impulses together with situation-specific group norms gov-
ern.m In turn, those emotions as well as those emergent norms
reflect the proclivities of group members.278
While the form of deindividuation discussed thus far has been
radical or acute deindividuation, it appears that deindividuation
may best be conceived as including a continuum of psychological
272. Diener, supra note 267, at 232.
273. See itL at 210; Charles S. Carver, Physical Aggression as a Function of Objective
Self-Awareness and Attitudes Toward Punishment, 11 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL
510, 518 (1975); Brian Mullen, Atrocity as a Function of Lynch-Mob Composition: A Self-
Attention Perspective, 12 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL BuLL. 187, 188 (1986).
274. See Steven Prentice-Dunn & Ronald W. Rogers, Effects of Deindividuating Situa-
tional Cues and Aggressive Models on Subjective Deindividuation and Aggression, 39 . OF
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL 104, 104 (1980) [hereinafter Prentice-Dunn & Rogers,
Deindividuating Situational Cues]; see also Steven Prentice-Dunn & Ronald W. Rogers,
Effects of Public and Private Self-Awareness on Deindividuation and Aggression, 43 . OF
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYcHOL 503, 503 (1982) [hereinafter Prentice-Dunn & Rogers,
Public and Private].
275. Diener, supra note 267, at 210.
276. let at 230.
277. lI at 231.
278. Id at 230, 232-33.
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states ranging from acute deindividuation to milder and perhaps
more chronic or ongoing forms of deindividuation in which con-
sciousness and identity are heavily communal, and individuality
and individuated identity are minimized 9  Such low-level or
"chronic" deindividuation might be found, for instance, in day-to-
day life in a religious cult.
The normative level of individuation of group members varies
between different primary groups. While some groups, such as
some families for instance, normatively encourage the individuation
and individuality of their members, other groups, such as the
chronically deindividuated religious cult, have norms encouraging
or requiring deindividuation. Similarly, acute deindividuation also
is normative behavior for some groups.O' For instance, acute de-
individuation may be normative behavior at a religious revival or
at some rock concerts.
Thus, the occurrence of deindividuation itself-both chronic
and acute-is affected by group norms that favor or disfavor
deindividuation. Moreover, the "disinhibited" behavior that will
occur once in the deindividuated state also is guided by group
attitudes, proclivities, and emergent group norms.282 That
disinhibited behavior may range from the heights of generosity to
the depths of atrocity, including rape.
b. Normative deindividuation in military organizations. Military
organizations share norms favoring deindividuation, both chronic
(in training, in barracks life) and acute (in combat). This is not to
say that deindividuation is fostered to the exclusion of all
individuality in the military. On the contrary, recognition of
individuality is reflected in, for instance, achievement awards and
commendations to individuals. However, some degree of deindi-
viduation is favored throughout a military career, and a particu-
279. Id. at 210, 219, 237. See generally Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, supra note 269, at
102-03 (discussing deindividuation in contexts other than those involving the prototypical
acute deindividuation).
280. Cf. Back, supra note 162, at 339-40 (discussing differing levels of conformity
demanded by different types of cohesive groups); Leon Festinger & John Thibaut, Inter-
personal Communication in Small Groups, 46 J. OF ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 92
(1951) (considering the relationship between group cohesiveness and pressure on members
to conform to group norms).
281. Cf. Diener, supra note 267, at 218-19 (discussing the role of norms and cues for
disinhibited behavior).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 276-78.
19961
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
larly high degree of deindividuation is called for during certain
periods of service, including basic training and, for those who
serve in combat, the combat context.
From the time of basic training, low-level deindividuation is
cultivated in recruits. Throughout training, recruits learn to view
themselves less and less as the individual identities they came in as
and more and more as part of a team or group of buddies.' In-
deed, learning to identify with the other members of the unit is
perhaps the most important lesson of basic training.' Integral to
basic training is the systematic stripping away of the recruit's prior
self-image and identity.' As Peter Bourne simply states, "[T]he
recruit must reject his preexisting identity and envelop himself
instead in the institutional identity of the military organiza-
tion." Robert Lifton similarly observes that the recruit's "civil
identity, with its built-in restraints, is eradicated, or at least under-
mined and set aside in favor of the warrior identity."' ' 7 This pro-
cess of deindividuation is carefully constructed as part of the basic
training process. As Gwynne Dyer vividly describes,
The first three days the raw recruits spend at Parris Island
[Marine Corps Recruit Depot] are actually relatively easy, though
they are hustled and shouted at continuously. It is during this
time that they are documented and inoculated, receive uniforms,
and learn the basic orders of drill that will enable young Ameri-
cans to do everything simultaneously in large groups. But the
most important thing that happens in "forming" is the surrender
of the recruits' own clothes, their hair-all the physical evidence
of their individual civilian identities.
During a period of only seventy-two hours, in which they
are allowed little sleep, the recruits lay aside their former lives in
a series of hasty rituals (like being shaven to the scalp) whose
symbolic significance is quite clear to them even though they are
quite deliberately given absolutely no time for reflection....
[S]o the recruits emerge from their initiation into the sys-
tem, stripped of their civilian clothes, shorn of their hair, and
deprived of whatever confidence in their own identity they may
283. See DYER, supra note 141, at 114.
284. See id.
285. Bourne, supra note 64, at 463; KUNEN, supra note 64, at 237.
286. Bourne, supra note 64, at 465.
287. LIFrON, supra note 212, at 28 (1973).
[Vol. 45:651
1996] RAPE AND THE MILITARY 729
previously have had as eighteen-year-olds, like so many blanks
ready to have the Marine identity impressed upon them.'
In these ways, deindividuation is normatively favored and encour-
aged in military training. Additional techniques that foster de-
individuation include screaming in bayonet training, chanting ca-
dences in drill training, and other exercises that minimize individu-
al self-reflection and maximize group cohesion.29
Deindividuation has been found to be fostered and intensified
by high levels of group cohesiveness,2 9 by physiological arousal
of group members (caused by physical exertion, sensory stimula-
tion, and the like),2 9 by intensive situational involvement (espe-
cially when the group has an urgent common goal),2' and by
lack of situational structure.293 All of those potentiating factors
are present at particularly powerful levels in the combat context,
where deindividuation tendencies among military units will there-
fore be heightened.
J. Glenn Gray provides a vivid description of the deindividua-
tion characteristics of the combat situation:
In these situations some are able to serve others in simple yet
fundamental ways. Inhuman cruelty can give way to super-hurn-.i
kindness. Inhibitions vanish, and people are reduced to their es-
288. DYER, supra note 141, at 110-11. Personnel interviewed by the author at Parris
Island Marine Corps Recruit Depot in October 1993 referred to this process of identity
transformation as the "break down" and "build up" periods. See, e.g., Interview with CpL
Cardella, supra note 140.
The analogy with deindividuation norms in other forms of primary group is
striking. Regarding fraternities, for instance, Peggy Sanday has noted that
[b]ound emotionally to one another in the group, they consider group
values and traditions to be significant guides for behavior. These values and
traditions are inculcated during the pledging period and in the initiation rituals.
In these rituals, pledges endure verbal and physical abuse as a condition for
membership. The abusive behavior strips the pledge of his individual identity so
that he is ready to accept a group-defined identity.
The victimization of pledges is part of a process designed to bring about
a transformation of consciousness so that group identity and attitudes becomes
personalized. The process includes a symbolic sacrifice of the self (or some part
of the self) to a superior body that represents the communal identity of the
house.
SANDAY, supra note 153, at 135.
289. See generally Diener, supra note 267, at 226 ("Rapid talking, shouting, and chant-
ing are frequent accompaniments of deindividuated group activity.").
290. Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, supra note 269, at 94, 97.
291. lId
292. Diener, supra note 267, at 223.
293. Zimbardo, supra note 269, at 257.
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sence.... Again and again in moments of this kind I was as
much inspired by the nobility of some of my fellows as appalled
by the animality of others, or, more exactly, by both qualities in
the same person. The average degree, which we commonly know
in peacetime, conceals as much as it reveals about the human
creature.2 4
Some of the commonalities between military and religious organi-
zations were noted earlier.295 With regard to deindividuation, the
parallels become striking. As Gray has commented regarding the
experience of combat:
In moments like these many have a vague awareness of how
isolated and separate their lives have hitherto been and how
much they have missed by living in the narrow circle of family or
a few friends. With the boundaries of the self expanded, they
sense a kinship never known before. Their "I" passes insensibly
into a "we," "my" becomes "our," and individual fate loses its
central importance.... [A]t its height, this sense of comradeship
is an ecstasy.296
Gray concludes that
[t]here must be a similarity between this willingness of soldier-
comrades for self-sacrifice and the willingness of saints and mar-
tyrs to die for their religious faith....
This is the mystical element of war that has been mentioned
by nearly all serious writers on the subject. William James spoke
of it as a sacrament.2'
Thus, the situation of a cohesive military unit in a combat situa-
tion is, like certain religious experiences, highly conducive to de-
individuation.
Once military unit members are in a deindividuated state, and
if the group's proclivities-its culture and normative attitudes,
including gender and sexual attitudes-have already been devel-
oped in a rape-conducive direction, then rape becomes a plausible
outcome.28 This would be particularly true under the conditions
294. GRAY, supra note 133, at 14-15.
295. See supra note 144 and accompanying text; supra note 155; supra note 164 and
accompanying text.
296. GRAY, supra note 133, at 45; see also JEAN B. ELSHTAiN, WOMEN AND WAR
207 (1987) ("Communal ecstacy explains a willingness to sacrifice and gives dying for
others a mystical quality.").
297. GRAY, supra note 133, at 47.
298. The normative factors (both gender and sexual norms, and norms favoring
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of acute deindividuation that are characteristic of combat, but
would also apply in peacetime when a milder or chronic deindivi-
duation appears to be common and acute deindividuation occasion-
al.
In summary, the deindividuation fostered in military units may
interact with normative rape-conducive sexual and gender attitudes
to elevate the rape propensity of military organizations. This inter-
active effect would be expected to occur in peace as well as in
war, but to be particularly potent in the combat context.
III. CHANGES IN THE CONTENT OF MILITARY CULTURE
We have seen evidence in the discussion thus far that there
exists a differential between military rape rates and military rates
of other violent crime. We have considered the possibility that the
military rape differential may be attributable in part to the norms
and attitudes-toward gender and sexuality, and toward deindivi-
duation-extant within military organizations. If that causal anal-
ysis is at all accurate, then it suggests that we may be able to
reduce military rape rates, in peace and also in war, by altering
the norms that are conveyed within the military.
The potential for reducing military rape incidence in this way
suggests an additional perspective from which to evaluate policies
affecting military culture. The possibility that certain aspects of
military culture contribute to the military rape differential weighs
in favor of policy choices that foster change in those aspects of
military culture.
Thorny questions, however, remain. In particular, we must ask
what sorts of policy choices would foster the cultural change in
question and whether the contemplated cultural change can occur
deindividuation) that may increase the rape propensity of military units would be expect-
ed to increase both the incidence of rape by individual members and also, perhaps
disproportionately, the incidence of group rape. It appears from the available anecdotal
data that unlike rape in the nonwar context, which is more often than not committed by
a lone individual, see GROTH, supra note 89, at 110 (1979); MACKELLAR, supra note 89,
at 105, rape in war typically is committed by a group of two or more. See, e.g., supra
notes 5-10 and accompanying text; Arnold J. Toynbee, Violation of Women in War, in
MORALS IN WARTIME 136, 149 (Victor Robinson ed., 1943) ("The [WWII] officers and
soldiers usually hunted in couples [for rape victims]."). It seems plausible that
deindividuation-the eclipsing of individual identity by group identification-may particu-
larly increase a propensity toward group rape.
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without undermining military effectiveness. These are the issues to
be addressed in this and the following section.
Primary group bonding has repeatedly been found in military
research to be essential to combat performance-and thus essential
to the effectiveness and, indeed, the survival of troops in com-
bat.2" Primary group relations provide essential elements of mo-
rale in combat, including on-the-scene motivation, 3'0 emotional
support, and self-confidence.0 1 Primary group bonding in the mi-
litary is, in this way, a matter of life and death.
Deindividuation too appears to be an important contributor to
combat effectiveness, fostering bravery and heroism in battle. In-
deed, it has been suggested that traditional rituals such as war
dances or chanting before battle were designed to facilitate
deindividuation of the warriors in combat.3°
For these reasons, in exploring ways to reduce the rape inci-
dence of military personnel, reducing primary group bonding or
deindividuation of troops would not be an appropriate place to
start. Rather, a more appropriate focus would be on the normative
gender and sexual attitudes within military culture.
There is reason to believe, as we have seen, that change in
the gender and sexual norms of military culture could contribute
to a reduction in the rape incidence of military organizations. Such
cultural change could very likely be fostered through gender inte-
gration of the military, from basic training through combat, as
shall now be considered. Such thoroughgoing integration of the
military would be importantly facilitated by further narrowing or
elimination of the female combat exclusion and by "accession" (as
299. See, e.g., MOSKOS, supra note 132, at 135, 144-45; I STOUFFER ET AL, supra
note 137; Little, supra note 134, at 206-07; David H. Marlowe, The Basic Training Pro-
Cess, in THE SYMPTOM AS COMMUNICATION IN SCHIZOPHRENIA 75 (Kenneth L. Artiss
ed., 1959); Shils & Janowitz, supra note 146, at 280; see also Moskos, supra note 155, at
37 (arguing that primary-group ties in combat units arise from instrumental strategies for
individual physical survival). It is interesting to note, however, that primary groups in the
military do not always contribute to military effectiveness. When primary groups develop
group norms in opposition to the goals of the larger military, primary groups can supply
solidarity in opposition to official goals. See Little, supra note 134, at 195.
300. See Shils, Primary, supra note 143, at 21.
301. IL at 27-28.
302. Zimbardo, supra note 269, at 257. We should not, however, lose sight of the
risks associated with deindividuation in combat: One cross-cultural study, for instance, has
found deindividuation to be correlated with torture and mutilation of the enemy in war-
fare. Robert I. Watson Jr., Investigation into Deindividuation Using a Cross-Cultural Sur-
vey Technique, 25 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 342, 344 (1973).
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hiring of uniformed personnel is called) of a greater proportion of
female personnel, as shall be discussed later in this section.
We might expect that a truly thoroughgoing integration of
women throughout the military services would do much to under-
mine group norms featuring the constellation of attitudes com-
prised of hypermasculinity, hostility toward women, adversarial
sexual beliefs, and the like, discussed earlier. The presence of
women as full members of the fighting forces would be inconsis-
tent with a military culture in which women are viewed as the
"other," primarily as sexual targets, and in which aggression is
viewed as a sign of masculinity. The very presence of women as
military equals would call into question such views.
There has been considerable movement in recent years toward
integration of women into the American military. The gender
integration of some military units may already be having a positive
effect on gender attitudes. According to one female Army Ser-
geant interviewed in 1994, "The idea that being a soldier means
being masculine is changing because of more women coming into
the services. The fact that there are now female fighter pilots, for
example, helps a lot."3 ' A female Army Staff Sergeant summed
up the point, saying: "The units that work with females every day
seem to be able to relate better. 314
While we have seen some movement toward integration of
women into the services in recent years, however, that movement
has been within limits. Those limits on gender integration of the
303. Interview with female Army Sergeant, Name Withheld, at Fort Bragg, N.C. (Sept.
23, 1994). Another female Sergeant commented that
[t]he guys from the all-male units are not used to having women around. But
once they do work with females, it helps. Like the guys at NPDLC [non-com-
missioned officer training] who hadn't worked with females before. They even
told us after a while that they were surprised and they had a lot of respect for
us.
Interview with Sgt. Alesia Rodriguez, U.S. Army, at Fort Bragg, N.C. (Sept 23, 1994).
304. Interview with Staff Sgt. Monica Krause, U.S. Army, at Fort Bragg, N.C. (Sept.
23, 1994).
By contrast, regarding the units that still remain all-male, one female former Army
Captain who is married to an Army enlisted man observed:
The things that the leaders do in the male-only branches are different from in
the integrated branches. Like they'll call the guys who don't do well "girls" and
things like that. That will happen in the combat branches because there are no
girls there to object; they won't get caught and turned in in all-male units. So
all the leaders in the male units know it's not supposed to go on, but they still
do it.
Telephone Interview with female former Army Captain, Name Withheld (Sept. 25, 1994).
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military also appear to limit the extent of change likely to occur in
military gender and sexual culture. It seems improbable, for rea-
sons now to be considered, that we will see a full transition in the
gender and sexual norms of the military as long as rules remain
excluding w6men from a range of combat positions, and low pro-
portions of women are accessed for military service.
A. The Combat Exclusions
The rules excluding women from combat have been narrowed
considerably in recent years. However, the remaining exclusions of
women from combat positions still limit the potential for change in
the gender and sexual culture of the military. A very brief histori-
cal overview of legal limitations on American women's military
participation will place these issues in context.
Prior to the Armed Forces Integration Act of 1948, American
military women served only in auxiliary units.' The 1948 Act
authorized the participation of women in certain roles in the regu-
lar services, but limited their total presence to 2% of enlisted
strength, and limited the rank that a female officer could
achieve.3 6 The 2% total-female-enlisted participation limit was
lifted in 1967."07 In 1976, women were admitted for the first time
to the Naval, Air Force, and Military (Army) Academies.' Two
years later, statutory reform permitted women to be assigned to
duty on certain naval vessels.' Throughout this period, women
were prohibited by statute from naval and air combat roles. Army
policy, in the absence of statutory law, excluded women from
combat positions. The legal status of American women's military
participation remained in essentially this posture until 1988, when
the Department of Defense (DOD) further defined the combat
exclusion by adopting the "risk rule," which excluded women from
noncombat units or missions in which the risks of exposure to
direct combat, hostile fire, or capture equaled or exceeded those
risks in the combat units they supported.310
305. See M.C. DEvILBLIss, WOMEN AND MILrrARY SERVICE 3-9 (1990).
306. Act of June 12, 1948, ch. 449, 62 Stat. 356 (repealed 1967).
307. See 10 U.S.C. § 3069 (1994) (repealing 10 U.S.C. § 5410 (1956)).
308. See Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-106, Title VIII, § 803(b)(1), 89 Stat. 531, 538 (1975).
309. See Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1979, Pub. L. No.
95-485, § 808, 92 Stat. 1611, 1623 (1978) (repealed 1993).
310. The risk rule provided that risks of direct combat, exposure to hostile fire, or
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Major changes toward a narrowing of the combat exclusion
for women began to occur in 1991, when Congress repealed the
statutory exclusion of women from combat aircraft in the Air
Force and Navy.31' In 1993, Congress eliminated the statutory
restrictions on women serving on combatant Navy vessels.312
Then, in the spring of 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin di-
rected the services to open combat aircraft positions to women, to
provide recommendations to the DOD on whether to retain or
replace the risk rule, and to study the possibilities for opening to
women additional positions, including combat positions.1 3
Pursuant to Secretary Aspin's initiative, the risk rule was re-
scinded in January of 1994, and was replaced by the "Direct
Ground Combat Rule" (DGC Rule), which provides as follows:
A. Rule. Service members are eligible to be assigned to all posi-
tions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be
excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose
primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground, as
defined below.
B. Definition. Direct ground combat is engaging an enemy on the
ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being
exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical
contact with the hostile force's personnel. Direct ground combat
takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and
closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or
shock effect.31
4
capture are proper criteria for closing noncombat positions or units to women, when the
type, degree, and duration of such risks are equal to or greater than the combat unit
with which they are normally associated within a given theater of operations. If the risk
of noncombat units or positions is less than that of the land, air, or sea combat units
with which they are associated, then they should be open to women. Noncombat units
should be compared to combat land units, air to air, and so forth. Memorandum from
Frank Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, to Secretaries of the Military Departments (Febru-
ary 2, 1988) (discussing Women in the Military) (on file with author).
311. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L.
No. 102-190, § 531, 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991).
312. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, §
547, 107 Stat. 1547, 1659 (1993).
313. Memorandum from Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the
Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management & Personnel), and Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (April 28, 1993) (setting policy regarding the
assignment of women in the Armed Forces) (on file with author).
314. Memorandum from Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the
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Pursuant to Secretary Aspin's directive, the Air Force in 1994
opened additional combat aviation positions, bringing to over 99%
the total proportion of Air Force positions open to women. 15
Air Force positions remaining closed include Air Force Pararescue,
Combat Controllers, and any other positions or units defined as
involving direct ground combat or assignment with direct ground
combat units.316
The Navy, pursuant to its interpretation of the DGC Rule,
opened most combatant vessel positions to women, bringing to
94% the proportion of all active-duty Navy positions open to
women.3 17 Positions still excluding women include those in sub-
marines, coastal patrol boats, certain mine warfare ships, and Spe-
cial Operations Forces.318
The Army, pursuant to its interpretation of the DGC Rule,
opened certain additional positions, raising to 67% (from a former
61%) the proportion of Army positions open to women.319 Army
positions that remain closed include, but are not limited to, all
combat units below the brigade level; Special Operations Forces;
all armor and infantry; cannon, artillery, and short-range air de-
Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness), and Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Reserve Affairs) (Jan. 13, 1994) (on file with author).
315. Secretary of Defense, Press Release, Secretary of Defense Perry Approves Plans
to Open New Jobs for Women in the Military, July 29, 1994 [hereinafter Press Release]
(on file with author). These numbers for the Air Force include reserve and national
guard positions. See Undersecretary of Defense Dorn, Special Briefing on Women in the
Military, July 29, 1994, at 4 (The Federal News, Reuters Transcript Service) [hereinafter
Special Briefing].
316. See Letter from William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, to Senator Sam Nunn,
Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services (July 28, 1994) (reporting actions
taken to expand the role of women in the military) (on file with author).
317. See Letter from Perry, supra note 316, at 2.
318. See id., Enclosure 2, at 5.
319. These percentages for the Army include reserve and national guard positions
together with active duty positions. The Army currently does not know the percentage of
active duty positions that were open before or after the policy change. Telephone Inter-
view with Major Anita Minniefield, Public Affairs, Public Communications Division, U.S.
Army (Aug. 19, 1994).
Considerable controversy among forces in the Army and the Department of De-
fense attended the decision of which Army positions were to open to women. Secretary
of the Army Togo West favored but was not successful in achieving the opening of virtu-
ally all positions not considered to involve direct ground combat, which was narrowly
defined. See Eric Schmitt, Army Will Allow Women in 32,000 Combat Posts, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 1994, § A, at 12.
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fense artillery; and units that co-locate by doctrine or requirement
with direct ground combat units."
The Marine Corps opened additional positions, raising from
33% to 62% the Marine Corps positions open to women.32' Ma-
rine Corps positions still closed to women include positions analo-
gous to Army positions still closed to women, listed above.3z
Considerable progress has thus been made in narrowing the
legal limitations on American women's military participation. How-
ever, exclusions still remain in all four forces, particularly in the
Army and Marine Corps.
While the recent narrowing of the combat exclusion has been
extremely valuable, the perpetuation of the exclusion in its present
form limits potential effects on the gender and sexual norms of
military culture that might be gained from a more thoroughgoing
integration of women. The remaining combat exclusions limit
women's advancement into leadership positions and also retain as
exclusively male many of the most stereotypically masculine roles.
Each of these factors limits the cultural change likely to result
from the presence of women in the forces.
The remaining combat exclusions pose significant limitations
on women's advancement within military organizations, particularly
in the Army and Marine Corps. As one reporter asked Under-
secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Edwin Dorn,
If you're going to keep women, particularly in the Army and the
Marine Corps, out of direct ground combat, are you not denying
them... the opportunity to compete with their male counter-
parts for promotion, particularly to general officer? If they're not
allowed to be in infantry and armor and most artillery, you've
kind of removed them from the fast track, have you not?3'
Undersecretary Dorn replied that "to be quite honest, you are
partially correct, because [of] the prohibition against ground com-
bat, it is not likely that in the next 25 or 30 years there will be a
female chief of staff of the Army."'324 Of course, Chief of Staff is
not the only position that women will be impeded in achieving.
Rather, insofar as combat service has been and continues to be an
320. See Special Briefing, supra note 315, at 4-5.
321. Press Release, supra note 315, at 1.
322. See Special Briefing, supra note 315, at 5.
323. Id. (anonymous reporter).
324. Id
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important element in promotion decisions,325 women's exclusion
from much of combat service will limit their opportunities for
promotion generally.
Integration of women into positions of military leadership
would affect military gender norms both at a symbolic level and in
very concrete ways. As one female former Army officer stated,
It helps a lot to have females there, but especially if they have
some rank. Like in Saudi, during the Persian Gulf War, my com-
mander told me to "Act like a soldier, not like a girl." I con-
fronted him and he backed off. So he got feedback, because
there was a female there-but especially because I had enough
rank and the confidence to confront him. Not everyone would
have been in a position to do that.3'
To the extent that women are, because of remaining combat exclu-
sions, less likely to become military leaders and more likely to re-
main in lower echelons, their value in changing the gender norms
of military culture is thereby limited.
But it is not only the rank held by women but also the sub-
stance of their military roles-their job fields and duties-that
would be expected to affect military gender norms. The combat
exclusions contribute to a powerful symbolic message about the
appropriate roles of men and women. Only men are deemed suit-
able for ground and certain other forms of combat-arguably the
very positions that have been considered the prototypical military
positions, perhaps the most "macho" ones. In this way, the contin-
ued exclusion of women from certain combat roles may actually
reinforce and reaffirm traditional military gender norms; that is, to
be a "real soldier," a fighter, one must be a man.
In addition to the general effects on military culture of the
symbolic message carried by the remaining combat exclusions, we
also must consider the particular effects of the exclusion on those
occupational fields from which women are actually excluded. Units
from which women are excluded may well elaborate "macho"
norms (norms consisting of the constellation of rape-conducive
gender and sexual attitudes discussed earlier) even more inten-
sively than we have seen before, as all-male composition now be-
comes a distinguishing group feature even within the broader mili-
325. See Rodman D. Griffin, Women in the Military, 2 CONG. Q. REs. 835, 836-37
(1992).
326. Telephone Interview with female former Army Captain, supra note 304.
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tary. We would expect for that tendency toward masculinist group
identification to be heightened yet further as individuals attracted
to that group image self-select into the remaining all-male occupa-
tional fields.3'
While important progress has been made in reducing the
range of combat positions from which women are excluded, reform
also has been limited in ways that are likely to limit the effects of
that reform on military culture. The remaining combat exclusions
may tend, in both concrete and symbolic ways, to reinforce the
traditional military gender and sexual norms that may be contrib-
uting to the military rape differential.
B. Accessions Policies
Related to but distinct from the issue of combat exclusion
rules are the military services' policies on accessions of service
members. No matter how many military positions are "open to
women," unless the services' accessions policies contemplate ac-
tually placing women in some substantial proportion of those posi-
tions, military occupations will not become substantially integrated,
and resultant change in military gender and sexual culture will
thereby be limited.
1. Accessing Recruits. Each year, each service produces a
personnel management plan for the next year including projected
accessions, promotions, and discharges. 328 These plans set
numerical goals for accessions on a variety of bases, including
prior service experience, job specialty, geographical district, race,
327. It is important additionally to observe that, unfortunately, the very occupational
fields, centered in the Army and Marine Corps, that have been chosen to remain all
male encompass the very units most at risk to rape in war. They are the units that occu-
py the ground, take prisoners, and come into contact with civilians. As Hays Parks has
observed,
The problem [of crimes of violence, including rape, in the combat context] most
directly involves members of the Army and Marines, for they have the greatest
face-to-face confrontation with enemy forces and civilians on the battlefield.
Additionally, certain triggering factors generally are found only in the area of
ground operations.
William H. Parks, Crimes in Hostilities: Conclusion, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, Sept. 1979,
at 18. At the time of that writing, Parks was a Major, U.S.M.C. He is now Chief, Inter-
national Law Branch, International Operational Law Division, Office of the Judge Advo-
cate Gen. (JAG), U.S. Army, and Special Assistant for Law of War Matters, Office of
the JAG, U.S. Army.
328. See STIEHM, supra note 228, at 155, 158.
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and ethnicity. 9 The Army and Marine Corps also have set
minimum female enlisted accessions goals (18% and 16%,
respectively).33 Informed sources within each of these services
state that they intend to meet but do not expect to exceed their
minimum goals for female accessions.331 The Navy and Air Force
now have gender-neutral accessions policies (in the sense of having
no stated gender goals or quotas),332 but still have projected or
predicted numbers of females expected to be accessed (18% to
20% for the Navy).333
The planned or projected number of women to be accessed
obviously is not simply a function of the number of jobs "open" to
women in each service (i.e., jobs not restricted to men under a
combat exclusion and not "reserved" to men for other policy rea-
sons).' Rather, each service considers a variety of factors, in-
cluding the service's needs, potential availability of female recruits,
and costs, in identifying the number of females to be accessed.35
That number may bear only a very distant relationship to the
number of jobs open to women in the service.3  For .instance,
while 62% of Marine Corps positions are "open" to women,337
the current Marine Corps minimum goal or floor for female enlist-
ed accessions is 6%.338 And the Navy prediction for female en-
listed accessions is 18% to 20%," even while 94% of Navy posi-
tions are open to women.'
For gender integration to be effective in changing gender and
sexual norms in the military, women must be present in sufficient
numbers to be perceived as more than tokens.Y Two decades of
329. See Telephone Interview with Capt. Ted Triebel, U.S. Navy (Ret.) (Nov. 2,
1994).
330. See id.
331. See id.
332. Regarding the Air Force gender-neutral accessions policy, see STIEHM, supra note
228, at 155. Regarding the Navy gender-neutral accessions policy, see Telephone Inter-
view with Capt. Triebel, supra note 329.
333. See Telephone Interview with Capt. Triebel, supra note 329. A predicted percent-
age for the Air Force was not available.
334. STIEHM, supra note 228, at 157, 165, 175.
335. Id. at 155-158; Telephone Interview with Capt. Triebel, supra note 329.
336. See STIEHM, supra note 228, at 157.
337. See supra text accompanying note 321.
338. See Telephone Interview with Capt. Triebel, supra note 329.
339. See Interview with Capt. Ted Triebel, U.S. Navy (Ret.) in Durham, N.C. (Aug.
26, 1994).
340. See supra text accompanying note 317.
341. For a review of military research on female participation in the military general-
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research in commercial, educational, and military contexts indicates
that when women are introduced into a previously male environ-
ment, the proportions of male and female in the newly integrated
environment are crucial in determining the outcome of integration.
When women remain a small minority, stereotyping and negative
reaction are perpetuated and women remain isolated within the
group. 42 As Rosabeth Kanter has observed, "As long as num-
bers are low, disruptions of interaction around tokens... are seen
by the organization as a huge deflection from its central purposes,
a drain of energy, leading to the conclusion that it is not worth
having people like the tokens around.?' 3 The presence of wom-
en in small numbers dispersed throughout the military creates, in
some ways, the worst of both worlds. As Judith Stiehm puts it,
"Because the women remained a small percentage both of the
whole and of any unit to which they were assigned, were dispersed
through a variety of noncombat jobs, and were integrated into
many previously all-male units, their presence disturbed without
altering."' The gender ratios of accessions are thus a very im-
portant factor in determining what effect the presence of military
women will have on the gender and sexual norms of military cul-
ture.
Accessions policies exert a strong influence on accessions
results. Based on accessions policies, recruiting commands in each
service pursue recruiting strategies that target particular popula-
tions (defined by factors including age, region, race, and gender)
in their advertising and in high school recruiting visits. While ac-
cessions policies and resultant recruiting strategies surely do not
entirely determine the proportion of recruits that are female
(broader societal gender roles, for instance, may more narrowly
limit the number of females than the number of males that are
"recruitable"), those policies do exert a considerable influence on
the proportion of female accessions. For that reason, accessions
ly, see STIEHM, supra note 228, at 134-54.
342. See Diane N. Ruble & E. Tory Higgins, Effects of Group Sex Composition on
Self-Presentation and Sx-Typing, 32 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 125, 125-31 (1976); James H.
Thomas & Dirk C. Prather, Integration of Females into a Previously All-Male Institution,
FIFTH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON PSYCHOLOGY IN THE AIR FORCE 8 APRIL-10 APRIL
1976, at 100, 100-01 (1976); Ross A. Webber, Perceptions and Behaviors in Mixed Sex
Work Teams, 15 INDUS. REL. 121, 121-29 (1976).
343. ROSABETH M. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 239 (1977).
344. STIEHM, supra note 228, at 152.
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policies are crucially important to the future of women's military
participation and thus to the potential effects of gender integration
on military culture. "Accessions are the heart of the women-in-the-
military matter. If women are not accessed, all other consider-
ations become moot."345
Numerous factors, including military readiness, force diversity,
and cost, have formed the basis of accessions policies to date. Mil-
itary cultural change and the potential resulting reduction in mili-
tary rape rates are yet another factor that might valuably be taken
into account in the future formation of accessions policies regard-
ing gender.
2. Basic Training. An especially important problem for
purposes of military cultural change that arises from the low rate
of female accessions into the services is the resultant impossibility
of thoroughly integrating basic training. The most intensive period
of socialization into military culture occurs in the basic training of
new recruits. Therefore, an important point for transformation in
the gender and sexual norms of military culture is in this initial
training of military personnel.
The Army, Navy, and Air Force each conduct some form of
gender-integrated basic training. But those services, in attempting
to integrate basic training, are constrained by the fact that there
are far fewer female than male recruits.' The Air Force has re-
sponded to that constraint by distributing recruits in a gender-
neutral manner, with the result that women generally constitute a
small minority within their training units (on average, 21% in
fiscal year 19 93).7 The Navy, in contrast, clusters female recruits
into a few basic training units with roughly equal numbers of
345. Id. at 174.
346. In 1993, the percentage of recruits in each service who were female was 16% in
the Army, 13% in the Navy, 5% in the Marine Corps, and 22% in the Air Force. De-
fense Manpower Data Center, Non-Prior Service Accessions to Active Forces, Attained
Age By Race By Service and Sex, Oct. 1992-Sep. 1993 (Jan. 23, 1996) (computer print-
out provided by the U.S. Defense Manpower Data Center, on file with author).
347. Telephone Interview with Sgt. Anita Bailey, Public Affairs Manager, Lackland
Air Force Base, San Antonio, Tex. (July 14, 1994). All activities in Air Force basic train-
ing are gender-integrated and include identical curricula except for some differences in
physical training requirements. Men and women are billeted on the same barracks floors
in different rooms (two men or two women to a room). Telephone Interview with Maj.
Valerie Lofland, Chief, Force Management Directorate, Military Personnel Policy, Lack-
land Air Force Base, San Antonio, Tex. (Feb. 10, 1994).
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males and females, and leaves the remaining majority of basic
training units male only." The Army clusters female recruits in-
to a few basic training units with a minimum of 25% females,
leaving the remaining majority of units male only.9 The Marine
Corps makes no attempt to integrate basic training, segregating
male and female recruits at the battalion level.
Air Force basic training thus occurs in a context in which
females constitute a small minority within their training units. This
minority status may substantially diminish the effects of women's
presence on the gender norms and attitudes of the units in which
they train. For Marine and most Army and Navy personnel,
basic training, a crucial period of socialization into military culture,
occurs in an all-male environment.352 The result of maintaining
all-male training units is that females may be viewed by male
recruits (and perhaps even by female recruits themselves) as mar-
ginal or peripheral to military life.353
348. Interview with Capt. Ted Triebel, U.S. Navy (Ret.), in Durham, N.C. (March 9,
1994).
349. Telephone Interviews with Raymond Harp, Public Information Specialist, U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command (Sept. 1, 1994 and Nov. 2, 1994).
350. Marine Corps basic training is sex-segregated at the battalion level (approximately
1,200 personnel), and there exist no plans for integration. Telephone Interview with Cpl.
Daniel Jones, Press Chief, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, S.C. (July 14,
1994).
351. Based on what is known about the consequences of placing a small proportion of
women or other out-group members into a predominantly male or otherwise dominant-
majority group, we may predict that those few women placed in each Air Force basic
training unit would tend to be more subject to marginalization than would be the case if
they constituted a more substantial proportion of their units. See KANTER, supra note
343, at 206-42 (discussing the marginalizing effects on women of constituting a small
proportion of an otherwise male group); Kanter, supra note 248, at 987 (observing that
constituting "less than 20% [of the group] in any particular situation... is not always a
large enough number to overcome the problems of tokenism"); Thomas & Prather, supra
note 342, at 100-01 (finding that marginalization of females in a previously all-male insti-
tution is more common when women constitute less than 25% of the new group); see
also MICHAEL RUSTAD, WOMEN IN KHAKI: THE AMERICAN ENLISTED WoMAN 228-35
(1982) (arguing for a 65-35 male/female ratio in the U.S. Army as necessary to improve
the status of enlisted women soldiers).
352. Even for those Army recruits trained in "gender-integrated" units, their training
occurs in units in which females are in the minority. (The Army sets a minimum of 25%
female for its gender-integrated basic training units. See supra text accompanying note
349.) As in the Air Force context, this minority status may diminish the beneficial effects
of the females' presence. See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
353. See WILLIAMS, supra note 238, at 67 ("Because of the segregation of basic train-
ing, military women are an enigma to most servicemen."). An additional problem with
segregated basic training is that it does not prepare female recruits for their military life
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In explaining the Navy's reasons for moving toward gender-
integrated recruit training, Patricia Thomas and Kathleen Bruyere
state that "the Navy recognized that the practice [of single-sex
recruit training] is divisive, setting the stage for differential treat-
ment of women later in their military careers."354 Such marginali-
zation of female recruits presumably would minimize the impact of
their presence on the norms and attitudes of the organizations in
which they participate. It will be difficult, however, for the Navy
to counteract a tendency toward such marginalization of female
recruits by "integrating" basic training if, because of accessions
numbers, most basic training units remain all male even after
"integration."
In addition to potentially causing female recruits to appear
marginal or peripheral, another consequence of the single-sex basic
training that occurs in all Marine and most Navy and Army units
is that the presence of women in the services has little effect on
the content (particularly the informal, "cultural" content) of the
male recruits' training. This phenomenon is reflected in an anec-
dote mentioned earlier: The name "Suzie Rottencrotch" was still
in unofficial use by males at Parris Island in 1993, but the female
drill instructor I spoke with learned this only by asking her male
counterpart.355 Also illustrative is the fact, related to me by a fe-
male drill instructor at Parris Island in 1994, that female recruits
are informally instructed on what sexual conduct is appropriate for
them, and on how to deal appropriately with the sexual conduct of
the male Marines, which they should not expect to be exempla-
ry.356 In ways such as those reflected in these brief anecdotes,
the maintenance of single-sex basic training units permits the in-
formal content of the training of male and female recruits to differ
and, thereby, minimizes the effect that the existence of female
to come in the way that it does for male recruits. As Stiehm has noted, "[B]asic does
not serve the same initiation function for women that it serves for men. . . . [I]t is only
at her first assignment that a woman is likely to encounter a nearly all-male and some-
times hostile environment." STIEHM, supra note 228, at 4.
354. Patricia J. Thomas & Capt. Kathleen M. Bruyere, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Gender
Integrated Recruit-Training 2 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (Ms.
Thomas is Director of Women and Multicultural Research, Navy Personnel Research and
Development Center, Captain Bruyere was Chief of Staff at the Treasure Island Naval
Base, San Francisco, CA).
355. See supra text accompanying note 215.
356. Telephone Interview with female Marine Gunnery Sergeant, Name Withheld,
Parris Island Marine Recruit Depot (May 23, 1994).
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recruits has on the gender and sexual norms conveyed in basic
training.
Thoroughgoing integration of basic training would thus be an
important component in transforming the gender and sexual norms
of military culture. Such integration, however, is rendered highly
problematic by the relative paucity of female accessions. The low
proportion of female accessions therefore represents an obstacle to
military cultural change both in terms of the reduced presence of
women in the military generally and, of particular significance,
during the intensive socialization period of basic training.
Although extensive progress has been made toward integration
of women into the military, significant limitations remain that re-
duce the extent of resultant change in the gender and sexual
norms of military culture. 57 Arguably, a more thorough program
357. Together with thoroughgoing integration of women, acknowledged integration of
gays in the armed forces also would likely be a valuable means for transforming the gen-
der and sexual norms of military culture. A candid recognition of military participation
by gays would be helpful in severing the association of military service with the set of
sexual norms that casts men as promiscuous heterosexual consumers and women as sexu-
al adversaries or targets. That particular construction of masculine sexuality could no
longer remain central to military group identity if gays were recognized as part of the
military group.
There has been some minimal movement in recent years toward acknowledgement
of gay participation in the military, though far less extensive than the movement toward
gender integration. The "compromise" resolution of the intensive debate on the legal
status of gays in the military was the adoption in 1993 of the "don't ask, don't tell" rule.
That policy provides that
a.... Applicants for enlistment, appointment, or induction shall not be asked
or required to reveal whether they are heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual.
Applicants also will not be asked or required to reveal whether they have en-
gaged in homosexual conduct, unless independent evidence is received indicating
that an applicant engaged in such conduct or unless the applicant volunteers a
statement that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect.
b. Homosexual conduct is grounds for barring entry into the Armed Forc-
es .... Homosexual conduct is a homosexual act, a statement by the applicant
that demonstrates a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, or a
homosexual marriage or attempted marriage....
(2) An applicant shall be rejected for entry if he or she makes a state-
ment that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect, unless
there is a further determination that the applicant has demonstrated that he or
she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to
engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 1304.26, CHANGE 1, QUALIFICATION STANDARDS
FOR ENLISTMENT, APPOINTMENT, AND INDUCTION 1-5 to 1-6 (March 4, 1994) (made
effective Feb. 28, 1994), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (1994).
The "don't ask, don't tell" policy attempts precisely to reduce legal impediments to
gay military participation while also protecting the traditional sexual and gender norms of
the military by precluding acknowledgement of gay military participation.
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of gender integration of the military would be preferable. Effects
on military rape incidence are an additional factor, not previously
taken into account, that should be considered in the making of
policies-including combat-exclusion and accessions policies-that
will ultimately shape the gender and sexual culture of the mili-
tary.358
While the effects of sexual-orientation integration on the gender and sexual culture
of the military would be a potentially profitable line of inquiry, any extensive treatment
of the issue is beyond the scope of the present paper. For analysis of the issue of gays
in the military and military culture generally, see Michelle M. Benecke & Kirstin S.
Dodge, Military Women in Nontraditional Job Fields: Casualties of the Armed Forces' War
on Homosexuals, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 215 (1990); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of
Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 499 (1991).
For analyses of the constitutionality of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, see David Cole
& William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection
of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 319 (1994); David A.
Schlueter, Gays and Lesbians in the Military: A Rationally Based Solution to a Legal
Rubik's Cube, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393 (1994).
358. The point of all of the foregoing is not to say that the presence of women in
military organizations will ensure that no rapes by military personnel will occur. In fact,
the increased presence of women in the military might actually result in an increase in
military rape rates in the short term as rape opportunities immediately increase with the
increased presence of women. However, taking a long-term view, the increased presence
of women in the services would likely result in a reduced rape rate as the integration of
women causes associated changes in the gender and sexual norms of military culture. (In
addition, the increased presence of women would increase the opportunities not only for
rape but also for consensual sexual relationships between men and women from different
units, which also might tend, according to one possible theory of the military rape differ-
ential, to reduce military rape rates. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing sexual deprivation explanation for military rape differential).) Thus, there are rea-
sons to believe that the increased presence of women in the armed forces would result in
a net reduction in rape by military personnel at least in the long run.
Nevertheless, we would not expect rape by military personnel-in peace or in
war-to be entirely eliminated. The Russian Army in WWII, for instance, in which wom-
en constituted approximately 8% of combatants, see Anne E. Griesse & Richard Stites,
Russia: Revolution and War, in FEMALE SOLDIERS-COMBATANTS OR NONCOMBATANTS?
61, 73 (Nancy L Goldman ed., 1982), reportedly raped very pervasively. See BROWN-
MILLER, supra note 5, at 63-71; COSTELLO, supra note 5, at 140-42. Indeed, some Rus-
sian military women in WWII reportedly collaborated in rapes. See, e.g., COSTELLO, supra
note 5, at 142. Thus, the point is not that the presence of women precludes rapes. Rath-
er, the suggestion here is that, to the extent that certain gender and sexual norms con-
tribute to rape propensity, and to the extent that integration of women may help to
change those norms, rape incidence in military organizations may be reduced by the
integration of women. We may be witnessing some such effects in Peru's Communist
Party, Shining Path. Human Rights Watch has speculated that the large number of fe-
male militants in Shining Path may have reduced its rape incidence: "Rape of women by
the Shining Path is much less common [than rape by government forces], perhaps due
to ... the high number of women militants." AMERICAS WATCH & THE WOMEN'S
RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 5, at 4.
RAPE AND THE MILITARY
A detailed analysis of the considerations for and against thor-
ough gender integration of the military is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, in suggesting that considerations of rape reduc-
tion may weigh in favor of policies that will change military gen-
der and sexual culture, it is worthwhile to explore the feasibility of
such change at the conceptual level. In particular, it is important
to ask: Can military gender and sexual culture be changed more
thoroughly than has occurred to date without eroding military
effectiveness? That is, does the traditional gender culture of the
military itself contribute in necessary ways to military readiness?
That question is addressed in the next and final Part.
IV. FUNCrIONS OF AND ALTERNATIVES TO A
MASCULINIST MILITARY IDENTrrY
We have seen that a certain constellation of attitudes toward
gender and sexuality has been found to be associated with height-
ened rape propensity. For ease of exposition, I will refer to this
attitudinal constellation as "masculinist. '359 We have also seen
evidence suggesting that this masculinist constellation of normative
attitudes toward gender and sexuality is prevalent within military
culture as currently constructed.
We now must ask, in contemplating a change in those gender
and sexual norms of military culture, whether such a change can
occur while also maintaining military effectiveness. For that reason,
it will be valuable to explore the reasons for and the functions of
a masculinist military identity,36° in order to consider whether
functions now served by a masculinist military identity can be
fulfilled through alternative means.
359. 1 add the "ist" suffix to "masculine" to indicate "one who practices or is occu-
pied with, or a believer in," WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 975 (2d ed. 1971), a particular construction of masculinity.
Thus, I do not intend for the word "masculinist" to carry a particular evaluative valence.
Rather, I aspire for it to take its place among the multifarious group of "ist" words such
as herbalist, specialist, feminist, dermatologist, racist, therapist, capitalist, somnambulist,
sexist, proctologist, economist, criminalist, cultist, novelist, and of course, The Shootist.
360. I will not distinguish here between causes and functions. For a discussion of the
importance of this distinction in some contexts, see Marc Galanter, News From Nowhere:
The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENY. U. L. REv. 77 (1993). For present pur-
poses, the question is whether the causes or functions of the masculinist-military phenom-
enon necessitate its retention.
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Certainly, the phenomenon of linking military identity with
masculinity has been longstanding and widespread. As David
Mailowe has commented,
A widespread relationship links male sexual validation and vali-
dation in war, combat, and aggression. Until recent times, many
human groups' definition of the male as sexually mature and
eligible for marriage and intercourse was contingent upon his
having proven himself as a warrior in battle. For example, the
Afar and Issa peoples of the Horn of Africa required the slaying
of an enemy in combat before a male was eligible for marriage.
Among the Somali the demand for blood vengeance following
assault is underlined by threats to withdraw sexual access and
taunts about sexual unworthiness made by the women of the
group to goad the men into combat. The examples can be multi-
plied for human groups on every continent and, at almost every
level of societal complexity. 1
The pervasiveness of a masculinist military construct raises the
question of the reasons for its widespread popularity and the func-
tions that the construct may serve. Although no definitive explana-
tion for the pervasiveness of the masculinist military construct is
possible, five elements are likely contributing factors. The first two,
as we shall see, may be waning in their causal vitality at this mo-
ment in history. The latter three continue to be causally effica-
cious, but may not represent an insurmountable barrier to change
because of the availability of suitable alternatives.
The first and rather obvious explanation for the linkage of
military service and masculinity is that, historically, success in com-
bat depended heavily upon the physical strength of the combat-
ants. Combat was a male domain because strength was largely
determinative of combat's outcome. Now, of course, with the ad-
vent of increasingly lighter and more effective firepower, this basis
for linking combat and maleness has become much more tenu-
ous.
362
361. Marlowe, supra note 132, at 191 (citations omitted).
362. A broader version of the physical-suitability-for-combat explanation for the link
between combat and maleness would address not only the strength differences between
men and women but also the fact that males are not subject to pregnancy and lactation
as are women. However, technological progress, including the availability of contraception
and of bottle feeding, lessen the import of these additional physical factors favoring
males as fighters just as the advent of lighter firepower reduces the import of the
strength differences between the genders.
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But the historical importance of strength for combat, while ad-
dressing the linkage of combat and maleness, does not satisfac-
torily explain the more complex linkage of combat with the partic-
ular construction of masculinity (and attendant attitudes toward
sexuality and toward women) that I have termed "masculinist" or
the significant emotional energy invested in that link. The second
explanation of the linkage between military service and masculinity
addresses the issue on that more complex dimension. Here, at the
level of psycho-sexual causes, explanations necessarily become
more speculative.
One psychoanalytic explanation for the linkage of military
service and a particular, "masculinist" construction of masculinity is
that young males, unlike young females, utilize institutions like the
traditional military as means through which to affirm their gender
identities. The reasoning is that young* males gravitate toward
opportunities to affirm their masculinity (in a manner not analo-
gous to the behavior of young females) because of gender-asym-
metry in parenting which makes the psycho-sexual development of
girls and boys fundamentally different. In essence, the argument
here is that, in a society in which girls and boys are both primarily
parented by women, girls never have to shift away from their pri-
mary attachment (mother) to develop (female) gender identity,
whereas boys have to separate psychologically from the primary
bond with mother to establish identification with a male figure to
develop male gender identity. This more problematic male course
of development, it is argued, creates a variety of psychological
differences between the sexes, including a continuing need in many
young (and some older) men to separate, distance, and distinguish
themselves from the feminine, the (m)other, and to affirm their
masculine identification in sharp contradistinction to femininity.363
Methods for such affirmation of maleness presumably would in-
clude bonding with father figures as well as with all-male,
363. See NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 173-77 (1978); WILLIAMS, supra note 238, at 13-15;
see also STIEHM, supra note 228, at 226-27 (observing that this psychoanalytic explanation
of the implications of female primary parenting may go far in explaining why males,
especially young males, are so susceptible to motivational ploys, such as the military's,
that offer a confirmation of masculine identity). For an anthropological analysis relating
male initiation rites to societal levels of gender role differentiation, see Roger V. Burton
& John W.M. Whiting, The Absent Father and Cross-Sex Identity, 7 MERRILL-PALMER Q.
85 (1961).
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hypermasculine groups. One such group would be, of course, the
traditional armed forces.' Viewed in this light, we can perhaps
make sense of the Army National Guard advertisement that shows
a group of young men wading through high water and bears the
caption: "Kiss your momma goodbye." 5
David Marlowe has once again made pertinent observations:
The military group is, in this sense, a reflection of the myriad
other adolescent and youthful male groups that in most cultures
traditionally play either a formal or informal role in the process
of maturation and the acquisition of full male sexual and social
identity. These institutions range from the poro and other age-
graded groups in African societies, including circumcision and
warrior-age class groups, to the men's societies and men's houses
of the Circum-Pacific and other specialized groups. Horizontally
bonded, exclusive groups of young males have also characterized
the social developmental process in Western Europe. These range
from groupings of apprentices and students to those of young
professionals, all based upon highly elaborated and complex per-
cepts and images of male brotherhood. The United States has
since its founding been marked by many like groups in the form
of gangs, militias, volunteer fire companies, and other organiza-
tions that partake of elaborate sets of constructs of masculinity
and male behavior.'
To whatever extent the above psychoanalytic view of the
reasons for a masculinist military is accurate, trends toward more
shared parenting should reduce the power of young males' need
for participation in masculinist groups defined in distinction to the
feminine (m)other. At the same time as technology plays a part in
weakening the link between maleness and combat (by making
successful use of violence less dependent on physical strength),
technology and other social factors also weaken the link between
364. See WnLLIAMS, supra note 238, at 15, 32, 66-67, 134-35. Other such groups
would include gangs, fraternities, sport teams and the like.
Regarding the process of initiation into college fraternities, for instance, Peggy
Sanday observes that
[the] cycle is not unlike that described by anthropologists for male initiation
rites elsewhere. Generally speaking, these rites separate boys from psychological
and social bonding to their mothers and forge new bonds centered around men.
This process is accomplished by a symbolic death of the old and rebirth of the
new.
SANDAY, supra note 153, at 141.
365. See WILLIAMS, supra note 238, at 47.
366. Marlowe, supra note 132, at 191.
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femaleness and primary parenting. Both of these historical changes
make more possible and more likely a movement away from the
traditional masculinist military and toward a desegregation of mili-
tary culture.
The first two reasons for the masculinist military construct
thus may be waning in their causal efficacy. The other three, how-
ever, are of continuing vitality.
The third factor contributing to the masculinist military con-
struct relates specifically to the particular vision of masculinity as
dominance, aggressiveness, and toughness embraced in military
culture. Presumably, idealization of those characteristics is highly
functional in an organization whose raison d'etre is combat. It
therefore is unsurprising that those characteristics would be highly
valued in military organizations.
Nevertheless, there is no reason that the high valuation of
those attributes cannot be retained while simultaneously dissociat-
ing them from masculine gender; they may be valued instead as
important attributes in a good soldier regardless of gender. Nor
need the celebration of a certain steeliness exclude the approval
also of compassion and understanding (as it does in the hypermas-
culinity component of the masculinist construct).67 Indeed, it is
that very combination of aggressivity with compassion that is re-
quired for compliance with the laws of war that require humane
treatment of prisoners, civilians, and the wounded.3" Therefore,
there is much to be gained and little to be lost by changing this
aspect of military culture from a masculinist vision of unalloyed
aggressivity to an ungendered vision combining aggressivity with
compassion.
The two final factors contributing to the masculinist military
construct arise from the benefits of that construct for group cohe-
367. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
368. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Related
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter, collectively, Geneva Conventions].
Compassion, understanding, and "taking care of your troops" also are important
attributes in officers and unit leaders, as is taught in, for example, the Navy's "LMET"
(Leadership, Management, Education, Training) classes. See Interview with Capt. Ted
Triebel, U.S. Navy (Ret.), in Durham, N.C. (August 18, 1994).
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sion. First, a masculinist group identity may provide a basis for
group cohesion between group members who otherwise share little
in common. The group of individuals composing a military organi-
zation is often quite diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, religion,
region, education, and class. This is especially true under conscrip-
tion but remains somewhat true even with an all-volunteer force.
Because military organizations have been virtually all male until
recently, a focus on masculinity or "manhood" may well have
served as a handy and powerful basis for group identity, 9 allow-
ing for a stable definition of group and other.3 0 Moreover, ern-
bracing a particular vision of masculinity that is defined in part by
eschewal of the feminine may further aid group cohesion by defin-
ing an "other" that is constant over time: Even while the "enemy"
changes, the sexual other does not change.
Given the importance of group cohesion for military effective-
ness, especially in combat units,371 we must ask, in contemplating
changes to the military's traditional masculinist group identity,
what alternative bases of group identity and cohesion could suc-
cessfully replace the existing, gender-based structure. As discussed
earlier, group identity and cohesion in ideological primary groups
can be effectuated around themes that are religious, political, mor-
al and the like; and nonideological primary groups can bond on
the basis of not much more than the merest assertion of a
"we/they" divide such as gang, fraternity, or team membership.
There thus exists a range of possible bases for group identity and
cohesion to be considered.
369. The recruiting slogan "The Marine Corps Builds Men," used from the 1960s to
early '70s, Telephone Interview with Gunnery Sgt. Thomas Neal, U.S. Marine Corps
Recruiting Command, Marketing Branch (Sept. 21, 1994), presumably reflected a recogni-
tion by the Marine Corps of this broadbased aspect of the service's appeal to potential
recruits.
370. As Judith Stiehm notes, "[Slome have argued that the 'woman debate' has been
functional for the military because it enhances the unity of Black and white men, whose
own integration is relatively recent." STIEHM, supra note 228, at 154.
The analogous group bonding fmiction of group sexual identity in college fraterni-
ties has been noted by anthropologist Peggy Sanday. As she observes, "The sexual desire
[the fraternity members] talk about provides the means and the mechanism to bond
among themselves. Women are objects used to bring the brothers together as virile, het-
erosexual, loyal comrades." SANDAY, supra note 153, at 133. See generally DUNPHY, su-
pra note 120, at 54-55 (discussing the psychological needs of group members as the*
source of collective group mythologies).
371. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
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Appropriate and effective bases for military group identifica-
tion other than gender could incorporate both ideological and non-
ideological elements. Ideological bases could include an identifica-
tion of the group as just warriors, protecting democracy and the
decent lives of decent people. The "other" (always important for
group identity) could be defined as those who would be oppres-
sors, the unjust. Such visions of just warriors on an honorable
mission can be mightily motivating.
One may have certain misgivings about such a basis for mili-
tary group identity. Group identification as an armed band on a
righteous mission can indeed be powerfully motivating-even in-
toxicating-and, for that reason, risky. Certainly, people who be-
lieve that they are justified in using violence for a righteous cause
often are dangerous. As Myriam Miedzian well states,
Cossacks, whose pogroms against Jews terrorized my father and
his family... believed that they had God and virtue on their
side.... [T]he Germans who threw my aunts and uncles...
into gas chambers ... believed that they were serving the higher
cause of purifying the Aryan race?'
The use of violence in the pursuit of good, then, is always
something of which to be suspicious; but so is pacifism in the face
of atrocity. Short of adopting a position of thoroughgoing pacifism,
the merits of which I will not debate here, some basis for military
group identification must exist. Surely, if armed force is ever to be
deployed, then idealism and moral conviction are preferable mo-
tives to macho posturing. Examples of cohesive groups centered on
ideological rather than gendered bases for bonding include some
religious orders, Communist Party cells, the French resistance
underground, and even Alcoholics Anonymous. Each of these
types of groups has based a high degree of cohesion on an ideo-
logical basis, a shared cause, without utilizing gender as a basis of
group bonding.
Nonideological bases for military group identification also are
available. Those bases could include such basic definitions of group
and other as national identification and, of course, unit and buddy
identification.373 The readiness with which formation of group
372. MIEDZIAN, supra note 238, at 275.
373. See Manning, supra note 135, at 456-65; see also Maurice Gamier, Technology,
Organizational Culture, and Recruitment in the British Military Academy, 3 J. OF POL &
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identification occurs even in the absence of shared ideology or
other apparent basis is notable. As Donald Horowitz has de-
scribed,
There is now a rapidly accumulating body of evidence that it
takes few differences to divide a population into groups. Groups
can form quickly on the basis of simple division into alternative
categories. Once groups have formed, group loyalty quickly takes
hold....
The tendency to cleave and compare ... forms the theme
of a series of experiments ... [which demonstrated] a marked
propensity to form groups on the basis of the most casual differ-
ences and then to behave in a discriminatory fashion on the basis
of the new group identity. There are many variations on the ex-
periments, but they generally involve subjects assigned to a cate-
gory on the basis of trivial differences, no differences, or a con-
spicuous toss of a coin. Once assigned, group members experi-
enced no face-to-face interaction with other ingroup or outgroup
members, and there was no effort to instill ingroup loyalty or
outgroup hostility. Given the opportunity to apportion rewards,
subjects nevertheless discriminated so as to favor ingroup mem-
bers and disfavor outgroup members.
The minimal basis of group differentiation needs to be un-
derscored. What produces group feeling and discrimination is
simple division into categories .... In another experiment, sub-
jects who were not placed into categories were accorded an op-
portunity to discriminate in apportioning rewards among other
subjects with similar artistic preferences, dissimilar preferences,
and no known preferences at all. This produced no statistically
significant tendency to discriminate on the basis of similarity.
Plainly, what counts is group membership and not demonstrated
similarity....
These findings have now been replicated and have a solid
basis in the experimental literature.374
There thus exists a range of bases for group identity and
motivation that would be suitable alternatives to the traditional
masculinist military identity. Indeed, new bases for military identity
may actually be more sustaining for soldiers' morale over time
MIL SOC. 141, 143 (1975) (discussing the importance of regiment affiliation to the group
identity of units in the British military).
374. DONALD L. HORowrrz, ETHNIc GROUPS iN CoNFLicr 143-46 (1985) (citations
omitted).
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than the masculinist identity. William Manchester has argued that
while the "macho" image provides initial attraction, soldiers faced
with the tragic realities of combat may reject that vision as false,
and may feel duped and betrayed by the leaders who fostered that
image.375 Manchester describes his own experience reflecting this
phenomenon:
After my evacuation from Okinawa, I had the enormous pleasure
of seeing [John] Wayne humiliated in person at Aiea Heights
Naval Hospital in Hawaii .... Each evening, Navy corps-
men ... could watch a movie. One night they had a surprise for
us. Before the film the curtains parted and out stepped John
Wayne, wearing a cowboy outfit .... He grinned his aw-shucks
grin, passed a hand over his face and said, "Hi ya, guys!" He
was greeted by a stony silence. Then somebody booed. Suddenly
everyone was booing.
This man was a symbol of the fake machismo we had come
to hate, and we weren't going to listen to him. He tried and
tried to make himself heard, but we drowned him out, and even-
tually he quit and left. 76
In short, while macho images may be potent motivators for young
men, their productive effects may be shortlived and followed by
counterproductive ones. Alternative bases for group identification
thus might be not only equally but actually more efficacious than
the traditional masculinist construct.
To recognize potential alternative bases for military group
cohesion is not to underestimate in any way the power of gender
as a basis for group bonding. Prudence requires clear recognition
that gender-based bonding has served well to foster unit cohesion
in the past. At the same time, however, we must acknowledge that
utilization of that basis likely comes at a price. Loss of cohesion
resulting from a shift away from gender as a basis for group iden-
tity may be at least minimized by the development of other bases
for cohesion. A policy decision then is required as to whether, if
any residual loss of cohesion remains, the benefits in military cul-
tural change are worth that loss. We have accepted marginal losses
of cohesion in choosing to integrate units by race, ethnicity, class,
region, and religion.' A similar weighing of costs and benefits
375. William Manchester, The Bloodiest Battle of All, N.Y. TIMas MAG., June 14,
1987, at 84.
376. Id.
377. See Manning, supra note 135, at 462 ("[H]eterogenous ethnic, racial, class, even
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would be required as to any loss of cohesion that could result
from further change in military gender and sexual culture.
Fifth and finally, in considering the functions of a masculinist
military identity, it is important to note that an exclusively male,
heterosexual group identity may serve to minimize sexual tensions
between group members. As discussed earlier, sexual loyalties as
well as sexual rivalries or jealousies pose potential threats to pri-
mary group cohesion.37 The maintenance of an all-male, osten-
sibly all-heterosexual military would be expected to minimize those
threats to cohesion within military primary groups.379 Moreover,
if those outside the group were viewed primarily as sexual targets
(or even adversarial sexual targets), then this would tend to mini-
mize even threats to group cohesion coming from the formation of
bonds and loyalties in sexual relationships outside the group. Giv-
en this cohesion-protecting function of a masculinist group identity,
we must ask, in considering amending such a basis for group iden-
tity, whether there are alternative means to minimize sexual ten-
sions within the military group.
As discussed earlier, all primary groups develop sexual
norms-sometimes specialized sexual norms-to control the poten-
tially destructive effects of sexuality on group cohesion.3" The
specialized sexual norms best suited to the military would appear
to be much like those of the family38' (just as the military unit
replicates many of the other psychological structures of the family,
as discussed earlier).3" A military "incest taboo" would strictly
prohibit sexual relationships between members of the same mili-
tary units.' The minimization of sexual relationships within mili-
regional origins tend to inhibit the development of unit cohesion .... Few if any modem
armies make much of an effort to create [sic] homogeneous units around any of these
variables.").
Regarding the process of racial desegregation of the U.S. armed forces, see Karst,
supra note 357, at 516-22 and sources cited therein.
378. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
379. Of course, a male heterosexual group identity may exist despite the presence of
homosexual group members, particularly if their presence is unacknowledged. For discus-
sion of acknowledged integration of gays into the military, see supra note 357.
380. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
381. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (referring to familial incest taboo).
382. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
383. The level of "unit" (squadron, platoon, etc.) to which the "incest taboo" would
apply would need to be defined and might vary depending on the functional needs of
the different components of military organizations (e.g., the cohesion needs of combat
versus noncombat groups). Presumably, an essential criterion for defining "unit" for pur-
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tary units has been accomplished historically through the exclusion
of women and the ostensible exclusion of gays. The full inclusion
of women would require adjustment of the mechanisms for contin-
ued minimization of sexual relationships within units. Just as mili-
tary units have traditionally been "a band of brothers," gender-
integrated units would have to be carefully shaped and defined as
a band of brothers and sisters between whom sexual relationships
would be unacceptable."8 The incest taboo approach would
amount to a broadened fraternization policy, prohibiting not only
inappropriate relationships between ranks but also sexual relation-
ships regardless of rank within military units.3" We might realis-
tically expect that the "incest taboo," like the longstanding frater-
nization policy prohibiting sexual relationships between ranks,
would be less than completely enforceable but nevertheless suffi-
ciently effective to minimize the potential problem of sexual ten-
sions within military units.
poses of the incest taboo would be whether and to what extent the grouping in question
is intended to have primary group characteristics. Another important criterion would be
practicability: The narrower the definition of "unit," the smaller the range of potential
relations would be prohibited and, in turn, the greater the likelihood that the taboo
would be observed in practice.
384. Cf. Little, supra note 134, at 198 (observing the existence of a norm even in all-
male units that limits the potentially divisive effects of exclusive "buddy" pairs within the
groups). As Little states, "[A]n interview or conversation [with combat veterans] about
'buddies' always elicited additional comments about a context of solidarity in which dis-
tinctions among individuals did not appear." Id.
385. Currently, the anti-fraternization rule as a criminal prohibition arises from Article
134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and applies only to inappropriate relation-
ships between officers and enlisted personnel. See 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1994), implemented by
Executive Order No. 12,473, 3 C.F.R. 201 (1985), amended by Executive Order No.
12,767, 3 C.F.R. 334 (1992). In addition, however, each military Service has promulgated
regulations governing fraternization and professional relationships. These tend to cover a
broader range of relationships than only officer/enlisted. See, e.g., Air Force Instruction
36-2909, Fraternization and Professional Relationships, Attachment 1 (Feb. 20, 1995)
("[U]nprofessional relationships can develop between officers, between enlisted members,
and between officers and enlisted members. Such relationships create the appearance that
personal friendships and preferences are more important than individual performance and
contribution to the mission.... Any relationship that harms [a] unit's morale, discipline
or efficiency requires action .... ").
Regarding the need for an adapted anti-fraternization type policy in a gender-inte-
grated military, see Lt. Commander William J. Davis, Jr. (U.S.N.), Nobody asked me,
but. . ., PROCEEDINGS, Sept. 1994, at 105 ("Currently stated Navy policy fails to address
the issues that must be resolved for a commanding officer to lead a gender-integrated
wardroom. The Navy's fraternization policy, for example, does not address the particulars
of intra-wardroom relationships among peers.").
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Results of a large-scale study on gender relations in mixed-
gender military units support the validity and potential efficacy of
this family-analogy approach. The study observes that in fostering
positive gender relations that minimize sexual tensions,
[w]omen may... rely on societal roles in which men and wom-
en are not sex objects for one another, such as sibling, parent,
and child. Common during interviews were sentiments similar to
this one heard in Somalia: "We're just like brothers and sisters
out here." Women often note that harassment tends to come
from outside the unit-from men who do not know them person-
ally and especially from men who do not work with women regu-
larly. A "brother" may stick up for a "sister" he feels is being
discussed disparagingly behind her back.'
The taboo against within-unit sexual relationships could be
intensified in units, such as combat units, in which cohesion is
particularly crucial. Impressing upon troops that their lives may
depend upon group cohesion in combat may cause units to devel-
op internal mechanisms for enforcing the sexual-relationships pro-
hibition for purposes of self-preservation.
Thus, there are methods available to minimize the disruptive
potential of sexuality other than through the maintenance of a
masculinist military. Certainly, other cohesive groups such as zeal-
ous political, religious, and self-help organizations have maintained
strong group cohesion without gender exclusions.3" Moreover,
group cohesion appears to have been adequate in the gender-inte-
grated combat units of the past, including those of Russia, Israel,
North Vietnam, and others.3"
386. Laura L. Miller, Creating Gender Detente in the Military 2 (1994) (unpublished
manuscript written for Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Sullivan, and also distributed to Navy
Flag Officers, on file with author).
387. See supra text accompanying note 373; JOHN M. BROWNLEE, TOWARD DIVERSI-
TY IN THE LOCAL CHuRCH 76, 88, 116-17, 184 (doctoral dissertation, Columbia Theologi-
cal Seminary) (1993) (discussing religious bases of group unity in Christian churches in
the light of gender, race, and cultural diversity); MARC GALANTER, CULTS: FAITH,
HEALING, AND COERCION 176, 187 (1989) (noting the highly cohesive nature of zealous
"healing groups" such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Federation of Parents for Drug Free
Youth, which are mixed-gender groups).
388. See generally Griesse & Stites, supra note 358, at 68-85 (regarding Russian wom-
en in the combat units of World War II); Anne R. Bloom, Israel. The Longest War, in
FEMALE SOLDIERS-COMBATANTS OR NONCOMBATANTS?, supra note 358, at 137, 137-62
(discussing the history of women's participation in the Israeli military); William J. Duiker,
Vietnam: War of Insurgency, in FEMALE SOLDIERS-COMBATANTS OR NONCOMBATANTS?,
supra note 358, at 107, 107-22 (discussing women's roles in Vietnam's wars).
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As the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Assign-
ment of Women in the Armed Forces states,
A review of the psychological literature and post-integration
studies and testimony before the Commission indicates situations
have existed in which women were able to bond with men in
various non-combat environments. Also, non-combat mixed-gen-
der units seemed to communicate and work better than single
gender units performing similar tasks.S
Even so, the presence of both men and women within a unit
surely creates some potential for sexual tensions that would not
exist in an all-male group. Some loss of cohesion may result at the
margin. As discussed earlier, the decision whether any loss of
cohesion that does result from gender integration is warranted by
the benefits of integration is a policy decision. Rape incidence
considerations are among those that should be taken into account
in that weighing.
In sum, while the masculinist military identity has served
important functions as a basis for military group cohesion and
identification, sound alternative bases for military group identity
appear to be available. Masculinist military identity, then, is not
inevitable or indispensable to military effectiveness but, rather, is a
matter of choice.
Altering the masculinist basis of military group identification
raises important concerns: What if there are important functions of
the masculinist identity that have not been accounted for?39°
What if the new basis is therefore less powerful, and leads to less
cohesion, less motivation, less effectiveness in combat? These are
crucial questions requiring careful address. Experimental programs
to test the viability of a fully integrated combat force, for instance,
should be earnestly pursued.39' The exploration undertaken in
this section suggests that the prospects for military cultural change
consistent with military effectiveness are promising, and identifies
389. THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE
ARMED FORCES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT C-82 (1992).
390. For instance, some have speculated on a possible genetic basis for the link be-
tween combat and masculinity. See, e.g., William Matthews, Military Has Basic Link to
Sex, ARMY TIMES, July 27, 1992, at 16 (quoting Charles Moskos). For a review of the
research on gender and aggression, see MIEDZIAN, supra note 238, at 39-74.
391. See BINKN, supra note 68, at 59-60 (describing how such experimental programs
and research should be designed).
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reduction in military rape incidence as one potential benefit of
such change.
The factors that have been considered to date in the policy
debate regarding women in the military have been primarily equal
employment opportunity and military readiness."9 This Article
points to yet another, previously unconsidered, factor-the reduc-
tion of rape by military personnel-that should be taken into
account in future consideration of policies, such as integration of
women, that are likely to influence and to shape military culture.
Indeed, taking into account the potential effects of military policies
on military rape rates is a national obligation under some interpre-
tations of international humanitarian law and human rights law.
Both of those bodies of law require states to respect and to ensure
respect for the legal prescriptions and prohibitions they entail. A
comprehensive interpretation of the obligation to "ensure respect
for" the prohibitions against rape would encompass both an obli-
gation to refrain from policies that may unduly heighten rape in-
cidence and an affirmative duty to pursue policies that would
contribute to a reduction in rape rates when feasible. 93
392. See, eg., BINKIN & BACH, supra note 132, at ch. 4 (equal opportunity); BINKIN,
supra note 68, at 26-47 (military readiness).
393. Rape of civilians is a violation of humanitarian law. See supra note 108 and
accompanying text. Conventional and customary humanitarian law require that states work
to ensure respect for those bodies of law. See, e.g., Geneva Conventions, supra note 368,
at Common Art. 1. A broad interpretation of the obligation to "ensure respect" includes
an obligation to desist from policies that unduly foster a military culture that results in
heightened rates of violation of humanitarian law, including rape by military personnel.
National obligations to prevent rape by military personnel arise not only under
international humanitarian law but also under international human rights law, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), or the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 (entered into force July 18, 1978), re-
printed in 9 I.LM. 673 (1970). The ICCPR prohibits "unlawful attacks on honor,"
ICCPR, art. 17, and "torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment." Id. art. 7. The ACHR provides that "[e]very person has the right to have his
physical, mental, and moral integrity respected" and that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading ... treatment." ACHR, art. 5, 9 I.L.M. at
676. Presumably, rape can be considered in some circumstances to fall within each of
these prohibitions. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, NO JUSTICE, No
PEACE: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR RAPE AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN THE FORMER
YUGOSLAvIA 7 n.74 (1993); Elizabeth A. Kohn, Rape as a Weapon of War: Women's
Human Rights During the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 199,
211 (1994). States are obligated under both the ICCPR and the ACHR to respect, pro-
tect, and ensure individuals' human rights. See ICCPR, art. 2(1); ACHR, art. 1, 9 I.LM.
at 675. See generally DOMINICK McGoLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITEE: ITS
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CONCLUSION
This Article has presented evidence of a military rape differ-
ential, has considered methods of addressing that differential
through domestic and international law, and has explored in some
depth one avenue of explanation for and remediation of the differ-
ential observed. The evidence considered suggests that the gender
and sexual norms of military culture may be causal factors contrib-
uting to the rape differential. The foregoing consideration of the
ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITI-
CAL RIGHTS 269 (1991); MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 26 (1993); Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure:
State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72, 77-79 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
Under the doctrine of state responsibility, a state is accountable for breaches of
customary international law or treaty obligations committed by or attributable to the
state. Regarding developments in the law of state responsibility, see SHABTIA ROSENNE,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY
(1991). A breach, such as rape, may be attributable to the state if the perpetrator is
acting as an agent of the state or if the breach occurs under circumstances in which the
state has failed diligently to fulfill its duty to prevent or to prosecute such offenses. See
Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Rights, 7 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 125, 145 (1994); see also Kenneth Bullock, United States Tort Liability for War
Crimes Abroad: An Assessment and Recommendation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1995, at 139 (specifically examining U.S. civil liability). As the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights has stated in interpreting the ACHR,
[A]ny violation of rights recognized by the Convention carried out by an act of
public authority or by persons who use their position of authority is imputable
to the State. However, this does not define all the circumstances in which a
State is obligated to prevent, investigate and punish human rights violations, nor
all the cases in which the State might be found responsible for an infringement
of those rights. An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially
not directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private
person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to
international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but be-
cause of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation ....
.... This duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political, admin-
istrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights ....
Velisquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. CL H.R., Series C No.
4, at 154-55, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 291, 325 (1989) (emphasis added).
Recent litigation before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides an exam-
ple of an attempt to obtain civil relief against a State for wrongs including rape. In 1993,
Bosnia-Herzegovina instituted ICI proceedings against Serbia and Montenegro for violat-
ing the Genocide Convention. The ICJ issued provisional measures ordering Serbia and
Montenegro to "take all measures within [their] power to prevent commission of the
crime of genocide," including rape as a manifestation of genocide. Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia v.
Yugoslavia), 1993 I.CJ. 3, 24 (Apr. 8), reprinted in 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 505, 519 (1993).
Regarding national obligations to prevent rape under international law, see generally
Chinkin, supra note 5.
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functions of and possible alternatives to a masculinist military
culture suggests that changes in the military's gender and sexual
norms, which may help to reduce military rape incidence, may be
effectuated without unduly degrading military effectiveness.
This exploration of rape incidence in the military has implica-
tions both for further research and for present policymaking. Re-
search comparing rape and other crime rates among different types
of units (for instance, combat and noncombat units, units stationed
at home and stationed abroad) may reveal important information.
Further research on the handling and prosecution of rape by mili-
tary personnel also is required to identify methods of improving
both domestic and international enforcement of the prohibition
against rape. In addition, evaluation research techniques394 should
be employed to measure military cultural change and to measure
the effects of that change both on military effectiveness and on
military rates of rape and sexual assault. The generalizability of
the findings reported in this Article also remains to be considered:
Further research is warranted to determine the extent to which the
factors increasing U.S. military rape rates may also increase rape
incidence in non-U.S. military organizations, and the extent to
which common remedies may be applied. 95
Beyond indicating the need for further research, this Article
points to the appropriateness of taking rape incidence into account
in making policy decisions affecting the gender and sexual norms
of military culture. We may begin to act upon the indications that
we already have of the sorts of cultural changes that could contrib-
ute to reducing rape incidence in the military. The benefits of such
a reduction are great for potential victims of rape in war and in
peace and also for those personnel who may thus be spared from
becoming rape perpetrators.396
394. "Evaluation research is the systematic application of social research procedures
for assessing the... utility of social intervention programs." PETER H. Rossi &
HOWARD E. FREEMAN, EVALUATION: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 5 (5th ed. 1993) (em-
phasis omitted).
395. See supra notes 361-66 and accompanying text. Indeed, having seen how the rape
propensity of a military unit may inadvertently be heightened, we may also be able to
gain insight into how a military organization can be intentionally shaped and deployed as
an instrument to carry out an official military policy of rape such as those in WWII
Japan and 1990s Bosnia. See supra note 5.
396. Susan Brownmiller described the tragic experience of both victim and perpetrator
of a rape in WWII:
Klaus Kllster, a member of the Hitler Youth, saw three Russians grab a woman
on the street and take her into a hallway. He followed. One soldier trained his
[Vol. 45:651
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APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY FOR COMPARING MILITARY AND CivILIAN
CRIME RATES FOR THE PERIOD 1987-1992
The following methodology was used to compare male military
and civilian crime rates while controlling for age.
For each year,
1) Divide the total population base ("Total All Agencies") of
the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) "Offenses Known to the Po-
lice, Population Group" table3" by the total U.S. civilian popula-
tion398 to obtain the percentage of the U.S. civilian population
pistol on Klaus. The second held the screaming woman while the third raped
her. Klaus watched the Russian who had done the raping emerge from the
doorway. Tears were streaming down the soldier's face as he wailed, "Ya
bolshoi svinya"---"I am a big pig."
BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 67.
397. UCR 1992, supra note 33, at 196; UCR 1991, supra note 33, at 192; UCR 1990,
supra note 33, at 156; UCR 1989, supra note 33, at 154; UCR 1988, supra note 33, at
150; UCR 1987, supra note 33, at 146.
398. For total U.S. civilian population data, see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, PPL-8, APPENDIX C, Civilian Popula-
tion-Estimates, by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin (July 1, 1992) [hereinafter Bu-
REAU OF THE CENSUS 1992]; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P25-1095, Table 3: Civilian Population-Estimates, by
Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin (July 1, 1991) [hereinafter BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
1991]; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, P25-1095, Table 3: Civilian Population-Estimates, by Age, Sex, Race, and
Hispanic Origin (July 1, 1990) [hereinafter BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 1990]; BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P25-1095,
Table 3: Civilian Population-Estimates, by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin (July 1,
1989) [hereinafter BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 1989]; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P25-1095, Table 3: Civilian Popula-
don-Estimates, by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin (July 1, 1988) [hereinafter BU-
REAU OF THE CENSUS 1988]; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P25-1095, Table 3: Civilian Population-Estimates, by
Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin (July 1, 1987) [hereinafter BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
1987].
The U.S. civilian population, as opposed to the U.S. resident population (which
includes U.S. troops stationed in the United States), is used as the demographic base for
UCR analysis throughout this study. It is possible that some error is introduced by using
the civilian population measure. While much or most serious crime by military personnel
is handled through military channels and therefore does not appear in the UCR statistics
(which reflect only crimes handled through civilian authorities), some crimes committed
by military personnel are handled through civilian authorities and therefore do appear in
the UCR statistics. For that reason, using a population base of civilians results in a
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included in the UCR offenses-known population.
2) A) Create age groupings as follows. Because military par-
ticipation begins at age seventeen, the first age group includes ages
17-19. The remainder of the age groups represent five-year incre-
ments (to be consistent with UCR data age groupings) beginning
with age 20 and ending with age 65 (because there is essentially
no military participation over that age).
B) Multiply the total number of males3" in each age
group in the U.S. civilian population 4° by the percentage of the
civilian population included in the UCR offenses-known population
(obtained in step one) to identify the number of males in each age
group in the UCR offenses-known population.
slightly inflated civilian offense rate per person. This is so to the extent that military
personnel's offenses are included in the raw UCR numbers of offenses known, but mill-
tary personnel are not included in the civilian population to whom those offenses are
attributed in calculating the rate per person.
The alternative approach, using not the civilian but the resident population mea-
sure, would introduce the opposite (and presumably a greater magnitude of) error. Using
a population base of civilians and troops stationed in the United States (the resident
population) would result in a deflated civilian offense rate per person to the extent that
military personnel's offenses are excluded from the raw UCR numbers of offenses known
(because they were handled through military channels), but military personnel are includ-
ed in the resident population to whom the offenses are attributed in calculating the rate
per person.
Therefore, some error may be introduced whichever base population is used. The
decision in this study to use the civilian population base rests on the view that the mag-
nitude of the error thus introduced is smaller than that which would be introduced by
use of a resident population base because the majority of serious crime by military per-
sonnel is handled through military channels. See Interview with Wilbur L. Hardy, Direc-
tor, U.S. Army Crime Records Center, in Baltimore, Md. (May 19, 1994) (discussing the
distribution of handling of crimes by military personnel between military and civilian
authorities); Interview with personnel at the Navy Criminal Investigative Service, in
Washington, D.C. (May 4, 1994) (same).
399. Males constituted approximately 90% of U.S. military personnel during the period
studied. See Defense Manpower Data Center, Active Duty by Age and Gender
1986-1992 (Feb. 15, 1994) (computer printout provided by the U.S. Defense Manpower
Data Center, on file with author). In addition, males commit virtually all rapes, see, e.g.,
UCR 1992, supra note 33, at 234 (stating that the persons arrested for forcible rape were
98.7% male in 1992), as well as the great majority of murder/nn.m's, aggravated assaults,
and robberies. See id. (listing the respective percentages as 90.3%, 85.2%, and 91.5%).
For those reasons, the important group to examine in attempting to compare the rape
incidence of military and civilian populations is the male component of those populations.
400. For age distributions of civilian males, see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS sources
cited supra note 399.
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3) A) List the number of arrests for the year of males in
each age group for the crime in question."
B) Multiply that number of arrests in each age group by
the percentage of completed crimes for the crime in question (i.e.,
excluding attempts) to obtain the number of arrests for the year
for the completed crime in question committed by males in each
age group.4
4) Divide that number of arrests of males in each age group
for completed crimes (obtained in step 3) by the rate of arrest per
offense known for the crime 3 to estimate the number of com-
pleted offenses known to the police committed by males in each
age group.
401. For arrest data on males by age group, see UCR 1992, supra note 33, at 229-30;
UCR 1991, supra note 33, at 225-26; UCR 1990, supra note 33, at 186-87; UCR 1989,
supra note 33, at 184-85; UCR 1988, supra note 33, at 180-81; UCR 1987, supra note
33, at 176-77.
402. Because the military crime statistics provided do not include attempts in the
numbers of crimes committed, except in the case of aggravated assault in which attempts
are included in the definition of the crime, see 10 U.S.C.A. § 928 (West 1983), the UCR
data must be adjusted to exclude attempted crimes other than aggravated assault.
For murder/nn.m, completed crimes by definition equal 100% of UCR offenses
known. The UCR excludes attempted killings from the murder/nn.m category. See UCR
1992, supra note 33, at 13; UCR 1991, supra note 33, at 13; UCR 1990, supra note 33,
at 8; UCR 1989, supra note 33, at 7; UCR 1988, supra note 33, at 8; UCR 1987, supra
note 33, at 7.
For rape, the proportion of attempts to completed crimes for each year is pub-
lished in the UCR. See UCR 1992, supra note 33, at 24; UCR 1991, supra note 33, at
24; UCR 1990, supra note 33, at 16; UCR 1989, supra note 33, at 15; UCR 1988, supra
note 33, at 16; UCR 1987, supra note 33, at 14.
For robbery, an estimate of the proportions of attempted to completed crimes was
derived from data stating those proportions for 1991 and 1992 provided by four states
(Idaho, Iowa, North Dakota, and South Carolina) that have begun (since 1991 or 1992,
depending on the state) gathering that information under the new National Incident
Based Reporting System currently being instituted by the FBI. The estimated percentage
of robberies completed was 88%.
403. To obtain the rate of arrest per offense known for the crime, divide the total
yearly arrests for the crime by the total yearly offenses known for the crime. For total
arrest data, see UCR 1992, supra note 33, at 227; UCR 1991, supra note 33, at 223;
UCR 1990, supra note 33, at 184; UCR 1989, supra note 33, at 182; UCR 1988, supra
note 33, at 178; UCR 1987, supra note 33, at 174. For total offenses known data, see
UCR 1992, supra note 33, at 208; UCR 1991, supra note 33, at 204; UCR 1990, supra
note 33, at 165; UCR 1989, supra note 33, at 163; UCR 1988, supra note 33, at 159;
UCR 1987, supra note 33, at 155.
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5) Divide that number of completed offenses known commit-
ted by males in each age group (obtained in step 4) by the num-
ber of males in the UCR population in that age group (from step
2) to obtain the rate per person.
6) Identify the percentage of male personnel in the relevant
military service that are in each age group (out of the total male
population of that service).' Multiply that percentage by 1,000
to identify the number of males in each age group that would
exist in a model population of 100,000 males with the age distribu-
tion of that military service.
7) Multiply the civilian completed offenses-known rate per
person for each age group (obtained in step 5) by the number of
males in that age group in the model population to produce a
number of offenses known of that crime that would be produced
by that age group in the model population, i.e., in a population of
males with the age distribution of the particular military service
and with the crime rate structure of the civilian population.
8) Add up the number of offenses committed by each age
group in the model population to obtain the total number of of-
fenses in the model population. That total is the rate of the crime
in question per 100,000 population that would be expected in a
male population with the age structure of the particular military
service and the crime rate structure of the civilian population.
9) To estimate the number of founded investigations of mur-
der/nn.m for the Navy and for the Marine Corps, multiply the
number of founded reports of cases of (murder/nn.m plus negli-
gent/involuntary manslaughter) by .74.'5
404. For age and sex distributions of military personnel, see Defense Manpower Data
Center, supra note 400.
405. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) provided the offense data on
Navy and Marine populations (on file with author). The NCIS does not keep mur-
der/nn.m statistics separately from statistics for negligent/involuntary manslaughter. For
that reason, the following procedure is used to estimate the number of founded inves-
tigations of murder/nn.m for the Navy and for the Marine Corps.
Identify the proportion of all Army cases (murder/nn.m plus negligent homicide
plus involuntary manslaughter founded cases investigated) that are murder/nn.m cases.
That proportion is .74. See U.S. Army Crime Records Center, CIDIMPR Reports
1986/1993 (May 11, 1994) (computer printout provided by the Army Crime Records Cen-
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10) Adjust the number of founded investigations' of the
crime in question4°  for each service 8 to exclude crimes com-
ter, on file with author). Multiply the number of founded investigations of (murder/nn.m
plus negligent/involuntary manslaughter) for the Navy and for the Marine Corps by that
proportion (.74) to estimate the number of founded cases of murder/nn.m investigated for
the Navy and for the Marine Corps.
406. The statistics provided by the military services are numbers of "founded investi-
gations" of each crime. This measure most nearly equates with the UCR "actual offenses
known," which includes all offenses brought to the attention of the police but excludes
any "complaints of crime [that] are determined through investigation to be unfounded or
false." UCR 1992, supra note 33, at 376.
Different law enforcement agencies, both civilian and military, may vary somewhat
in their standards and practices for founding and unfounding cases. To the extent of that
variation, "founded investigation" or "offenses known" data from different jurisdictions
may reflect the actual underlying crime rates somewhat differently.
Additionally, while one "founded investigation" generally equals one UCR "offense
known," the count of crimes by military personnel may be slightly conservative because
the method employed for counting investigations will on occasion include more than one
UCR "offense known" within one "investigation." For example, there could be one mili-
tary "investigation" into the rape of two women raped in the same episode by the same
individual or gang. Interview with Kell Carroll, Program Analyst, Naval Criminal Investi-
gative Service, in Washington, D.C. (May 4, 1994). Under the UCR, that event would
constitute two rapes known to the police because there are two victims. Or if a rapist
confessed in a single confession to three rapes, that confession might result in one, two,
or three Navy "investigations," see id., while it would constitute three rapes under the
UCR because of the number of victims.
Both the UCR and the data from the military services record only the most seri-
ous offense occurring in any criminal episode. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTirG HANDBOOK 33 (1984) (regarding
"hierarchy rule" for crime recording).
407. As indicated in Table I, the assault rates for the Navy and for the Marine Corps
were each, on yearly average, 4% of the civilian rate. In fact, the Navy and Marine
assault rates may actually be even less than 4% of civilian rates because the statistics
kept by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), which supplied the Navy and
Marine data, do not separate simple assault from aggravated assault. Therefore, the as-
sault numbers obtained for the Navy and Marine Corps included simple assaults along
with aggravated assaults. Those assault numbers are compared in the present analysis
with UCR aggravated assault numbers only. The reason for comparing all reported Navy
and Marine assaults with only aggravated UCR assault figures is that many or most sim-
ple assaults by military personnel would be handled at the company level (through nonju-
dicial punishment) and, therefore, would not be reflected in the NCIS's assault statistics.
Interview with Brigadier General George Walls, U.S.M.C. (Ret.), in Durham, N.C.
(March 25, 1994). Thus, the assault data provided by NCIS likely reflects primarily aggra-
vated assaults. For that reason, including simple assaults in the UCR comparison data
would tend to overestimate the Navy and Marine diminution of assault from civilian
levels. Comparison with only UCR aggravated assault figures should produce the more
accurate or, at least, the more conservative estimate of the Navy and Marine diminution
factor for aggravated assault. By minimizing the assault diminution measure, this approach
is the measure least favorable to the Article's thesis.
408. The offense data on the Army and Air Force populations were provided by the
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mitted by females by the following procedure. Multiply the percent
male in the service population by the percent male arrestees for
that crime that year (from UCR arrest data).' Now divide that
number by the sum of (the percent male in the service population
times the percent male arrestees) plus (the percent female in the
service population times the percent female arrestees). The result-
ing figure estimates the percent of the service's founded reports of
the crime in question committed by males. Multiply the total num-
ber of founded reports by that percentage to obtain the number of
founded investigations of the crime in question committed by
males in that service.410
11) Divide the expected rate per 100,000 model population
(obtained in step 8) by the actual male offense rate in the particu-
lar military service (obtained in step 10) to obtain the ratio of
"expected rates" (i.e., civilian male rates adjusted for age) to actu-
al rates (i.e., military male rates).
12) To test the statistical significance of the differences be-
tween rape diminution from "expected rates" and diminution for
other crimes from "expected rates," the regression analysis is as
follows.
U.S. Army Crime Records Center and the U.S. Air Force, respectively. See U.S. Army
Crime Records Center, supra note 406; Computer Printout provided by U.S. Air Force
(Feb. 16, 1994) (on file with author). The crime statistics kept by the Air Force prior to
1992 did not separate out unfounded cases. Therefore, the raw Air Force numbers were
adjusted to exclude the approximate proportion of unfounded cases by the following
procedure. Determine for each crime the percentage of cases classified by the Air Force
as "unfounded" in 1992-93. Multiply the raw number of Air Force cases for each crime
in the years prior to 1992 by the percentage of "founded" cases for that crime in
1992-93 to obtain the approximate number of founded cases of each crime for the years
prior to 1992.
409. See UCR 1987-92, supra note 404. The assumption here is that the distribution
of crime commission between males and females is the same in the military and civilian
populations. That assumption may or may not be correct.
410. The founded investigation numbers reported by the four military services should
cover very close to all of the murder/nn.m, rape, and aggravated assault committed by
active duty military personnel. Such crimes would either be investigated by military au-
thorities or, even if handled through civilian channels, would come to the attention of
military authorities by formal notification by the civilian agency or, in cases where no
formal notification occurred, by the absence of the service member if he is placed under
arrest (as presumably would occur for the serious crimes here examined). Interview with
Wilbur L. Hardy, supra note 399; Interview with personnel at the Navy Criminal Investi.
gative Service, supra note 399.
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The basic linear regression model has annual ratios for four
types of crime under consideration as a dependent variable and
three dummy variables as predictors: murder/nn.m, aggravated
assault, and other-violent-crime. The reference category is rape.
This model is estimated separately for each one of the four
military services.
The data used in the analysis are pooled panel data. For that
reason, to safeguard against potential autocorrelation across years,
employ the SAS Autoreg procedure. Because in all but one4 ' of
the estimated models the autocorrelation has been negligible, uti-
lize the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators for the regression
coefficients in the analysis.
411. The one exception has been the analysis for the Marine Corps when excluding
the observations for 1987. Crime ratios for the Marine Corps in 1987 are strikingly dif-
ferent from the data for other years. Thus, an additional analysis was required to evalu-
ate the effect of this series of influential cases. After elimination of the 1987 observa-
tions, the autocorrelation became pronounced enough to warrant reference to the maxi-
mum likelihood estimators rather than OLS ones.
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APPENDIX B
TABLE IV
MILITARY RATES OF MURDERNN.M, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT,
OTHER-VIOLENT-CRIME INDEX, ROBBERY, AND RAPE
AS PROPORTIONS OF U.S. MALE CIVILIAN RATES
1987-1992
(controlling for age)
1987-1992 on Yearly Average412
Army Navy Marine Air Force
I [_ Corps
Murder/nn.m .20 .07 .13 .05
Aggravated .18 .04 .04 .02
Assault
Other-Violent- .19 .04 .05 .02
Crime Index
4 13
Robbery .02 .009 .02 .003
Rape .47 .19 .27 .20
412. Any discrepancies between yearly rates and average rates are due to rounding.
413. Index combining murder/nn.m and aggravated assault.
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1987
Army Navy Marine Air Force
I Corps
Murder/nn.m .25 .02 .05 .11
Aggravated .15 .04 .08 .02
Assault
Other-Violent- .16 .04 .08 .02
Crime Index
Robbery .03 .008 .01 .003
Rape .45 .13 .22 .17
1988
Army Navy Marine Air Force
I Corps
Murder/nn.m .19 .10 .15 .08
Aggravated .18 .03 .04 .02
Assault
Other-Violent- .18 .03 .04 .02
Crime Index
Robbery .02 .008 .01 .003
Rape .50 .18 .30 .22
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1989
Army Navy Marine Air Force
I Corps
Murder/nn.m .18 .11 .27 .06
Aggravated .24 .03 .05 .02
Assault
Other-Violent- .24 .03 .05 .02
Crime Index
Robbery .02 .01 .03 .003
Rape .46 .17 .23 .20
1990
Army Navy Marine Air ForceCorps
Murder/nn.m .18 .12 .16 .08
Aggravated .18 .04 .04 .02
Assault
Other-Violent- .18 .05 .05 .02
Crime Index
Robbery .01 .009 .03 .002
Rape .44 .25 .32 .20
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1991
Army Navy Marine Air Force
Corps
Murder/nn.m .23 .09 .20 .09
Aggravated .18 .04 .04 .02
Assault
Other-Violent- .18 .04 .04 .02
Crime Index
Robbery .02 .01 .01 .002
Rape .47 .22 .25 .22
1992
Army Navy Marine Air Force
Corps
Murder/nn.m .17 .09 .18 .01
Aggravated .17 .04 .04 .02
Assault
Other-Violent- .17 .05 .04 .02
Crime Index
Robbery .01 .01 .03 .002
Rape .51 .25 .34 .23
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APPENDIX C
METHODOLOGY FOR COMPARING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
CRIME RATES FOR JUNE 1944 THROUGH MAY 1945
The following methodology was used to compare male military
and civilian crime rates while controlling for age.
For each month,
1) Divide the total population base of the Uniform Crime
Reports (UCR) "Monthly Variations, Offenses Known to the Po-
lice" table414 by the total U.S. civilian population 15 to obtain
the percentage of the U.S. civilian population included in the UCR
offenses-known population.4 6
414. UCR 1945, supra note 59, at 89; UCR 1944, supra note 59, at 66.
415. For total U.S. civilian population data, see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, P12-98, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Table 2: Civilian Popula-
tion-Estimates by Age, Color, and Sex: 1940-1950 (Aug. 13, 1954).
The U.S. civilian population, as opposed to the U.S. resident population (which
includes U.S. troops stationed in the United States), is used as the demographic base for
UCR analysis throughout this study. For discussion of the ramifications of using the civil-
ian demographic base, see supra note 399. For a discussion of the preferability of using
civilian rather than resident population data for studying crime during World War II
specifically, see Darrell J. Steffensmeier et al., World War 11 and Its Effect on the Sex
Differential in Arrests: An Empirical Test of the Sex-Role Equality and Crime Proposition,
21 SOC. Q. 403, 407 (1980).
416. Until 1958, the UCR used the population statistics of the decennial census, unad-
justed for population growth, throughout each decade between decennial censuses. See
Marvin E. Wolfgang, Uniform Crime Reports: A Critical Appraisal, 111 U. PA. L REV.
708, 725 (1963). Thus, throughout the 1940s, the UCR used the population statistics from
the 1940 census, unadjusted for population growth. Ordinarily, the result of that practice
would be to create an artificial appearance of rising crime rates throughout the decade.
This would occur because as an actually growing population produced higher numbers of
crimes, that crime number would be transformed into a crime "rate" by dividing the
number by a population figure that was inaccurately low-and became more inaccurately
low each successive year after 1940.
However, during the period 1944-45, the normal population growth of the civilian
population was approximately counterbalanced by the induction of personnel into the
WWII military force. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra
note 416. Thus, as it happens, the total civilian population base on which the 1944 and
1945 data are based may be relied upon as relatively accurate. The population changes in
the U.S. civilian population from 1940 to 1944-45 were not changes in total population
but changes in age and gender distribution of that population. Those changes are, of
course, accounted for in the age and gender controls used in the present study.
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2) A) Create age groupings as follows. The first age group
includes ages 18-19.! 17 The rest of the age groups represent five-
year increments for age groups 20 through 49 and then end with
age group 50 (to be consistent with UCR data groupings).
B) Multiply the total number of males418 in each age
group in the U.S. civilian population419 by the percentage of ci-
vilian population included in the UCR offenses-known population
(obtained in step one) to identify the number of males in each age
group in the UCR offenses-known population.
3) Identify the percentage of arrestees for the crime in ques-
tion that year that were males.4'
4) List the number of arrests for that crime for the year in
each age group.42'
417. During the World War II period, there was in fact a small number of troops sta-
tioned abroad who were under the age of 18. The available data indicates only that they
were over 14 and under 18 years old, but we may assume that they were more likely
than not close to 18. Because the age groupings in the census data for the World War II
period do not permit an age grouping for 17 year olds only, and because a 15-17-year-
old age range would be unworkable for attributing crime rates to this group (violent
crime rates increase exponentially within the 15-17-year-old age range), the present study
places these "under-age soldiers," for purposes of statistical analysis, in the 18-19 age
group.
418. Males constituted approximately 99.3% of U.S. military personnel abroad during
the World War II period studied. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, supra note 416; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, P-25, Table 3: Total Population Including Armed Forces
Abroad-Estimates by Age, Color and Sex, 1940-1950 (Aug. 13, 1954). In addition, males
committed virtually all rapes, see UCR 1945, supra note 59, at 113; UCR 1944, supra
note 59, at 91, as well as the great majority of murder/nn.m's, aggravated assaults, and
robberies. See UCR 1944-45, supra. For those reasons, the important group to examine
in attempting to compare the rape incidence of military and civilian populations in
1944-45 is the male component of those populations.
419. For age distributions of civilian males, 1944 and 1945, see BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 416.
420. For arrest data by sex, see UCR 1945, supra note 59, at 113; UCR 1944, supra
note 59, at 91. UCR arrest data for this period do not provide separate figures for ag-
gravated assault and other assault. See UCR 1944-45, supra. Therefore, the combined
"assault" category data must be used to approximate the sex distribution of arrestees for
aggravated assault. Similarly, because UCR arrest data for this period do not provide
separate figures for murder/nn.m and negligent manslaughter, see id., the combined "crim-
inal homicide" category data must be used to approximate the sex distribution of
arrestees for murder/nn.m.
421. For arrest data by age group, see UCR 1945, supra note 59, at 117; UCR 1944,
supra note 59, at 96. Because UCR arrest data for this period do not provide separate
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5) Multiply the number of arrests for that crime for the year
for each age group (obtained in step 4) by the percentage of male
arrestees for that crime for the year (obtained in step 3) to esti-
mate the number of arrests of males in each age group for that
crime for the year.
6) Divide that number of arrests of males in each age group
(obtained in step 5) by the total number of arrests for that crime
for the year4' to obtain the percentage of arrests for that crime
for the year that were arrests of males in each age group.
7) A) Multiply the average daily number of offenses known
for the crime in question for the month4 by the number of days
in the month to obtain the monthly number of offenses
known.42 4
B) For rape, multiply the monthly number of offenses
known by the percentage of all rapes for the year that were forc-
ible4' (i.e., to exclude statutory rapes, which are not included in
the ETO rape figures4Z).
8) Multiply that monthly number of offenses known for the
crime in question (obtained in step 7) by the percentage of offens-
figures for aggravated assault and other assault, see UCR 1944-45, supra, the combined
"assault" category data must be used to approximate the age distribution of arrestees for
aggravated assault. Similarly, because UCR arrest data for this period do not provide
separate figures for murder/nn.m and negligent manslaughter, see id., the combined "crim-
inal homicide" category data must be used to approximate the age distribution of
arrestees for murder/nn.m.
422. For total arrest numbers, see UCR 1945, supra note 59, at 117; UCR 1944, supra
note 59, at 96.
423. For average daily offenses known data, see UCR 1945, supra note 59, at 89;
UCR 1944, supra note 59, at 66.
424. The UCR monthly offenses known figures are based only on data collected from
cities over 25,000 in population. Those cities have higher violent crime rates than smaller
towns or rural areas. Compare, e.g., UCR 1945, supra note 59, at 5 (crime rates of cities
and towns of various sizes) with id. at 28 (crime rates of rural areas). For that reason,
crime rate estimates based on UCR monthly offenses-known figures somewhat overes-
timate actual national crime rates. This factor may cause the civilian crime rates estimates
in the present study to be somewhat in excess of actual national civilian crime rates.
Because the difference between urban and rural rates is particularly marked for aggravat-
ed assault, the overestimation of that crime may be greatest.
425. For number of forcible and statutory rapes for both 1944 and 1945, see UCR
1945, supra note 59, at 103.
426. See Office of the Judge Advocate Gen., supra note 47, at 251, 254.
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es completed for that crime to obtain the monthly number of com-
pleted offenses known for the crime in question.4'
9) A) Multiply that monthly number of completed offenses
known for the crime in question (obtained in step 8) by the per-
centage of offenses cleared4 for the crime in question429 to es-
timate the monthly number of offenses cleared for the crime in
question.
B) Multiply that monthly number of offenses cleared for
the crime in question by the percentage of arrests for the crime
for the year that were arrests of males in each age group (ob-
tained in step 6) to estimate the monthly number of completed
offenses cleared for males in each age group.
10) Divide that monthly number of completed offenses cleared
for males in each age group (obtained in step 9) by the number of
males in the UCR population in that age group to obtain the
civilian monthly rate of completed offenses cleared per person in
each age group.
11) Identify the percentage of male personnel in the military
population430 that are in each age group out of the total male
427. Because the ETO crime statistics do not include attempts in the numbers of
crimes investigated, see A MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY, I 152(c), at 190
(1943) (defining crimes to exclude attempts), other than in the case of aggravated assault,
see id. 149(1) (defining crime of "assault with intent to commit any felony" to include
attempts), the UCR data must be adjusted to exclude attempted crimes other than aggra-
vated assault
For murder/nn.m, completed crimes by definition equal 100% of UCR offenses
known. The UCR excludes attempted killings from the murder/nn.m category. See UCR
1945, supra note 59, at 120; UCR 1944, supra note 59, at 101.
For rape, the proportion of attempts to completed crimes for each year has been
published in the UCR only since 1964. For that reason, an estimate of the percentage of
all rapes that are completed is drawn by averaging the completed rape percentages for
the five years between 1964-68. That average percentage (approximately 66%) is then
used as an estimate of the percentage of rapes completed in 1944 and 1945.
428. An offense is "cleared" by arrest or exceptional means. An offense is cleared by
exceptional means when the offender has been identified and there is sufficient informa-
tion to support an arrest and charge, but the offender cannot be arrested because of
some circumstance outside the control of the law enforcement agency. See FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 407, at 42.
429. For clearance rate data, see FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, 1946 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 54 (Total Groups I-VI) (citing 1945 data);
UCR 1945, supra note 59, at 40 (Total Groups I-VI) (citing 1944 data).
430. The military population used for age distribution of males includes all U.S.
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military population. Multiply that percentage by 1,000 to identify
the number of males in each age group that would exist in a mod-
el population of 100,000 males with the age distribution of the
military population.
12) Multiply the civilian monthly completed-offenses-cleared
rate per person for each age group (obtained in step 10) by the
number of males in that age group in the model population to
produce a number of offenses cleared for that crime that would be
produced by that age group in the model population, i.e., in a
population of males with the age distribution of the military popu-
lation and with the crime rate structure of the civilian population.
13) Add up the number of offenses cleared for each age
group in the model population to obtain the total number of of-
fenses cleared in the model population. That total is the rate of
offenses cleared for the (completed) crime in question per 100,000
population that would be expected in a male population with the
age structure of the military population and the crime rate struc-
ture of the civilian population.
14) A) For aggravated assault, adjust the ETO assault-with-a-
dangerous-weapon numbers as follows.431 Divide (the number of
ETO courts martial for assault with a dangerous weapon plus the
number of ETO courts martial for assault with intent to do mur-
der or manslaughter) by the number of ETO courts martial for
assault with a dangerous weapon.432 Now multiply the resulting
percentage (113%) 43' by the number of ETO investigations for
Armed Forces Abroad, not just Army personnel in the ETO. Separate age distribution
data on the Army in the ETO are not available. See MACHINE RECORDS BRANCH, WAR
DEP'T GENERAL STAFF, STRENGTH OF THE ARMY (monthly reports August 1944-May
1945) [hereinafter STRENGTH OF THE ARMY].
431. The available ETO assault investigations data reflect only assault with a danger-
ous weapon. See 1944 SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 41. The ETO data thus ex-
clude assaults with intent to do murder or to do manslaughter, which should be included
to create a category comparable to UCR aggravated assault. Therefore, the assault with a
dangerous weapon numbers must be adjusted to include an estimated number of assaults
with intent to do murder or to do manslaughter in order to produce a figure represent-
ing a category comparable to the UCR aggravated assault category.
432. For courts martial numbers, see THE GENERAL BOARD, U.S. FORCES, EUROPE-
AN THEATER, MILITARY JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN THEATER OF OPERATIONS 23
(UA 25 U586 no. 83).
433. In the ETO from late 1942 until May 1945, there were 687 courts martial for
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assault with a dangerous weapon to estimate the total number of
ETO investigations for aggravated assault.
B) Divide the expected offenses cleared rate per 100,000
model population (obtained in step 13) by the actual investigation
rate' for the ETO,435 for the crime in question (obtained, for
assault with a dangerous weapon, and 90 courts martial for assault with intent to do
murder or manslaughter. See id. Thus, the number of courts martial for assault with
intent to do murder or manslaughter was approximately 13% of the number of courts
martial for assault with a dangerous weapon. Therefore, the total number of (courts mar-
tial for assault with a dangerous weapon plus courts martial for assault with intent to do
murder or manslaughter) is approximately 113% of the number of courts martial for
assault with a dangerous weapon.
434. For the ETO, the available data measures "personnel investigated" rather than
"investigations conducted." See 1944 SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 41. This means
that the ETO measure (of subjects) differs from the UCR measure (of offenses cleared).
This difference in measures results in two types of error in rate comparisons. First, if
three individuals commit a crime together and are then identified as the offenders, that
counts as one UCR "offense cleared" and as three ETO "personnel investigated." This
error would cause the ETO count to be inflated relative to the UCR count. The second
error factor cuts in the opposite direction. If one individual is identified as the offender
for killing three people, that counts as one ETO "personnel investigated" and as three
UCR "offenses cleared." Because we do not know the magnitude of these two error
factors for any crime category, we cannot know whether or to what extent they cancel
each other out. In addition, it should be noted that comparing ETO "personnel inves-
tigated" with UCR "offenses cleared" may somewhat inflate the ETO rates relative to
UCR rates insofar as some proportion of ETO "personnel investigated" may be exonerat-
ed prior to arrest.
435. These ETO investigation rates are derived by using continental ETO troop
strength numbers, see STRENGTH OF THE ARMY, supra note 431, together with numbers
of ETO personnel investigated for the crimes in question as recorded in reports from the
Office of the Theater Provost Marshal, ETO. See 1944 SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 41 (citing 1944 data); European Theatre of Operation Historical Division, Dep't of
War, supra note 45 (citing 1945 data).
Women's contribution to ETO violent crime rates was negligible. Females constitut-
ed only .06% of the U.S. armed forces abroad in 1944-45, see STRENGTH OF THE ARMY,
supra, and women commit far less violent crime than men per person. See, e.g., supra
notes 400 and 419. For that reason, no adjustment is made here to exclude female
crime from the ETO crime rates.
Because continental ETO troop strength data were not available for December
1944, continental ETO troop strength for that month was estimated as an average of the
troop strengths for November 1944 and January 1945.
Data on nonnegligent manslaughter was available only for the 1944 months. The
nonnegligent manslaughter numbers for the ETO from January to May 1945 have there-
fore been estimated by establishing that, during the 1944 months, the number of
nonnegligent manslaughters in the ETO had been 84% the number of murders, and then
estimating that, for each of the 1945 months, the number of nonnegligent manslaughters
was 84% of the of the number of murders.
The ETO definitions for the crimes examined were essentially consistent with the
UCR definitions used at the time except for the ETO rape definition's exclusion of statu-
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
aggravated assault, in step 14A) to obtain the ratio of "expected
rates" (i.e., civilian male rates adjusted for age) to actual rates
(i.e., Army male rates).
15) It is not possible to test the statistical significance of the
difference between diminution factors for different crimes for the
WWII period because each month's data must be analyzed sepa-
rately (pooled data covering the ten-month period would not be
meaningful),4 6 and there is only one observation for each month.
tory and attempted rape, which has been adjusted for in the present study, and the ETO
data's inclusion of assault with a deadly weapon but not assault with intent to kill, which
also has been adjusted for in the present study.
Consistent with UCR practice, the ETO reports recorded only the most serious
crime occurring in any criminal episode (e.g., if a murder, robbery, and rape occurred in
one episode, only the murder would be recorded). See FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY,
REPORT OF OPERATIONS, 1 AUGUST 1944-22 FEBRUARY 1945, ANNEx 12, PROVOST
MARSHAL SECnION REPORT 237 (1945).
436. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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TABLE V
ETO RATES OF MURDERINN.M, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, AND
RAPE AS A PROPORTION OF U.S. MALE CIVILIAN RATES
AUGUST 1944-MAY 1945
(controlling for age)
Murder/nn.m Aggravated Rape
Assault
August .62 .21 2.86
September .32 .15 2.33
October .79 .27 1.02
November .48 .14 .60
December .75 .11 .48
January .83 .11 .24
February .35 .17 .36
March .56 .27 3.85
April 1.54 .27 4.76
May .96 .26 2.38
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